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in mathematics. In Study 1 (N = 210), I found using hypothetical vignettes that 
perceptions of task-elicited effort (i.e., effort that arises due to the subjective difficulty or 
ease of the task) led to perceptions of an inverse relation between one’s effort and ability, 
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ability, consistent with my hypotheses and prior research. In Study 2 (N = 160), 
participants completed an academic task and I used open-ended questions to manipulate 
their perceptions of effort source. I found that participants in the task-elicited condition 
endorsed no overall relation between effort and ability, and participants in the self-
initiated condition endorsed an overall inverse relation, which is inconsistent with my 
hypotheses and prior research. Possible explanations for the findings, as well as broader 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Statement of Problem 
 In school settings, students often make assessments about their academic competence. 
They ask themselves questions such as: Am I good at math? How good am I compared to the 
best student in the class? Can I succeed on this upcoming test or assignment? Overall, how smart 
am I in school? In general, students of all ages who are confident in their own academic abilities 
tend to utilize effective self-regulatory strategies, set high goals and aspirations, exhibit 
persistence in the face of difficulty, and perform well on tests of achievement or learning (e.g., 
Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Bouffard-Bouchard, Parent, & Larivee, 1991; Pajares, 1996a). 
Students are also more likely to value, be interested in, and choose to take classes in the fields or 
domains they feel competent in (e.g., Dennissen, Zarret, & Eccles, 2007; Durik, Vida, & Eccles, 
2006; Simpkins, Davis-Kean, & Eccles, 2006). College students’ beliefs about their abilities are 
particularly important, as they are predictive of their adjustment to college, choice of major, 
grades, retention, and career prospects (e.g., Chemers et al., 2001; Lent et al., 1986; Robbins et 
al., 2004; Zajacova et al., 2005).  
Given that students’ evaluations of their abilities are associated with critical school-
related outcomes, it is important to investigate how these evaluations are formed and what 
influences these evaluations. Previous research suggests that a useful indicator of one’s academic 
ability is the amount of effort one exerts on academic tasks, and that high effort can be 
interpreted as an indicator of either high or low ability (e.g., Harari & Covington, 1981; Kun, 
1977; Nicholls, 1978). Thus, individuals can either conceive of a positive relation between levels 
of effort and ability, or an inverse relation between levels of effort and ability. Two researchers, 
John Nicholls (1978, 1984) and Carol Dweck (1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988), developed 
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different theories of how individuals form ability evaluations of themselves and others based on 
effort information, and in what circumstances individuals may conceive of a positive or an 
inverse relation between levels of effort and ability. 
As will be described in more detail below, while Nicholls (1984) argued that 
developmental and situational forces change whether one conceptualizes ability as 
“differentiated” or “undifferentiated” from effort, Dweck (1999) argued that individuals’ beliefs 
about the nature of intellectual ability—specifically, whether they believe it is a fixed capacity or 
something that can be improved with practice—can influence whether they conceive of a 
positive or inverse relation between amount of effort and ability. However, both theorists 
primarily emphasized the importance of ability beliefs or conceptions in predicting how 
individuals will conceive of the relation between amount of effort and ability in a given 
achievement situation. 
Less research has examined aspects of effort that may influence how individuals relate 
the amount of effort they exert to evaluations of their own ability. In the present dissertation 
studies, I examined one aspect of effort that previous research has not examined extensively: The 
perceived source of one’s effort. As will be discussed in more detail later, I propose that the 
effort that individuals exert can be perceived as arising primarily from either external or internal 
sources. Individuals who perceive their own or another’s effort as externally driven by their 
perceptions of the task at hand—which I refer to as task-elicited effort—will be likely to endorse 
an inverse relation between amount of effort and ability. Conversely, individuals who perceive 
their own or another’s effort as internally driven by the individual’s own motivation—which I 
refer to as self-initiated effort—will likely endorse a positive relation between amount of effort 
and ability. As will be discussed later, there are important broader motivational implications of 
 3 
perceiving one’s effort as either task-elicited or self-initiated, and the implications of effort 
source for motivation are a main focus of the studies proposed here. 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Two theoretical frameworks underlie the different foci of the proposed studies. First, I 
utilized premises from social comparison theory as a rationale for examining both how students 
evaluate their own abilities as well as how they evaluate other students’ abilities with respect to 
different sources of effort. Researchers studying social comparison have found that students use 
information about other students when forming their self-evaluations, and that students often 
tend to choose to compare themselves with similar others (e.g., Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & 
Kuyper, 1999; Wheeler, 1966; Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982). Thus, in the proposed 
dissertation studies I examinined how students’ perceptions of the source of effort influenced 
their ability evaluations of themselves as compared to others. 
Second, because the central purpose of the proposed dissertation studies was to examine 
students’ perceptions of the relation between levels of effort and ability, classic attribution theory 
provided the overarching theoretical framework (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986). Weiner (1986), 
one of the original attribution theorists, identified effort and ability as two of the main things 
students use to explain their successes or failures to in school. Nicholls (1978, 1984) and Dweck 
(1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) attempted to explain how individuals form evaluations of ability 
based on information about effort, and so their extensions of attribution theory are important 
parts of this overarching theoretical framework. 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Nicholls (1978) suggested that children go 
through developmental levels in their understanding of effort and ability, eventually reaching the 
conclusion around 10-13 years of age that effort and ability are distinct constructs that are 
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inversely related to one another. That is, in many cases, a person with high ability can exert less 
effort than a person with low ability and still achieve the same outcome. For example, if Sarah 
finishes a puzzle with less effort than Emily, Sarah likely has a higher level of puzzle-solving 
ability than Emily. However, he argued that just because older children and adults are able to 
conceptualize an inverse relation between amount of effort and ability does not mean that they 
do so across all situations and contexts (Nicholls, 1984). He argued that in academic contexts 
focused on competition and social comparison (what he called ego-involving situations), 
individuals are likely to conceptualize ability as “differentiated” from effort and, thus, to 
conceive of an inverse relation between levels of effort and ability. Conversely, in academic 
contexts that are focused on one’s own learning and growth (what he called task-involving 
situations), individuals are likely to conceptualize ability as “undifferentiated” from effort and, 
thus, to conceive of a positive relation between levels of effort and ability. Thus for Nicholls both 
developmental and situational factors impact individuals’ thinking about effort and ability. 
Carol Dweck (1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) also posited that individuals could 
conceive of a positive or inverse relation between the quantity of effort and ability. However, she 
suggested that the main determining factor in individuals’ thinking about this relation was 
differences in their stable lay conceptions of ability rather than more transient situational factors 
such as the achievement context. While some individuals hold a lay conception of ability as a set 
of malleable skills or competencies that can improve with effort and practice, others view ability 
as a stable, fixed entity that cannot improve over time. From the former perspective, individuals 
would be likely to view the quantity of effort and ability as positively related; from the latter 
perspective they would be likely to view the quantity of effort and ability as inversely related. 
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Although both theories provide compelling reasons for why differences exist in 
individuals’ perceptions of how the quantity of effort relates to ability, neither adequately 
predicts how individuals will perceive this relation across a broad range of achievement 
situations. For example, Nicholls (1984) suggested that in competitive situations, all mature 
individuals will adopt the differentiated conception of ability and thus perceive the quantity of 
effort and ability as inversely related. But, there seem to be cases in which some people view 
effort and ability as positively related even within ego-involved situations (e.g., Hong, Chiu, 
Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; see further discussion of this study in Chapter 2). Similarly, Dweck 
(1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) posited that a significant proportion of individuals conceive of 
ability as malleable (i.e., incremental theorists) and that these people will generally perceive the 
quantity of effort and ability to be positively related. However, in certain achievement scenarios, 
such as when individuals are evaluating the abilities of two students who exert different levels of 
effort but receive the same grade, it appears that nearly every mature individual perceives effort 
and ability to be inversely related (e.g., Nicholls, 1978).  
One potential reason why Nicholls (1984) and Dweck’s (1999) theories may not fully 
predict how individuals perceive the relation between quantity of effort and ability across 
contexts may be that they both focus on how individuals’ conceptions of ability (i.e., as 
differentiated vs. undifferentiated or fixed vs. malleable) influence their perceptions of the effort-
ability relation, without focusing on aspects of effort, such as individuals’ perceptions of the 
source of effort. Perhaps taking into account this additional information would allow for a more 
complete understanding of what influences how individuals think about relation between levels 
of effort and ability. 
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As noted earlier, I propose that effort can be construed as arising from two different 
sources: the perceived difficulty or ease the task itself (i.e., task-elicited effort), or the 
individual’s own motivation (i.e., self-initiated effort). If people perceive that their effort on a 
particular task is primarily elicited by the properties of the task (i.e., was task-elicited), they 
might conceive of ability as an innate capacity and thus endorse an inverse relation between the 
quantity of effort and their ability. That is, the harder they must to work to complete a task, the 
lower their ability. On the other hand, if people primarily perceive that they put forth effort 
willingly because they are motivated (i.e., effort was self-initiated), they might conceive of 
ability as a set of skills or competencies and thus endorse a positive relation between levels of 
effort and ability. That is, the harder they choose to work to complete a task, the higher their 
ability is. This is because exerting a lot of effort on an academic task would be interpreted as a 
sign that they are highly motivated to increase their abilities. Thus, it might be important to 
consider how someone perceives the source of their own (or another person’s) effort in order to 
understand the ways in which that person relates quantity of effort and ability in an achievement 
scenario. 
My definitions of and hypotheses about these two sources of effort were inspired by work 
in cognitive psychology conducted by Koriat, Ma’ayan, and Nussinson (2006). Koriat et al. 
(2006) identified two different types of regulation that individuals use when completing 
academic tasks, which they called data-driven and goal-driven regulation. In a series of studies 
reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2, undergraduate participants completed word memorization 
tasks under different timed learning conditions. The researchers then examined the correlation 
between the amount of time participants spent on each word and their evaluation of how well 
they memorized that word. Data-driven regulation, which was used when participants completed 
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the tasks under no time pressure, was characterized by a negative correlation between time spent 
on each word and participants’ judgments of how much they had learned (i.e., judgments of 
learning; JOLs). This suggests that participants were using effort as an indicator of how much 
they had learned; spending more time on a particular word meant the participants believed they 
were less likely to recall that word later. Goal-driven regulation, which was used when 
participants completed the tasks under time pressure, was characterized by a positive correlation 
between time spent on each word and participants’ JOLs. In these cases, Koriat el al. (2006) 
suggested that participants targeted their effort to do well on the words they thought they could 
learn; thus effort was used a tool to improve their performance. In sum, these studies suggest that 
there is a qualitative component to effort that is not discussed in either Nicholls’ (1984) or 
Dweck’s (1999) theories. Importantly, however, Koriat et al. (2006) did not examine how these 
different types of effort influenced participants’ evaluations of ability more generally, but instead 
focused on their specific judgments of learning for specific words. In the present dissertation 
studies, I directly examined how individuals’ perceptions of the source of their own or others’ 
effort impacted their self-evaluations of ability. Because my focus was slightly different than 
Koriat et al.’s (2006), I decided to use the terms task-elicited effort instead of data-driven effort, 
and self-initiated effort instead of goal-driven effort, in order to distinguish my work from theirs. 
Although only one known study has directly examined task-elicited and self-initiated 
effort (Muenks, Miele, & Wigfield, in press, discussed more below), Gail Heyman and her 
colleagues (Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 2003; Heyman & Compton, 2006) found that when young 
children were told that a hypothetical character thought a task was difficult or easy, they were 
more likely to endorse an inverse relation between amount of effort and ability than when they 
were told that a hypothetical character simply worked hard or did not work hard. These studies 
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suggest that certain effort cues may impact how children conceive of the relation between 
amount of effort and ability. However, there is some disagreement in the literature as to whether 
young children are able to fully understand and differentiate between concepts of effort and 
ability (Nicholls, 1978; Karabenick & Heller, 1976; Surber, 1980; Harari & Covington, 1981) 
and so it is difficult to form any strong interpretation of these results. 
In order to address these developmental concerns and examine task-elicited and self-
initiated effort more directly, Muenks et al. (in press) gave undergraduate students hypothetical 
vignettes in which characters’ effort was described as task-elicited or self-initiated. They also 
varied the levels of effort the characters exerted and examined participants’ ability evaluations of 
those characters. Muenks et al. (in press) found that, in the absence of explicit performance 
information, participants who were given task-elicited effort cues (e.g., about ease/difficulty of 
the task being completed) were likely to endorse an inverse relation between amount of effort 
and ability, whereas participants who were given self-initiated effort cues (e.g., about 
motivation/lack of motivation to engage in a task) were likely to endorse a positive relation 
between amount of effort and ability. Muenks et al. (in press) therefore found evidence that 
changing the way that effort source is described can change whether students view high effort as 
an indicator of low ability or not. Although these studies suggest that students’ perceptions of 
effort source influence their thinking about the relation between levels of effort and ability, these 
studies focused on students’ evaluations of others, and did not connect these evaluations to 
students’ own evaluations of themselves. 
Purpose of the Proposed Studies and Hypotheses 
 The purpose of the proposed studies was to examine whether college students’ 
perceptions of the source of their own effort (i.e., whether it is task-elicited or self-initiated) 
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influence their ability evaluations of themselves as compared to another student, given the 
amount of effort they exert on a task relative to the other student. I examined this by utilizing a 
vignette methodology (Study 1), and having participants actually complete an academic task 
(Study 2). These studies extended those conducted by Muenks et al. (in press), which only 
examined students’ evaluations of other students, and provided crucial new information 
regarding individuals’ self-evaluations of ability. 
My hypotheses are as follows: 
1. When college students perceive their own effort as task-elicited, that is, arising from 
the demands of the task itself (i.e., ease or difficulty), they will evaluate their own 
ability lower than another person when they exert more effort than that person, and 
higher than another person when they exert less effort than that person. Specifically, 
in Study 1, I expect to find that participants in the task-elicited, low effort condition 
will increase their ability evaluations from the first to the second evaluation (i.e., once 
they receive effort source information), whereas participants in the task-elicited, high 
effort condition will decrease their ability evaluations from the first to the second 
evaluation. I expect that the average difference score between the high effort 
condition and the low effort condition will be significantly negative, suggesting an 
inverse relation between effort and ability. In Study 2, I expect that participants in the 
task-elicited high effort condition will evaluate their own ability (as compared to the 
other student) lower than participants in the task-elicited low effort condition. 
2. When college students perceive their own effort as self-initiated, that is, arising from 
their own motivation to engage in the task, they will evaluate their own ability higher 
than another person when they exert more effort than that person, and lower than 
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another person when they exert less effort than that person. Specifically, in Study 1, I 
expect to find that participants in the self-initiated, low effort condition will decrease 
their ability evaluations from the first to the second evaluation (i.e., once they receive 
effort source information), whereas participants in the self-initiated, high effort 
condition will increase their ability evaluations from the first to the second 
evaluation. I expect that the average difference score between the high effort 
condition and the low effort condition will be significantly positive, suggesting a 
positive relation between effort and ability. In Study 2, I expect that participants in 
the self-initiated high effort condition will evaluate their own ability (as compared to 
the other student) higher than participants in the self-initiated low effort condition. 
The rationale for these hypotheses is as follows: When one’s effort is perceived as driven by 
external forces such as the subjective difficulty of the task, it is viewed as something that the 
individual must do, and therefore having to exert high levels of effort is an indicator that the 
person lacks ability. Conversely, when one’s effort is perceived as driven by internal forces such 
as the individual’s own motivation, it is viewed as something that the individual chooses to do, 
and therefore exerting high levels of effort is a sign that the person is motivated to increase his or 
her ability. Thus, changing individuals’ perceptions of the source of their own effort may impact 
whether they believe high effort is indicative of low or high ability. 
Contributions 
The proposed dissertation studies added critical new information to the literature on 
college students’ motivation by extending our current knowledge of how students define and 
think about effort as it relates to ability. They made three primary theoretical contributions. First 
and most importantly, although a large body of research has examined how the quantity or 
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amount of individuals’ effort relates to evaluations of their ability, only one known study (e.g., 
Muenks et al., in press) has directly manipulated or measured students’ perceptions of the source 
of their own or another’s effort. Thus, more research is needed in order to determine whether 
effort source is a useful construct that could extend existing theories on students’ thinking about 
effort and ability. Perhaps this aspect of effort, which focuses more on why the effort was exerted 
rather than how much was exerted, will lead to more complete predictions of how one forms 
ability evaluations. The present studies extended extant literature by focusing on an aspect of 
effort that has been rarely explicitly examined in a school-related context before. 
Second, the proposed dissertation studies extended the Heyman studies (Heyman et al., 
2003; Heyman & Compton, 2006) by examining how perceptions of effort source influence 
ability evaluations in college students. Although Heyman and colleagues studied the influence of 
effort cues on the ability evaluations of young children (aged 5-10 years), researchers tend to 
disagree as to how much children of these ages understand about the distinction between 
concepts of effort and ability (e.g., Nicholls, 1978; Karabenick & Heller, 1976; Surber, 1980; 
Harari & Covington, 1981). Thus, it is crucial to study how effort source information impacts 
ability evaluations in college students. With this sample, I can be certain that all participants are 
cognitively mature enough to differentiate between concepts of effort and ability, and can 
understand the inverse relation between the two. Additionally, the Koriat et al. (2006) studies all 
utilized college students as participants. The proposed dissertation studies provided an extension 
of those studies by using a similar sample, but examining how students’ perceptions of effort 
source influence their evaluations of ability, not just their judgments of learning for a specific 
task. 
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Finally, I examined how individuals formed evaluations of their own ability as compared 
to others, given information about the source of effort. Previous studies have either only 
measured participants’ own judgments of learning for a specific task, as in the Koriat studies 
(e.g., Koriat et al., 2006), or participants’ ability evaluations of other individuals (e.g., Heyman 
& Compton, 2006; Muenks et al., in press). The proposed dissertation studies were the first to 
examine how individuals use information about the source of their own effort when evaluating 
their own ability. As discussed above, there is ample research demonstrating that students’ 
evaluations of themselves influence their motivation and achievement-related behavior (e.g., 
Wigfield et al., 2015). It was therefore critical to connect students’ perceptions of effort source to 
their own evaluations of themselves, not just their evaluations of others. 
Although the present studies may not have any direct practical implications, information 
gleaned from these studies can potentially inform future intervention efforts. For example, it is 
possible that some students hold assumptions or perceptions about others’ effort that make them 
feel discouraged in school. Maybe they assume that other students’ lack of effort on school 
assignments is due to those students’ feelings of ease with the task rather than their lack of 
motivation. Students who are working hard may then incorrectly assume that everyone else is 
breezing through the task, while they are struggling, and conclude that they must not be as smart 
as everyone else. Perhaps in certain situations, it is motivationally useful for students to shift the 
way they are thinking about their own and others’ effort. With more research, interventions could 
be formed to help students manage these beliefs and perceptions, with the ultimate goal of 
increasing students’ competence beliefs. 
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Definition of Terms 
 Ability. Defined by Nicholls (1978) as “what a person can do” (p. 800).1 
 Ability evaluation. One’s determination of the quantity of ability present in themselves 
or others. 
 Effort. Energy exerted on a task. “Quantity” or “levels” of effort will refer to the amount 
of effort exerted in a given situation. 
 Perceptions. I will often use the phrase “perceptions of the source of effort.” I 
specifically note that these are subjective interpretations rather than reality. One’s effort is likely 
actually driven by many sources simultaneously, but what I am focused on in these studies is 
what one perceives as the primary source driving their own or another person’s effort. 
 Self-initiated effort. Effort that arises due to one’s internal motivation or lack of 
motivation. The motivation may stem from a number of different factors. 
 Source of effort. What drives one’s effort on a task, specifically whether one’s effort is 
driven by the perceived ease or difficulty of the task (task-elicited effort) or one’s own 
motivation or lack of motivation (self-initiated effort). 
 Task-elicited effort. Effort that is externally driven and is required from a given task for 
a particular individual.  
                                                
1 As will be discussed more in Chapter 2, the definition of ability and its relation to intelligence has been debated in 
the literature (e.g., Nicholls, Patashnick, & Mattetal, 1986; Dweck, 1999), although researchers agree that 
individuals’ definitions of ability can change based on developmental, situational, and individual difference factors. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
As discussed in Chapter 1, students who believe that they are competent in school tend to 
be more motivated and perform better academically than students who do not (Bandura, 1997; 
Wigfield et al., 2015). The present dissertation studies focused on how one particular aspect of 
effort, the perceived source of one’s effort, influenced college students’ evaluations of their own 
ability compared to that of another student. In this chapter I summarize the relevant research 
regarding the important role of social comparison information in students’ self-evaluations and 
what developmental, situational, and individual factors influence how students conceptualize the 
relation between quantity of effort and ability. In this chapter I also describes in detail the 
theoretical framework for and prior work relating to the effort source construct that I examined. 
The chapter is organized as follows: First, I discuss social comparison theory (Festinger, 
1954; Wood, 1989) because as noted in Chapter 1 social comparison processes are important to 
consider when examining how students form evaluations of their own abilities. Second, I discuss 
work on individuals’ beliefs about ability and effort and their interrelations. I begin with 
attribution theory (Weiner, 1972) as it provides the theoretical foundation for Nicholls (1978, 
1984) and Dweck’s (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) work on ability and effort. Third, I discuss 
Nicholls and Dweck’s theories in more detail and review empirical findings that support them. 
Fourth, I discuss more fully what I mean by effort source, and describe two major sources, which 
I call task-elicited and self-initiated effort. I review some empirical evidence for the distinction 
between these two sources and distinguish my view of effort source from that of Koriat et al. 
(2006). Finally, I discuss the contributions my studies will make to the literature. 
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Social Comparison Theory 
In the proposed dissertation studies I examined how perceived effort source influenced 
individuals’ evaluations of their own academic abilities as compared to others. It is therefore 
important to review the literature on social comparison theory briefly. A full review goes beyond 
the scope of the kinds of focused social comparative evaluations relevant to academic ability 
focused on here. 
Social comparison theory originated with Leon Festinger (1954), who attempted to 
provide explanations for why and how individuals evaluate themselves through comparisons 
with others. Although Festinger (1954) made a large number of hypotheses regarding social 
comparison, I will focus on three of his hypotheses here that are particularly relevant to the 
present dissertation studies. First and foremost, he argued that people feel compelled to make 
accurate evaluations of their abilities. Second, he argued that, if individuals are unable to make 
these evaluations using objective information with reference to the physical world (such as 
evaluating their ability to jump across a stream by actually jumping across it), they often use 
other people as a source of information about how well they are doing. For example, if a person 
wanted to evaluate his chess ability, he would likely compare his chess performance with other 
chess players. Third, Festinger hypothesized that in order to make accurate evaluations of their 
abilities in different areas, individuals must compare themselves with other individuals who have 
a similar level of ability. For example, if a sixth-grade student is trying to get an accurate sense 
of her current math ability, she will need to compare herself with similar others, such as other 
sixth-grade students in her math class, rather than first-grade students or college-aged 
mathematics majors. 
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Empirical work generally supports these three hypotheses, although it is important to note 
that most of the work on Festinger’s (1954) original theory was conducted in the 1960s, 70s, and 
80s. More recently, researchers have focused their attention on extensions and elaborations of the 
original theory (e.g., upward/downward social comparisons, Big Fish Little Pond effect, etc.) that 
are not as relevant to the current dissertation studies. I will therefore focus on some of the older 
empirical work that examined the three hypotheses described above. Trope (1982) tested the first 
hypothesis that individuals feel compelled to accurately evaluate their abilities. Middle school-
aged participants were given either straightforward or conflicting results about their performance 
on a mental flexibility task and then asked to a complete a new task that was either diagnostic or 
undiagnostic of their ability. Participants who received conflicting results about their 
performance (and were therefore uncertain about their ability) worked harder on the diagnostic 
task than participants who received straightforward results, which suggests that these participants 
were concerned with accurately evaluating their ability. More recently, researchers have 
suggested that in addition to accurate self-evaluation, individuals have a need for self-
enhancement and self-improvement; however, this research will not be reviewed in detail here 
(see Wheeler & Suls, 2005, for a review). 
In support of the second hypothesis, Scheier and Carver (1983) found that undergraduate 
participants’ self-directed attention during a task (which was experimentally induced with the use 
of a mirrored surface or a live observer) increased participants’ tendencies to seek out 
information about how other undergraduate students performed on the task. Because participants 
were induced to have high levels of self-focus and did not have any objective means to evaluate 
their ability, they sought out information about other participants in order to form their self-
assessments. The third hypothesis, that individuals use similar others as a basis for comparison, 
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has been examined extensively in the literature (see Wood, 1989, for a review). In one study, 
Wheeler (1966) found that undergraduate participants were more likely to choose to compare 
their scores on a personality test (that was used for selection into a desirable or undesirable 
seminar) to similarly ranked others rather than dissimilarly ranked others. Similarly, Wheeler, 
Koestner, and Driver (1982) found that undergraduate participants who completed a task after a 
certain amount of practice chose to compare their performance with other participants who 
engaged in the same amount of practice as they did. More recently, researchers have argued that 
individuals may, in certain contexts, be compelled to compare themselves to higher performing 
individuals (i.e., upward comparisons) or lower performing individuals (i.e., downward 
comparisons), although the relevant literature will not be reviewed in detail here (see Wheeler & 
Suls, 2005). 
As a whole, previous research suggests that individuals are driven to form accurate self-
evaluations in academic contexts, and that they often use similar others as a basis of comparison 
when forming these evaluations. Many of these studies utilized college participants, which 
suggests that social comparison processes are important for this population. However, it is 
important to note that although social comparison processes appear to be important for many 
people, research suggests that there are individual differences in the extent to which individuals 
engage in social comparison (e.g., Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). In the present dissertation studies, 
college participants were asked to make evaluations of their own ability as compared to a similar 
student. They also completed several items that I created based loosely on the Iowa-Netherlands 
Comparison Orientation Measure (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) that measured the extent to which 
they rely on information about others to form their own self-assessments in academic settings. 
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I next discuss the main theories dealing with individuals’ beliefs about their ability that 
provide the overarching theoretical context for the present studies. 
Attribution Theory 
 In order to better understand current research on the perceived relation between effort and 
ability, it is useful to consider the ways in which these concepts were originally articulated by 
attribution theories of motivation. Attribution theorists aim to explain how individuals interpret 
outcomes and events in terms of their causes. The theories stem, in part, from Heider’s (1958) 
theory of naïve analysis of action, which suggests that human beings are like scientists who are 
constantly attempting to determine causal relationships in their world. Heider proposed that 
analyzing others’ actions allows individuals to understand and influence their own and others’ 
behavior and to predict future actions. Attribution theory can be applied to academic contexts by 
explaining how students make sense of academic outcomes, such as receiving a high grade on an 
assignment or failing a test (e.g., Nicholls, 1975; Nicholls, 1976). 
Heider (1958) distinguished between two different conditions of action: “can” and “try.” 
Can is defined as “the relation between the power or ability of the person and the strength of the 
environmental forces” (Heider, 1958, p. 86). He describes can as a function of both ability and 
environmental difficulty, where only those with greater ability (defined as a stable, dispositional 
characteristic) can succeed at more difficult tasks. While can represents what he calls the power 
factor of personal force, try represents the motivational factor. Try, which is similar to effort, 
also includes two elements: intention and exertion. Intention is defined as wishing or wanting to 
do something, while exertion is how hard a person tries to do it. Thus, Heider suggested that 
there is a qualitative aspect to effort (i.e., intention) that is distinct from the quantity of effort one 
puts forth (i.e., exertion). Although Heider argues that intention guides individuals to work 
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toward desired outcomes, exertion is more easily perceived by others and thus more often used 
as a means of determining another’s effort. Heider described exertion as varying directly with the 
difficulty of the task and inversely with the ability of the person. In other words, if the task is 
held constant, the person with less ability will have to exert himself more to succeed. 
Both Kelley (Kelley & Michela, 1980) and Weiner (1986) preserved the notion of an 
inverse relation between effort and ability in their own attribution theories. Weiner, whose theory 
has been particularly influential within educational psychology, discussed four main causes of 
success or failure at academic tasks: ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck (Weiner et al., 1971). 
Out of these four, Weiner and colleagues found that attributions to effort and ability tended to be 
the most salient. Weiner (1986) delineated three dimensions or ways that attributions could vary: 
by locus, stability, and controllability. The most fundamental distinction was internal versus 
external locus (similar to Heider’s [1958] distinction between personal and environmental 
factors). Weiner (1986) described ability and effort as internal factors, as they reside within the 
person, and task difficulty and luck as external factors, as they reside outside of the person. The 
second dimension was stability. Weiner et al. (1971) characterized ability as a stable and 
constant capacity, and effort as variable and unstable. However, later Weiner (1979, 1985) 
distinguished between what he called stable effort (which likely reflects an individual difference 
in how effortful one is in general) and immediate effort (which is more unstable and is brought 
about by the current situation one is in; see also, Graham & Williams, 2009). In the present set of 
studies, when I refer to “effort” I will be focusing on immediate effort as defined by Weiner 
(1979). Weiner (1985) also noted that ability could be perceived as unstable by some individuals. 
The third dimension was controllability, which was defined as whether or not the individual has 
volitional control over the perceived cause. Weiner (1986) described effort as controllable and 
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ability as uncontrollable. Thus, although he recognized that these classifications could vary, 
Weiner (1985, 1986) characterized ability as internal, stable, and uncontrollable, and effort 
(specifically immediate effort) as internal, unstable, and controllable. These characterizations of 
ability and effort suggest that, in an achievement situation, they would be perceived as inversely 
related to each other: because ability is stable and uncontrollable, it appears that it cannot be 
substantially increased with effort. 
I will argue, later in the paper, that there are differences in the way that people perceive 
the source of another’s effort, and these differences can lead to variation in the way that they 
perceive the relation between the amount of effort one exerts and one’s ability. Specifically, I 
propose that, although effort is internal and controllable in the sense that it comes from within 
individuals and individuals have control over how much effort they exert, it can be perceived by 
different individuals as being driven primarily by either the subjective difficulty of the task 
(which is more external and uncontrollable), or one’s own motivation (which is more internal 
and controllable), and that these perceptions may then influence how individuals relate levels of 
effort to ability (e.g., Heyman & Compton, 2006; Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 2003; Muenks, Miele, 
& Wigfield, in press). Thus, in the present studies I sought to extend Weiner’s (1986) attribution 
theory by examining whether individuals’ perceptions of effort in particular situations or 
contexts differed somewhat from the way that Weiner (1986) characterized immediate effort 
along the three dimensions. I am also interested in the extent to which individuals characterize 
ability as either stable/uncontrollable (i.e., inversely related to effort) or unstable/controllable 
(i.e., positively related to effort) based on their perceptions of effort source. 
These attribution theorists provide a theoretical foundation that broadly explains how 
individuals’ causal reasoning influences their motivations and emotions. They also lay the 
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groundwork for the two main theoretical frameworks that link quantity of effort to ability (e.g., 
Nicholls [1978, 1984] and Dweck [1999; Dweck & Master, 2009]) by introducing the idea that 
students’ attributions to effort and ability are motivationally important, describing characteristics 
of these attributions, suggesting that there are both motivational (intention) and quantifiable 
(exertion) components to effort, and by introducing the idea that ability is fixed and that exertion 
is inversely related to the ability of the person. This idea is expanded on in Nicholls’ (1978, 
1984) theory described below. 
Nicholls’ Theory of Ability Conceptions 
 As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, Nicholls’ theory of ability conceptions (Nicholls 1978, 
1984) builds on attribution theory by specifically examining what developmental and situational 
factors influence how individuals think about effort and ability in school-related contexts. He 
defined ability as “what a person can do” (Nicholls, 1978, p. 800) and adopted Heider’s (1958) 
assumption that ability limits the extent to which high levels of effort can increase performance. 
Nicholls’ theory consists of two main components. The first component is primarily 
developmental and explains how children’s reasoning about ability changes over time, while the 
second component is situational and explains why mature individuals might adopt different 
conceptions of ability in different contexts.  
In Nicholls’ (1978) original developmental study, participants ages 5 through 13 were 
shown videos of two eight-year-old children working on math problems at their desks. One child 
in the video spent all of the time looking at the text or writing in the workbook (high effort), 
while the other child spent half of the time working and half of the time doing non-work 
activities, like fiddling with an eraser or looking around the room (low effort). Participants were 
then told either that both children got the same number of answers correct on the math problems 
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(either 2 out of 10 or 10 out of 10), or that the child who worked continuously got a lower score 
(2 out of 10) than the child who worked intermittently (8 out of 10). The participants were then 
asked to determine which child from the video worked harder and which child was cleverer (or 
smarter), and explain their reasoning. The researchers did not give the participants a definition 
for “cleverness” or “smartness” and left it up to the children to define for themselves. 
Based on a qualitative analysis of the data, Nicholls (1978) proposed four levels of 
reasoning about others’ effort and ability. Each level was associated with a qualitatively distinct 
form of reasoning, and each higher level was a more advanced restructuring of the previous 
level. In the first level (age 5-6 years), effort, ability, and outcome were not distinguished from 
each other. Children tended to focus primarily on effort as an indicator of high ability. For 
example, children believed that the character from the video that tried harder was smarter, even 
if they got a lower score. In the second level (age 7-9 years), effort and outcome were 
distinguished as cause and effect (i.e., different levels of effort lead to different outcomes), but 
ability was not acknowledged as a cause of outcome because it was still conflated with effort. 
Thus, children tended to believe the character that got the higher score tried harder and was more 
able. In the third level (age 9-11 years), the distinction between effort and ability was partially 
established; effort was no longer the sole cause of outcomes. However, this reasoning was not 
consistently applied. In the fourth level (age 10-13 years), ability was clearly differentiated from 
effort, and the two were seen as independent causes of outcomes. Furthermore, ability was seen 
as a capacity that could limit or increase the effectiveness of effort. Based on these findings 
Nicholls (1978) suggests that most children go through a series of developmental levels in their 
reasoning about effort and ability and eventually come to the “mature” conclusion that amount of 
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effort and ability have an inverse relation to one another with respect to outcome (e.g., you need 
less of one if you have more of the other in order to reach the same outcome). 
Two central claims to the developmental component of Nicholls’ (1978) theory were 
abstracted: First, young children do not conceptually differentiate between effort and ability, but 
older children and adults do. Second, as children develop they become more sophisticated in the 
way they think about the relation between quantity of effort and ability. Nicholls (1978) 
suggested that this occurs because young children do not yet have the cognitive maturity to 
understand the relation between task difficulty and incentive value (i.e., that succeeding on 
difficult tasks is better than succeeding on easy tasks; also see Nicholls & Miller, 1983). Thus, 
they perceive their attainment less accurately and make attributions less logically than older 
children. Younger children have also not had much experience with repeated success and failure. 
However, as they grow and develop, they begin to understand that exerting high effort can be an 
indication of low ability. 
Both of Nicholls’ (1978) developmental claims have received support from empirical 
studies. First, a number of studies provide support for the idea that young children cannot 
differentiate effort from ability (e.g., Yussen & Kane, 1985; Stipek & Daniels, 1990; Bempechat, 
London, & Dweck, 1991). Stipek and Tannatt (1984) interviewed children in preschool through 
third grade about which students in their class were the best and worst at work- and play-related 
tasks, which were the best and worst thinkers, and which were smartest and least smart. For 
children of all ages, the concepts of effort, ability, and conduct were confounded. Children who 
behaved well in school were seen as putting forth more effort, and those who put forth more 
effort were seen as having higher ability. These results suggest that effort and ability do not 
emerge as distinct concepts until after third grade. In another study, Skinner (1990) gave 509 
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children in grades 1-6 questionnaires measuring their beliefs in the effectiveness of five different 
potential factors on school outcomes, two of which were effort and ability. She then conducted 
exploratory factor analyses and found that the factor structure of children’s means-ends beliefs 
(i.e., the extent to which children believed that these factors would affect school-related 
outcomes) differed by age. At younger ages (7-8 years), effort and ability loaded onto the same 
factor, but the factor structure became more and more differentiated over time, with children 
ages 11-12 being able to fully differentiate effort from ability. She concluded that children’s 
beliefs about effort and ability become more differentiated throughout middle childhood. 
The second claim Nicholls (1978) made in the developmental component of his theory is 
that children begin to reason about quantity of effort and ability in more sophisticated ways once 
they are able to distinguish between the two. Initial support for this claim comes from a study by 
Kun, Parsons, and Ruble (1974) with a sample of children aged 6-11 years and adults. Kun et al. 
(1974) found that an understanding of the multiplicative relation between effort and ability (i.e., 
when combining effort and ability information to predict performance, performance will be zero 
if either effort or ability is zero) emerges around age 10. Six-year-old children used an additive, 
rather than multiplicative model to explain the relation between effort and ability; that is, they 
believed that effort facilitates performance equally regardless of ability. Eight-year-olds were 
somewhere in the middle between an additive model and a multiplicative model, suggesting that 
there is a transitional stage. Thus, these studies provide support for Nicholls’ (1978) claim that 
children go through increasingly advanced developmental stages in their reasoning about the 
relation between quantity of effort and ability as they get older, although Kun et al. (1974) 
framed the developmental stages slightly differently than Nicholls (1978). 
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Further evidence for Nicholls’ (1978) second claim comes from a study by Kun (1977) 
that explored the development of conceptions of effort and ability with respect to explanations 
about success on an academic task. She specified two inference rules that people might use. First, 
people might use a magnitude-covariation schema, which involves understanding that an 
increase in the magnitude of an effect (e.g., success on a task) was preceded by an increase in the 
magnitude of a facilitative cause (e.g., ability or effort). Second, people might use a 
compensation schema, which involves understanding that when an effect is invariant, a change in 
the magnitude of one cause was accompanied by a compensating change in the magnitude of a 
second cause. Kun (1977) distinguished between two types of compensation schemas: A direct 
compensation schema, where the strength of the two causes changes in the same direction (e.g., 
an increase in effort occurs at the same time as an increase in task difficulty), and an inverse 
compensation schema, where the strength of the two causes changes in opposite directions (e.g., 
an increase in ability is counteracted by a decrease in effort). Results from a series of studies 
with elementary school and college students suggested that the magnitude-covariation schema 
develops first, then the direct compensation schema, and finally the inverse compensation 
schema. Together, Kun’s (1977) results suggest that as children get older, they learn to combine 
effort, ability, and outcome information in ways that are consistent with an inverse relation 
between amount of effort and ability. 
A number of subsequent studies have also explored developmental changes in children’s 
reasoning about quantity of effort and ability. A study by Nicholls and Miller (1984) extended 
Nicholls’ (1978) original study by including self-evaluations of effort and ability in addition to 
evaluations of others. Results supported Nicholls’ (1978) claim that a perceived inverse relation 
between quantity of effort and ability (in self and others) emerges around the fifth or sixth grade. 
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Miller (1985) found that older children who have a developed a “mature” conception of ability 
(by Nicholls’ [1978] definition) use self-protective strategies, such as not putting in as much 
effort to a task when they cannot attribute failure at that task to something other than their ability 
(see also Juvonen & Murdock, 1995). This pattern was not found for the younger children, 
suggesting that only the older children understood that high effort was indicative of low ability. 
Graham and Barker (1990) focused on effort and ability attributions that children make in 
response to helping behavior, and found that positive effort-ability correlations were highest for 
the youngest age group and declined over time, eventually becoming negative for the oldest age 
group. 
Droege and Stipek (1993) asked 80 children in kindergarten, third grade, and sixth grade 
to report their perceptions of the stability of others’ academic competence. Results indicated that 
younger children were more optimistic than older children in terms of both the malleability and 
potential for improvement of academic competence. In other words, the older children (sixth 
graders) believed that ability was more fixed and less influenced by effort than the younger 
children (kindergarteners and third graders). This finding suggests that older children are 
beginning to understand that effort and ability can be inversely related (see also Rholes & Ruble, 
1984; Rholes, Blackwell, Jordan, & Walters, 1980; Rholes, Jones, & Wade, 1988). 
 Several additional studies provide support for the idea that the relation between 
perceptions of quantity of effort and ability develop over time, but do not provide support for the 
specific age-related levels as Nicholls (1978) defines them. For example, several studies 
demonstrate that young children can reason about ability and effort earlier than Nicholls (1978) 
proposes (e.g., Karabenick & Heller, 1976; Surber, 1980; Wimmer, Wachter, & Perner, 1982; 
Schunk, 1983). Karabenick and Heller (1976) found that children as young as six tended to 
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attribute lower levels of effort to a character who had higher ability, showing an appreciation for 
the inverse relation between effort and ability. Surber (1980) asked 229 children in grades K-5 
and 113 adults judge the ability, effort, or performance of hypothetical 8-year-old boys in a 
weight lifting contest given ability, effort, and/or performance information. Results indicated that 
judged effort decreased as the level of ability increased for all ages. Even kindergarteners judged 
ability to be an inverse function of effort, though they had more difficulty judging effort as an 
inverse function of ability. 
In another study, Wimmer et al. (1982) asked children ages 4, 6, and 8 to infer effort, 
ability, or outcome level for a single character from information about the other two factors, and 
found that 4-year-olds got over 80% of the causal inferences “correct” (e.g., inferred higher 
ability when the character put forth less effort and the outcome remained the same) for all three 
types of judgments (effort, ability, and outcome), with older children getting even higher 
percentages correct. Another study found that young children could reason about effort and 
ability in mature ways when interpreting feedback from adults. Schunk (1983) found that when 
third grade children were given feedback about their effort and/or ability on a task, they related 
the effort feedback negatively to their ability. These four studies suggest that aspects of the 
developmental shift in reasoning about effort and ability occur earlier than Nicholls’ (1978) 
theory predicts. 
An additional study by Harari and Covington (1981) suggests that an understanding of 
the relation between amount of effort and ability may not occur until later than the theory 
predicts. Specifically, children may not fully understand the inverse relation between effort and 
ability until after the age (11 or 12) originally specified by Nicholls (1978). In this study, 
participants were given hypothetical scenarios about students who had different levels of effort, 
 28 
ability, and outcome. Students in grade 6 endorsed a positive relation between ability and amount 
of effort, students in grade 11 endorsed a negative relation between ability and amount of effort, 
and students in grade 8 were somewhere in the middle. Thus, Harari and Covington concluded 
that “adult-like” beliefs about the relation between quantity of effort, ability, and outcome do not 
occur until at least 13-14 years of age. 
Why is there so much disagreement within the literature as to when developmental shifts 
about the reasoning about effort and ability occur? One possible explanation is that studies 
differed greatly on the methodology they used. Several of the studies that found that very young 
children understand the inverse relation between quantity of effort and ability used specific 
precautions to ensure that the younger children understood the task. For example, Karabenick 
and Heller (1976) gave information verbally to participants in a cascading pattern: they first gave 
participants outcome information and had them make an effort or ability evaluation, then they 
provided effort or ability information and allowed them to change their initial evaluation. This 
way of designing the task would give young children time to think about and process each new 
piece of information individually. Surber (1980) and Wimmer et al. (1982) also used strategies to 
ensure that their participants understood the task, such as interviewing the young children 
individually, using a lot of pictorial or visual imagery, frequently asking the children to describe 
the stimuli in order to check their understanding, and giving additional prompts and help if 
necessary. Perhaps younger children in these studies better understood the tasks and therefore 
were able to perform similarly to the older children in other studies. In addition, there were 
several other factors that could have contributed to differences between studies, including 
domain (academic vs. non-academic), measures (e.g., vignettes, videotapes, more “real-life” 
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scenarios where participants actually completed tasks), and sample (e.g., the samples were fairly 
small overall and were recruited from around the world). 
In summary, the studies described above support Nicholls’ (1978) claim that most 
individuals eventually develop a conception of quantity of effort and ability as inversely related 
to one another with respect to outcome (i.e., when the outcome is held constant, more effort is 
indicative of lower ability). However, it is possible that the shift in the sophistication of 
reasoning about effort and ability may occur earlier or later than Nicholls’ (1978) predictions, 
depending on the context. Although the studies above do not all agree on the specific ages at 
which that these conceptions arise, they do agree that, by adulthood, most people understand and 
can fairly consistently use the inverse compensation rule when evaluating ability based on 
information about the quantity of effort. 
Importantly, just because mature individuals are able to view amount of effort and ability 
as inversely related does not necessarily mean that they will do so in every context. In the second 
component of Nicholls’ (1984) theory, he suggests that there are specific features of achievement 
situations that can change individuals’ conceptions of ability, and thus their perception of the 
relation between quantity of effort and ability. In situations where individuals are seeking to 
demonstrate or assess normative levels of ability and that are typically characterized by an 
emphasis on social comparison and competition (i.e., ego-involved situations), individuals tend 
to employ what Nicholls (1984) calls a “differentiated” conception of ability, where ability is 
seen as a capacity and is judged relative to one’s peers. In these situations, individuals view high 
effort as an indication that one lacks ability, which is consistent with the belief that quantity of 
effort and ability are inversely related to one another: the more effort or time someone needs to 
learn something, the lower their capacity. Therefore, under these conditions, individuals are 
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likely to perceive a negative relation between quantity of effort and ability. However, in 
situations that are focused on increasing mastery or competence, and where there is less of a 
social or external perspective on the self (i.e., task-involved situations), individuals of different 
ages often employ an “undifferentiated” conception of ability, defining ability in terms of 
changes in one’s competence due to effort. In these situations, individuals view the attainment of 
mastery as an end in itself, and thus perceive the relation between amount of effort and ability 
positively: more effort will lead to more learning, and thus, higher ability. 
It is worth noting that this component of Nicholls’ (1984) theory is conceptually similar 
to modern goal orientation theory (see Kaplan & Maehr, 2006, for a review) in that ego-involved 
situations are associated with the goals of outperforming others and exhibiting normative level of 
competence (i.e., performance goals), while task-involved situations are associated with the 
goals of developing one’s knowledge and skills (i.e., mastery or learning goals; Nicholls, 1984). 
However, although a number of studies have linked students’ perceptions of a mastery classroom 
goal structure to the belief that effort is more important than ability for success (e.g., Ames & 
Ames, 1981; Ames & Archer, 1988; Thorkildsen & Nicholls, 1998), no studies that I know of 
have directly examined how classroom goal structures are related to students’ conceptualizations 
of the relation between effort and ability within a particular classroom. 
This second component of Nicholls’ (1984) theory also has empirical support. In a series 
of studies conducted by Jagacinski and Nicholls (1984), college students were asked to imagine 
themselves in a hypothetical task-involved or ego-involved scenario where they put forth either 
high or low effort, and then asked to rate their competence using a single item. Results showed 
that in the ego-involving conditions (e.g., studying Italian in order to become an Italian 
professor, a job with a scarcity of positions available), less effort was associated with higher 
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competence ratings, whereas in task-involving conditions (e.g., studying Italian due to a love of 
the Italian culture and interest in the language), more effort was associated with higher 
competence ratings. 
Another series of studies conducted by Jagacinski and Nicholls (1987) sought to 
disentangle the influence of social comparison information from task/ego involvement on 
individuals’ conceptions of ability. College students were asked to imagine themselves in either a 
task-involved or ego-involved situation and then were either given social comparison 
information or not (Study 1 manipulated this between-subjects and Study 2 within-subjects). 
They found that, across both task-involved and ego-involved situations, an emphasis on social 
comparison information shifted students’ conceptions of ability. In the absence of social 
comparison information, higher effort on a task was associated with greater feelings of 
competence in college students. However, once social comparison information was emphasized 
(e.g., when students were told, “Other people did not find [the task] challenging and needed 
much less effort than you did”), students associated higher effort on a task with less competence. 
Although this pattern was found in both task-involving and ego-involving contexts, it was 
stronger in ego-involving contexts. Overall, these studies show that aspects of the situation (i.e., 
whether task-involved, ego involved, or emphasizing or de-emphasizing social comparison 
information) can influence one’s perception of the relation between amount of effort and ability. 
Additional evidence for competition and social comparison as cues for thinking in terms 
of an inverse relation between effort and ability comes from the developmental studies reviewed 
in the previous section.  For instance, many of the studies in which students of different ages 
endorsed an inverse relation between effort and ability were situated within competitive contexts 
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(e.g., Droege & Stipek, 1993; Graham & Barker, 1990; Harari & Covington, 1981; Karabenick 
& Heller, 1976; Kun et al., 1974; Kun, 1977; Miller, 1985; Surber, 1980; Wimmer et al., 1982). 
 In summary, Nicholls’ (1978, 1984) theory of ability conceptions helps explain how 
individuals think about relations between effort and ability. His theory consists of two main 
components. The first, a developmental component, focuses on how children grow in their 
understanding of how to conceptualize ability and how to use effort and outcome information to 
form ability evaluations. Although Nicholls’ (1978) developmental levels are generally 
supported by empirical research, extant research provides mixed evidence about the exact 
timeline for when children begin to understand the “differentiated” conception of ability that is 
inversely related to amount of effort. In the second component, Nicholls (1984) extends the first 
by trying to understand why older children and adults, once they are able to conceptualize ability 
as either differentiated or undifferentiated from effort, might hold different conceptions of ability 
in different situations. He specifically focuses on how situational factors can influence 
individuals’ perceptions of the relation between quantity of effort and ability: in ego-involved 
situations where social comparison and competition is salient, more effort may be indicative of 
lower “differentiated” ability (i.e., inverse relation), whereas in task-involved situations where 
the focus in on individual growth, more effort may be a sign of higher “undifferentiated” ability 
(i.e., positive relation). This component of Nicholls’ (1984) theory is also supported by empirical 
work and suggests that situational cues are important determinants of how individuals might 
think about effort and ability within a particular context. Overall, Nicholls’ (1978, 1984) theory 
helps us understand how individuals perceive the relation between effort and ability 
developmentally and in different contexts or situations.  
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Dweck’s Theory of Individual Differences in Beliefs about Intellectual Ability 
In addition to situational factors, there are also somewhat stable individual differences 
that affect the way people view the relation between quantity of effort and ability. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, Carol Dweck has shown that one important individual difference is people’s lay 
theories or naïve beliefs about intellectual ability (e.g., Dweck & Molden, 2005). Before 
discussing Dweck’s work in more detail, it is worth commenting on differences between 
Nicholls’ (1984) and Dweck’s (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) use of terminology. Nicholls 
made a conceptual distinction between “ability” and “intelligence”, such that the term 
“intelligence” naturally presumes a conception of ability as a capacity that is differentiated from 
effort, while “ability” refers to something that can be conceptualized in multiple ways (i.e., as 
differentiated or undifferentiated from effort; see Nicholls, Patashnick, & Mettatal, 1986). 
Dweck, however, used the terms “intelligence” and “ability” somewhat interchangeably (e.g., 
Dweck, 2002); thus, for the purposes of this review paper, we will discuss Dweck’s (1999; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck & Master, 2009) theory using the term ability, rather than 
intelligence, to be consistent with Nicholls’ terminology and because Dweck used the term 
frequently when discussing her own theory. However, it is important to note that concerns have 
been expressed in the literature about whether or not the two terms meaningfully differ from one 
another. 
Dweck (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) posits that individuals who believe that 
intellectual ability is fixed and unchanging (i.e., entity theorists) tend to believe that no amount 
of effort will change one’s ability, and that, in fact, putting a lot of effort into a task might 
indicate that one lacks ability. Thus, they are likely to perceive amount of effort as inversely 
related to ability. Conversely, those who believe that intellectual ability is malleable (i.e., 
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incremental theorists) tend to believe that increased effort leads to improvement and mastery. 
Thus, they are likely to perceive amount of effort as positively related to ability.  
A number of researchers found that the perceived relation between effort and ability 
depends in part on people’s implicit lay theories or naïve beliefs about intellectual ability. One 
study by Mueller and Dweck (1997; as cited in Dweck, 1999) found that college students who 
held an entity theory (i.e., those scoring one standard deviation above the mean on a measure of 
implicit theories) were likely to agree with statements such as, “I sometimes feel that the more 
effort you have to put into your school assignments, the less intelligent you probably are.” In 
other words, having to put forth a lot of effort is an indication that one has low intellectual 
ability, whereas putting forth little effort is an indication that one has high ability. Incremental 
theorists (i.e., those scoring one standard deviation below the mean on a measure of implicit 
theories) were more likely to disagree with these statements. Miele and Molden (2010) found 
that college aged entity theorists were more likely to interpret their own experiences of effort as 
an indication that they were reaching the limits of their ability, whereas incremental theorists 
were more likely to interpret effort as an indication of increased mastery. In another study 
(Dweck, 1999), grade school children and college students were asked, “Sometimes students feel 
smart in school and sometimes they don’t. When do you feel smart?” Grade school children with 
an entity theory said they felt smart “When I turn in my papers first” and college students with an 
entity theory said they felt smart “When others are struggling, but it’s easy for me.” In contrast, 
grade school children with an incremental theory said they felt smart “When I don’t know how to 
do it and it’s pretty hard and I figure it out without anybody telling me” and college students with 
an incremental theory said they felt smart “When I’m working on something I don’t understand 
yet”. Overall, these studies suggest that individuals with an entity theory view effort as an 
 35 
indication that one lacks ability, while incremental theorists view effort as having a positive 
effect on one’s ability. 
 Results of other studies are consistent with these findings. Hong et al. (1999) explored the 
relation between implicit theories (measured with a questionnaire) and attributions for failure in 
three studies. The studies found that undergraduate incremental theorists put greater weight on 
effort than entity theorists when seeking causal explanations for failure on a task, and were more 
likely to take a remedial course to improve their skills when they realized their performance was 
unsatisfactory than were entity theorists. Of particular relevance to the present discussion, 
participants in Study 3 were also given a hypothetical scenario and asked which of two students 
was more intelligent: Student A, who ranked first in the class and was diligent, or Student B, 
who ranked tenth in the class but only studied before the test. Participants who were induced to 
temporarily adopt an entity theory were more likely to name Student B as the more intelligent 
student than participants who were induced to adopt an incremental theory, suggesting that entity 
theorists perceive relatively low levels of effort to be indicative of high levels of intellectual 
ability. 
 Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck (2007) examined early adolescents’ implicit 
theories of intelligence in a longitudinal study. They followed four waves of students as they 
progressed from seventh to eighth grade. Blackwell et al. (2007) found that an incremental 
theory of intelligence was associated with learning (as opposed to performance) goals, positive 
effort beliefs (e.g., “the harder you work at something, the better you will be at it”), and positive 
effort strategies. Also, students who endorsed an incremental theory of intelligence had a better 
grade trajectory over the course of junior high than those who endorsed an entity theory, 
controlling for prior achievement. These results suggest that an incremental theory of 
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intelligence is associated with a belief that effort is positive and helpful, rather than an indicator 
of low ability, and that holding an incremental theory is associated with positive achievement 
outcomes (see also Jones, Wilkins, Long, & Wang, 2012; Miele, Son, & Metcalfe, 2013). 
 It is important to note that individuals’ theories of intelligence not only appear to 
influence how they conceive of the relation between effort and ability, but also how they 
evaluate the level of their own abilities in certain situations. Dweck and Leggett (1988) argue that 
individuals’ theories of intelligence interact with their beliefs about the level of their own 
abilities to predict behavioral outcomes. Specifically, they suggest that entity theorists who 
believe they have high ability will often display a mastery pattern of behavior when confronting 
challenges, whereas entity theorists who believe they have low ability will often display a 
helpless pattern of behavior. Incremental theorists, on the other hand, will display a mastery 
pattern of behavior whether they believe they have high or low ability. Thus, beliefs about the 
nature of ability and beliefs about the level of one’s own ability are different constructs and 
interact to predict motivational behaviors. 
 However, there is also evidence that individuals’ theories of intelligence (or, how they 
conceive of the relation between effort and ability) directly predict how they evaluate the level of 
their own abilities, especially in contexts where they exert high effort. Many studies have 
demonstrated that individuals with an entity theory tend to evaluate their own abilities negatively 
when they exert high effort, but that individuals with an incremental theory tend not to evaluate 
their own abilities negatively when they exert high effort (e.g., Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). This, at the very least, suggests that conceiving of an inverse relation 
between effort and ability can influence individuals’ beliefs about their own abilities when they 
exert high effort. In addition, to the extent that incremental theorists believe that effort increases 
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their competence or mastery on a task, and that ability can be defined in terms of competence 
and mastery (e.g., Dweck, 1999), it would make sense that incremental theorists (or, those who 
conceive of a positive relation between effort and ability) would evaluate the level of their own 
abilities higher when they exert high effort. Thus, how individuals conceive of the relation 
between effort and ability appears to be tied to how they evaluate the levels of their own abilities. 
As a whole, these studies provide support for Dweck’s (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) 
theory of individual differences in beliefs about intellectual ability, and can help account for both 
positive and negative relations between perceived amount of effort and ability. Individuals who 
believe that ability is fixed and unchanging tend to view effort and ability as being inversely 
related because they conceptualize ability as an innate capacity, while those who believe ability 
is malleable tend to view effort and ability as positively related because they conceptualize 
ability as consisting of skills or competencies that can change over time. 
How do these theories develop? Dweck and colleagues (e.g., Mueller & Dweck, 1998; 
Cimpian, Arce, Markman, & Dweck, 2007; Gunderson, Gripshover, Romero, Dweck, Golden-
Meadow, & Levine, 2013) suggest that children’s implicit theories about ability develop based 
on the feedback they receive from adults, such as parents or teachers. For example, when 
children are given feedback (i.e., praise or criticism) about “person” traits, such as their ability 
(e.g., “You’re smart”), it can lead to a belief that their ability is fixed and that effort is futile. As 
a result of this, they may display helpless behavior when encountering failure, which is 
consistent with an entity theory. However, when children are given “process” feedback about 
their effort (e.g., “You worked hard”), they may display mastery behavior in response to failure, 
which is consistent with an incremental theory. In addition to praise and criticism, adults may 
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also explicitly communicate their own theories of ability to children. These experiences may lead 
to the development of a somewhat stable entity or incremental theory. 
Unresolved Questions 
It is important to point out some unresolved questions about the extent to which 
contextual and/or individual difference factors predict how students perceive the relation 
between effort and ability in particular situations. In some studies, almost all cognitively mature 
individuals view effort and ability as being inversely related. For example, in Karabenick and 
Heller (1976), 94% of the low effort characters were chosen as being more able among college 
students, and in Nicholls (1978), 75% of 13-year olds had reached Level 4 of reasoning about 
effort and ability (i.e., relating effort and ability inversely). Thus, regardless of any individual 
differences in students’ theories of intelligence, almost all of these participants endorsed an 
inverse relation between effort and ability. However, in other studies, individual differences in 
students’ theories of intelligence do affect how they view the relation between effort and ability, 
despite being situated in ego-involved contexts (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; Hong et al., 1999). 
This raises the question of what circumstances lead to situational cues taking precedence over 
individual difference factors and vice versa. 
One possible answer has to do with methodological differences between the studies 
discussed in the sections on developmental and contextual factors and those discussed in this 
section on individual differences. For instance, in studies where participants were asked to 
compare the abilities of two characters who had put forth different amount of effort (Folmer et 
al., 2008; Nicholls, 1978), these characters were always described as doing equally well on the 
task. The individual difference study by Hong et al. (1999) used a similar paradigm; however, 
the character who put forth more effort was described as having slightly better grades than the 
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character who put forth less effort. Thus, when the performance of two students is equated, 
participants tend to assume that the person who put forth less effort has more ability, and thus 
perceive an inverse relation between effort and ability. But, when the harder working student is 
described as having performed better than the other student, participants may wonder whether 
the student who worked less hard would have performed better or only the same as the first 
student had he or she worked just as hard. When facing this type of ambiguity, participants may 
be more likely to rely on their general (i.e., situation-independent) beliefs about the nature of 
ability and, thus, equally likely to think in terms of an inverse or positive relation between levels 
of effort and ability. 
Another possibility is that there were differences in the timing of the study designs. In the 
developmental studies by Nicholls and others (Folmer et al., 2008; Nicholls, 1978), participants 
were asked to evaluate the abilities of two students who had put forth different levels of effort on 
a particular task at a single point in time. In the individual difference study by Dweck and 
colleagues (Hong et al., 1999), participants were asked to evaluate the abilities of two students 
who put different levels of effort into studying for a test over the span of months. Thus, the 
reason why nearly all of the older students in Nicholls’ (1978) study (including the incremental 
theorists presumably) identified the harder working student as having less ability may be because 
they viewed the students’ intellectual capacities as being stable over such a short period of time. 
In contrast, the reason that incremental theorists in the Hong et al. (1999) study identified the 
harder working student as having more ability may be because they viewed the students’ 
capacities as susceptible to change over relatively long periods of time. 
However, all of these possibilities are based on the assumption made by both Nicholls 
(1984) and Dweck (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) that people’s conceptions of ability (i.e., 
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whether differentiated/undifferentiated or entity/incremental) always dictate the perceived 
relation between amount of effort and ability. It is important to consider that there may be 
additional factors beyond individuals’ conceptions of ability that influence how individuals 
perceive the relation between effort and ability, such as individuals’ perceptions of the source of 
effort. Although many of the studies discussed above examined how information about the 
quantity or amount of effort elicited during a task influence ability evaluations, none of the 
studies examined the perceived source of that effort.  
For example, individuals who believe that the effort a student expended on a task was 
primarily elicited by the subjective difficulty of the task may be likely to perceive this effort as 
being inversely related to her ability (e.g., she had to work hard on the task because it was 
difficult for her, and therefore she must not have high ability), even if they previously held an 
undifferentiated or incremental conception of ability. That is, most incremental theorists are 
likely to acknowledge that although ability eventually increases with effort, a student with 
relatively low levels of current ability will need to put more effort into a task right now in order 
to achieve the same result as a student with relatively high levels of current ability (see Muenks 
& Miele, 2016). 
 On the other hand, individuals who believe that the effort a student expended on a task 
was primarily self-initiated may be likely to perceive this effort as positively related to her ability 
on that task (e.g., she chose to work hard on this task to improve her ability), even if they 
previously held a differentiated or entity conception of ability. That is, as will be discussed in 
more detail below, certain effort-related cues might temporarily shift entity theorists from 
thinking of ability as an innate capacity to thinking of ability in terms of a set of skills that 
emerges from this capacity and that can be improved (even if the underlying capacity is fixed). 
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In conclusion, Nicholls (1978, 1984) and Dweck’s (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) 
theories help us understand why individuals may perceive amount of effort and ability as either 
positively or inversely related. Both theorists posit that individuals’ conceptions of ability 
influence perceptions of the effort-ability relation. However, Nicholls focuses on developmental 
and situational predictors of ability conceptions, whereas Dweck focuses on individual difference 
predictors. Neither theory, however, fully predicts how individuals will perceive the effort-ability 
relation in any given context. Thus, the theories leave room for aspects of effort, such as the 
source of one’s effort, to influence students’ perceptions. 
Two Perceptions of the Source of Effort: Extending the Theories 
In addition to different conceptions of ability, individuals may also hold different beliefs 
about what drives their own or another person’s effort. This gets to the heart of what individuals 
believe about why they (or another person) works hard, which may have important implications 
for how they evaluate their own or another’s academic ability. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
present studies will examine what I refer to as individuals’ perceptions of the source of effort.  
I propose that, within any given achievement-related situation, there are two primary 
ways that one can perceive the source of their own or another’s effort: as task-elicited (i.e., 
arising from the subjective ease or difficulty of the task at hand) or self-initiated (i.e., arising 
from the individual’s own motivation). Note that when I refer to “task-elicited” effort I do not 
mean effort that is driven by the objective difficulty of a task, but by the subjective difficulty of a 
task that is determined by an individual (e.g., that math homework is difficult for him). 
Additionally, “self-initiated” effort encompasses all the reasons students may be motivated to 
engage in a task, including individual, social, or cultural reasons (e.g., being motivated because 
students are interested in the task, because they have set goals, because they want to please their 
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teachers, etc.). Although it is certainly possible that effort on academic tasks may, in actuality, be 
both task-elicited and self-initiated simultaneously, I am interested in examining one’s 
perceptions of which of these two sources primarily drives their own or others’ effort in a 
particular achievement situation. It is possible that perceptions of relative emphasis of these two 
sources within a particular achievement situation might influence how one relates amount of 
effort to ability in themselves or others. These two sources of effort are therefore crucial to 
consider because they may help to provide a more complete picture of how ability evaluations 
are formed, rather than just focusing on quantity of effort. The choice to focus on these two 
particular sources of effort was inspired by work by Koriat et al. (2006) in the cognitive 
psychology literature, which will be explained next. 
In a seminal series of studies within cognitive psychology, Koriat et al. (2006) examined 
participants’ effort (operationalized as study time) during memorization tasks completed either 
under time pressure or no time pressure. They found that effort could serve one of two functions: 
Either as a behavioral tool to improve task performance, or as an indicator of how much one had 
learned. When effort was used a tool to improve performance, the researchers called it goal-
driven effort: participants chose to regulate their behavior by spending more time memorizing 
the more difficult words. For Koriat et al. the term “goal-driven” does not refer to a specific 
motivation or goal, but more broadly to effort that is self-initiated by the individual. A number of 
studies have demonstrated the goal-driven function of effort or study time (e.g., Mazzoni & 
Cornoldi, 1993; Dunlosky & Thiede, 1998) and shown that individuals often chose to spend 
more time on certain tasks or items in order to facilitate their own learning. 
Koriat et al. (2006) also showed that effort could be used as an indicator of how much 
one had learned. That is, individuals sometimes formed metacognitive assessments of learning 
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based on the amount of effort they spent on a particular task or item. Koriat et al. (2006) 
described this kind of allocation of study time as data-driven rather than goal-driven. Individuals 
spent as much time as necessary on a given task or item. Then, if they had to spend a long time 
memorizing a particular word, they concluded that the word was difficult and therefore less 
likely to be recalled than another word that did not require much time to memorize. Effort or 
study time was therefore elicited by the task, and was not used as a strategic tool, but as an 
indicator of how much one had learned. 
Several studies have found evidence for both of these functions of effort. For example, 
Koriat et al. (2006) examined how judgments of learning (JOLs; i.e., judgments about what one 
knows or how much one has learned) for a word memorization task depend on whether effort 
was data-driven or goal-driven. Judgments of learning were measured with a single item asking 
participants what they thought their chances of recalling the word were (between 0%-100%). 
Koriat et al. (2006) found that the type of effort participants exerted was a function of the 
conditions of the task. In a self-paced learning scenario with no time pressure, the longer a 
participant spent studying a word (e.g., the more effort they put into the task), the lower the JOL, 
suggesting that effort was used as an indicator to the participant that the word was difficult (i.e., 
data-driven effort; see also Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Kelley & Jacoby, 
1996). However, under time pressure, participants strategically regulated their effort in order to 
achieve their task goals. Thus, effort became goal-driven—the longer the participant spent 
studying a word, the higher the JOL. Participants in this condition believed they were more 
likely to recall the words they spent more time on. 
In sum, increases in effort can lead to either higher or lower JOLs depending on the time 
pressure component of the task. In self-paced tasks with no time pressure, participants believed 
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they had learned less after putting forth high effort than after putting forth low effort (consistent 
with data-driven effort). In tasks that involved time pressure, participants believed they had 
learned more after putting forth high effort (consistent with goal-driven effort). In other words, 
high amounts of effort could either be linked to negative evaluations of how much one has 
learned, or positive evaluations of how much one has learned, depending on the timing 
conditions of the task. Taken together, these findings indicate that high levels of effort can lead 
to different metacognitive outcomes (see also Koriat & Nussinson, 2009). 
The studies described above all utilized samples of college participants. However, there 
has been some more recent work on the development of these concepts of data-driven and goal-
driven effort in young children and adolescents. A study by Koriat, Ackerman, Lockl, and 
Schneider (2009) found that children were not responsive to data-driven regulation until around 
the third grade. In a self-paced learning scenario, which should evoke data-driven effort, the 
JOLs of the older children (third through sixth grade) decreased with increased study time, which 
is consistent with what Koriat et al. (2006) found with adults. The JOLs of the younger children 
(first and second grade) did not. However, when examining actual performance, children in all 
age groups did in fact perform worse on items they spent longer studying. This suggests that the 
JOLs of the younger children were not accurate. Interestingly, despite the fact that children 
performed worse with increased study time, a self-report measure showed children of all ages 
(first through sixth grade) believed performance should actually increase with increased study 
time. Koriat et al. (2009) suggest that this implies that children understand the implications of 
goal-driven effort prior to understanding data-driven effort. Additionally, Koriat, Ackerman, 
Adiv, Lockl, and Schneider (2014) found that although children in fifth and sixth grade appeared 
to be responsive to both data-driven and goal-driven effort in different tasks, they were not 
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responsive to both types of effort in the same task, while ninth grade students and adults were. 
These findings suggest that children become more sophisticated in the sensitivity of their JOLs to 
both data-driven and goal-driven effort over time. 
As a whole, these studies provide support for these two different functions of effort: as an 
indicator of how much one has learned (data-driven effort) and as a tool to regulate learning 
(goal-driven effort). However, it is important to note that in Koriat et al. (2006) it is unclear 
whether participants were aware that their effort was data-driven or goal-driven. In later studies, 
Koriat and colleagues (Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Koriat, Nussinson, & Ackerman, 2014) 
attempted to examine whether participants’ attributions of their effort to data-driven or goal-
driven regulation influenced their JOLs. Koriat and Nussinson (2009) found that in self-paced 
tasks, participants who were asked to contract the corrugator muscle in their forehead (which 
makes individuals feel like they are exerting high effort) while memorizing word pairs had lower 
JOLs than participants in the control condition. In tasks with time pressure, participants who 
were asked to contract the corrugator muscle had higher JOLs than participants in the control 
condition. Thus, whether participants attributed the effort associated with contracting the 
corrugator muscle to data-driven or goal-driven sources impacted their JOLs. Koriat et al. (2014) 
also found that individuals’ interpretations of whether their effort was data-driven or goal-driven 
moderated the relation between study time and JOLs, as well as between effort ratings and JOLs. 
This pattern was found when participants were asked to monitor their own learning, as well as 
when they were asked to monitor another student’s learning. These studies provide evidence for 
an attribution process whereby individuals’ experiences of effort influence their judgments of 
learning. 
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Although Koriat and colleagues’ (2006, 2009) work provides a general conceptual 
framework for how I define sources of effort, I extended this work by examining students’ self-
evaluations about ability rather than their JOLs. I also did not want to use the term goal-driven as 
it may overlap with the way goals are typically defined in the achievement motivation literature 
(Kaplan & Maehr, 2006). Thus, I used slightly different terminology from Koriat et al. (2006) 
that is more consistent with the aims of the present studies. In the present dissertation studies, as 
discussed earlier, I used the terms task-elicited effort (i.e., effort that is perceived as arising from 
the task itself) instead of data-driven, and self-initiated effort (i.e., effort that is perceived as 
arising from one’s own drive or motivation) instead of goal-driven. 
Because the studies mentioned above all examined how data-driven and goal-driven 
effort relate to metacognitive judgments of learning on specific tasks (Koriat et al., 2006; Koriat 
et al., 2009; Koriat et al., 2014), it seems reasonable that perceptions task-elicited and self-
initiated effort may influence more global evaluations of one’s academic ability. If individuals 
perceive that their effort was primarily internally driven (i.e., effort was self-initiated), they 
might conceptualize ability as a set of skills and expect the relation between their effort and 
ability to be positive. This is because putting forth a lot of effort on an academic task would be 
interpreted as a sign that one is highly motivated to improve his or her ability, while exerting 
little effort on an academic task would be a sign that one is not very motivated to improve his or 
her ability. On the other hand, if people perceive that their effort was primarily elicited externally 
by the subjective difficulty of the task (i.e., was task-elicited), they might conceptualize ability as 
a fixed capacity and predict an inverse relation between their effort and ability. That is, the 
harder one has to work to complete a task, the lower his or her ability, and the easier one finds a 
task, the higher his or her ability. Thus, it might be important to consider how someone perceives 
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the source of their own or another’s effort in order to understand the way in which that person 
relates effort information to ability information in an achievement scenario. 
For example, say that a student named Rebecca is in her tenth-grade English classroom 
and is working on an in-class writing assignment on Hamlet. She is old enough from a 
developmental perspective to understand the difference between the concepts of effort and ability 
(Nicholls, 1978). She also knows that this assignment is going to be graded and that her work 
will be compared against the work of other students in her class. Thus, she is part of an ego-
involving situation characterized by social comparison (Nicholls, 1984). Rebecca notices that her 
classmate Adam, who is sitting right next to her, appears to be working very hard on the 
assignment, while Rebecca does not feel that she is working very hard. The next day, the class 
receives their grades on the assignment: Rebecca and Adam both receive an 85%. How will 
Rebecca perceive Adam’s ability compared to her own? 
In this scenario, Nicholls (1984) may predict that, because the situation is ego involving, 
Rebecca would hold a differentiated conception of ability and perceive Adam as having lower 
ability than her, since Adam had to work harder to reach the same outcome. Dweck (1999; 
Dweck & Master, 2009) may predict that Rebecca’s implicit theory of ability would determine 
how she perceived Adam’s ability: if Rebecca held an entity theory, she would likely perceive 
Adam’s ability as lower than hers, but if she held an incremental theory, she would likely not 
perceive Adam’s ability as lower than hers.  
However, I argue that Rebecca’s assessment of Adam’s ability also depends on what she 
perceived the source of Adam’s effort to be. If Rebecca perceived Adam’s effort as primarily 
being elicited by his perceptions of the difficulty of the task (i.e., task-elicited), then Rebecca 
might perceive Adam as having lower ability because he had to work harder to receive the same 
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grade as Rebecca. However, if Rebecca perceived Adam’s high levels of effort as primarily 
arising from Adam’s motivation (i.e., self-initiated), perhaps a personal interest in the story of 
Hamlet, she might not perceive Adam as having lower ability than herself, even within the 
context of an ego-involved achievement situation. Thus, Rebecca’s evaluation of Adam’s ability 
will depend on her perception of the source of his effort.  
Importantly, cues about the sources of effort may temporarily alter the way that 
individuals define ability. In Dweck’s (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) theoretical approach, 
entity theorists tend to conceptualize ability as an innate capacity, whereas incremental theorists 
are more likely to think of ability as a learned set of skills. However, both entity and incremental 
theorists can conceptualize ability in both ways and may shift the way that they think about it if 
strong situational cues are present. The example with Rebecca above suggests that even though 
the ego-involved nature of the situation or her own implicit entity theory may encourage her to 
think about ability as a capacity, salient cues about the intentions behind Adam’s effort may shift 
her into thinking about ability as a set of skills. Source of effort cues are therefore important 
factors that may influence how individuals conceptualize the relation between amount of effort 
and ability, and may be independent from information about the nature of the achievement 
situation or individuals’ own implicit theories of intellectual ability. 
As another example, say that a high school student named Emily, who is typically an 
entity theorist, notices that her friend, Sarah, works really hard on a set of math problems that the 
teacher assigned. If Emily perceives that Sarah is working hard because she is really motivated to 
learn, rather than because the task is difficult for her, Emily’s definition of ability may shift into 
one that focuses on skills or competencies rather than innate talent. She therefore may not 
perceive that Sarah’s ability is low just because she is working hard. On the other hand, say that 
 49 
another student, John, is typically an incremental theorist but he perceives that his friend Eric 
works really hard on his math problems because they are very challenging for him. Although 
John would usually define ability as a set of skills that can be improved, information about Eric’s 
apparent difficulty with the task may shift him into thinking about ability as a capacity, and thus 
conclude that Eric’s hard work indicates a lack of ability. It therefore seems possible that cues 
about the source of effort could at least temporarily change one’s conceptualizations of ability.   
Understanding how students make these evaluations of their own and others’ abilities is 
important because these evaluations can affect students’ motivation. For example, if students 
work hard and perceive their own effort as task-elicited (as opposed to self-initiated), they may 
evaluate their own ability negatively, which could decrease their motivation in school. Similarly, 
if students perceive others’ apparent lack of effort as due to their feelings of ease with the task as 
opposed to due to a lack of motivation to learn, they may evaluate their peers’ abilities more 
highly and their own ability more negatively by comparison, which may also decrease their 
motivation in school. It is therefore important to understand how perceptions about the source of 
effort in others might influence students’ beliefs about themselves. 
Evidence for the Distinction Between Task-Elicited and Self-Initiated Effort 
Only a few very recent studies (that will be discussed below) have specifically examined 
the impact of task-elicited and self-initiated effort cues on students’ ability evaluations. 
However, work by Gail Heyman and colleagues (Heyman et al., 2003; Heyman & Compton, 
2006) paved the way for this research by demonstrating that young children’s ability evaluations 
of hypothetical characters are sensitive to cues about effort. These findings underscore the 
possibility that perceptions about the type of effort exerted may influence how individuals relate 
quantity of effort to ability. 
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Heyman et al. (2003) examined children’s reasoning about effort, ability, and outcome. 
The researchers studied whether young children’s ability evaluations were sensitive to two types 
of information: perceived difficulty information (“thought the puzzle was easy/hard to do”) and 
effort information (“tried hard/did not try hard”). In Studies 1 and 2, Heyman et al. (2003) asked 
3-5 year old children (Mage in Study 1 = 4.58 years; Study 2 = 5.17 years) to respond to 
hypothetical scenarios about two characters completing a puzzle. In the perceived difficulty 
condition, they told participants: “Kayla finished the puzzle. Jennifer also finished the puzzle. 
Kayla thought the puzzle was easy to do, but Jennifer thought the puzzle was hard to do. Do you 
think one of them is smarter?” In the “effort” condition, they gave participants effort (high or 
low) and outcome (good or bad) information. For example, in the scenario involving high effort 
and bad outcome, participants were told: “Eva tried really hard on her schoolwork and got 
everything wrong. How smart is Eva?” Results showed that, in the perceived difficulty 
conditions, participants believed that the character who thought the puzzle was easy to do was 
smarter than the character who thought the puzzle was hard to do. The effort condition results 
differed across the two studies. In Study 1, there was no main effect of effort, but in Study 2, 
which was run with a higher-SES sample of participants, there was a main effect of effort: 
participants inferred that the character who tried hard was smarter than the character who did not 
try hard. Results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that preschool-aged children believe that thinking 
a task is difficult means you are not very smart, but working hard means that you are smart. In 
other words, thinking about effort differently (as it relates to task difficulty vs. working hard in 
general) influenced children’s ability evaluations of the characters. 
Study 3 involved a sample of 3-5 year old children (Mage = 4.75 years) as well as an older 
sample of 9-10 year old children (Mage = 9.83 years). The tasks were the same as in the first two 
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studies. Again, researchers found that participants of all ages believed the character that thought 
the puzzle was easy to do was smarter than the character that thought the puzzle was hard to do. 
Additionally, when asked to infer ability given effort and outcome information, both the younger 
and older children believed that characters who tried hard were smarter than characters that did 
not try hard, endorsing a positive relation between amount of effort and ability. 
Overall, results from these three studies suggest that children are sensitive to information 
about effort. Heyman et al. (2003) attempted to explain these results by discussing the possibility 
of a dual schema hypothesis. They argued that, when task difficulty information (e.g., the 
difficulty of the puzzle as perceived by the character) was provided, a perceived difficulty 
schema was activated, and children believed that the character who thought the task was difficult 
was not as smart as the character who thought the task was easy. In contrast, when effort 
information (e.g., how hard the character tried) was provided, an effort schema was activated, 
and children believed that the character who tried harder was smarter than the character who did 
not try as hard. Another way to interpret these results is that, when given perceived difficulty 
information, children thought about task-elicited effort, whereas when they were given effort 
information, they thought about self-initiated effort. It is important to note, however, that 
Heyman et al. (2003) did not give any explicit instructions that the effort was self-initiated in the 
effort condition; children were simply told, for example, “Eva tried really hard” or “Eva did not 
try very hard.” 
Although the concepts of task-elicited and self-initiated effort do not align perfectly with 
the perceived difficulty and effort constructs in Heyman et al. (2003), this pattern of results does 
suggest that effort-related cues can lead participants to interpret effort information in different 
ways, and these interpretations influence how they form ability evaluations. However, it could be 
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argued that the young children in this study were not thinking about effort per se when they 
thought about what makes a task “easy” or “difficult,” but had simply encoded the belief that 
smart people can solve easy and difficult problems, whereas people who are not smart can only 
solve easy problems. The next set of studies manipulated children’s perceptions of the source of 
effort more directly with samples of older children. 
In Study 1 of Heyman and Compton (2006), 5-10 year old children judged the ability of 
two different characters in a hypothetical scenario. Unlike in the previous studies, the characters 
in this scenario always differed in terms of how much effort they actually expended on the task, 
not just in terms of how they perceived the task. One of the characters was said to have finished a 
set of puzzles very quickly, while the other character finished the puzzles slowly. This difference 
in puzzle-solving effort was framed differently depending on whether participants were in the 
effort, perceived difficulty, or no prime condition. In the effort condition, participants were told 
that the slow character “tried and tried” and the fast character “hardly tried at all”. In the 
perceived difficulty condition, participants were told that the slow character “thought the puzzles 
were hard to do” and the fast character “thought the puzzles were easy to do.” In the no prime 
condition, participants were only given information about the speed of completion. Participants 
were then asked to determine who was smarter using a single item. Results showed that, for the 
older participants (8-10 year olds; Mage = 9.47 years), 72% of participants in the perceived 
difficulty condition identified the faster child as smarter, whereas only 41% in the effort 
condition identified the faster child as smarter. In the no prime condition, 50% of participants 
identified the faster child as smarter. There were no differences between conditions for the 
younger participants (5-7 year olds; Mage = 6.58 years). 
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In Study 2, which was also conducted with 5-10 year olds, Heyman and Compton (2006) 
used a slightly modified methodology by including priming information in the form of questions 
about the characters rather than having the information embedded within the character 
descriptions. Results showed that for both younger (5-7 year olds; Mage = 6.67 years) and older 
participants (8-10 year olds; Mage = 9.42 years), those in the perceived difficulty condition were 
more likely to believe that the faster child was smarter compared to those in the effort condition, 
consistent with Study 1. 
Heyman and Compton (2006) then examined whether these cues also influence children’s 
predictions of the character’s future performance and their beliefs about the malleability of 
ability in Study 3. In this study, kindergarten children (Mage = 6.08 years) were randomly 
assigned to either the effort first or perceived difficulty first condition. All participants were 
given both scenarios from Study 2 (but in different orders), and were then asked to complete two 
new dependent measures: one about future performance and the other about the malleability of 
ability. Results showed that, when asked about a character’s future performance, those who were 
asked the effort question most recently (“Did Elizabeth try hard when she did the puzzle, or not 
try hard?”) believed that the character would perform better in the future and that ability in 
general was more malleable than those who were asked the perceived difficulty question (“Did 
Elizabeth think the puzzle was hard to do, or easy to do?”) most recently. 
As a whole, these studies suggest that contextual effort cues can change the way that 
children reason about effort and ability. When given perceived difficulty information, children 
tended to view effort and ability as inversely related and when they were given effort 
information, they did not necessarily view effort and ability as inversely related. This difference 
appeared to be more pronounced for the older children than the younger children. However, it is 
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also important to note that researchers disagree about what exactly children understand about 
distinction between concepts of effort and ability at these ages (e.g., Nicholls, 1978; Karabenick 
& Heller, 1976; Surber, 1980; Harari & Covington, 1981), so it is difficult to make any strong 
conclusions about how children in these studies were conceptualizing effort and ability and the 
relation between them. Again, it is possible that some of children in the effort condition were 
unable to distinguish between the concepts of effort and ability and thus assumed that high effort 
meant high ability, while children in the perceived difficulty condition simply used the heuristic 
that smarter individuals generally feel that problems are easier. In fact, Nicholls and Miller 
(1983) found that children appear to understand objective task difficulty (i.e., that more difficult 
tasks demand more ability) prior to normative task difficulty (i.e., understanding that it is better 
to succeed on a normatively difficult task than an easy one). Children in this study may have 
used information about objective difficulty to make their ability judgments without fully 
understanding the inverse relation between effort and ability. Thus, it is possible that some of 
these children were not yet able to distinguish ability from either effort or task difficulty. 
Although there are some developmental concerns about interpreting these results, 
Heyman and Compton’s (2006) work does set the stage for making an argument for the role of 
task-elicited and self-initiated effort in students’ ability evaluations. When perceived difficulty 
information was given, children may have concluded that the characters worked hard primarily 
because of the characters’ perceptions of the difficulty of the task itself (i.e., task-elicited effort). 
As the results of Study 3 suggest, this perception of the source of effort may have also primed a 
conception of ability as an innate capacity. On the other hand, when effort information was 
given, some children may have shifted into thinking about effort as primarily driven by the 
character’s own motivation (i.e., self-initiated effort), and concluded that the characters who put 
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in lots of effort could still have high ability. This perception of the source of effort may have also 
primed a definition of ability as a set of skills or competencies that can be improved. However, 
because task-elicited and self-initiated effort were not explicitly manipulated in these studies, 
and because there were developmental concerns with participants’ understanding of effort and 
ability, these hypotheses were not tested directly in Heyman and Compton (2006). 
To address some of the concerns with the Heyman studies (Heyman et al., 2003; Heyman 
& Compton, 2006), Muenks et al. (in press) directly manipulated perceptions of effort source and 
examined its impact on the direction of the relation between amount of effort and ability in 
samples of college students. In Studies 1a and 1b, participants read a series of hypothetical 
vignettes in which two characters spent different amounts of time completing an academic task. 
In the task-elicited condition, effort was attributed to how difficult or easy the character found 
the task; in the self-initiated condition, effort was attributed to how motivated or unmotivated the 
character was during the task. Researchers also varied the characters’ performance (i.e., the 
character who spent more time scored higher, lower, or the same as the character who spent less 
time) and the academic domain of the task (math, English literature, or physics). After reading 
each vignette participants were asked to evaluate which character’s ability was higher. 
Study 2 consisted of three separate blocks. In the sequential information block, 
participants were provided with effort level, effort source, and performance information about a 
single character in sequential order and made ability judgments about that character after each 
piece of information was presented. In the concurrent information block, participants were 
provided effort level, effort source, and performance information about a single character all at 
once and made an ability judgment about that character after all pieces of information were 
presented together. In the peer ratings block, participants were asked to imagine a time when a 
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real-life peer either worked hard or slacked off on an academic assignment, and then were asked 
to imagine that their peer’s effort was due to either the difficulty/ease of the task, or the 
participant’s motivation/lack of motivation. They were then asked to evaluate their peer’s ability. 
Muenks et al. (in press) found across all studies that when effort was described as task-
elicited (e.g., arising due to subjective difficulty or ease of the task), participants were more 
likely to perceive an inverse relation between amount of effort and ability (i.e. high effort reflects 
low ability). When effort was described as self-initiated (e.g., arising due to motivation or lack of 
motivation), participants were more likely to perceive a positive relation between amount of 
effort and ability (i.e., high effort reflects high ability). 
Importantly, these patterns were found only in the absence of clear performance 
outcomes. In other words, when explicit performance information was provided, participants 
tended to rely heavily on that information when evaluating the characters’ abilities and ignore 
effort source information. Only in conditions in which performance information was not 
provided did effort source appear to influence participants’ ability evaluations. This finding is 
important because Muenks et al. (in press) were the first to examine students’ ability evaluations 
of hypothetical characters in both the presence and absence of explicit performance information. 
In previous research, performance information was always provided and appeared to play an 
important role in students’ ability evaluations (e.g., Nicholls, 1978; Nicholls & Miller, 1984; 
Kun, 1977; Heyman & Compton, 2006). Thus, results from these studies suggest that effort 
source may be particularly important in achievement situations in which students are not given 
access to information about others’ performance (e.g., grades). In Study 1 of the proposed 
dissertation studies, I isolated performance information from effort source information in order 
to examine whether I could replicate the results of Muenks et al. (in press). 
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As a whole, studies conducted by Muenks et al. (in press) suggest that task-elicited cues 
lead to an inverse relation between amount of effort and ability, whereas self-initiated effort cues 
lead to a more positive relation between effort and ability. This pattern of results was also found 
when participants were asked to recall achievement situations from their real lives and evaluate 
the abilities of peers or acquaintances. Thus, it appears that source of effort cues can influence 
the direction of the relation between effort and ability when college students are asked to make 
ability evaluations of other people. However, as will be discussed in the next section, Muenks et 
al. (in press) did not examine how cues about task-elicited and self-initiated effort impact 
students’ evaluations of their own abilities in school-related contexts, which I did in the present 
dissertation studies. 
In summary, the distinction between task-elicited and self-initiated effort can help extend 
existing theories about the relations between amount of effort and ability (Nicholls, 1978; Dweck 
& Master, 2009) by identifying an additional cue that individuals use to understand this relation. 
In their original form, both theorists seemed to assume that a student’s conception of ability 
determined how he or she viewed the relation between amount of effort and ability, although 
Nicholls (1978) focused on situational predictors of ability conceptions whereas Dweck (1999; 
Dweck & Master, 2009) focused on individual difference predictors. Specifically, they posited 
that a differentiated or entity conception of ability will lead people to perceive a negative relation 
between amount of effort and ability, whereas an undifferentiated or incremental conception of 
ability will lead them to perceive a positive relation. 
However, as previously suggested, it is possible that individuals’ conceptions of ability 
only predispose them to interpret effort in a particular manner. Those with a differentiated or 
entity conception of ability might be predisposed to view effort as task-elicited in most contexts, 
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while those with an undifferentiated or incremental conception of ability might be predisposed to 
view effort as self-initiated. But it is possible that even when people hold an entity or 
differentiated conception of ability, if they primarily perceive another person’s effort as being 
internally motivated (e.g., self-initiated), they might shift to a different definition of ability (e.g., 
ability as a set of skills) and view their effort as positively related to ability. Similarly, even 
when people hold an incremental or undifferentiated conception of ability, if they primarily 
perceive another’s effort as being elicited by the subjective difficulty of the task (e.g., task-
elicited), they might shift to a different definition of ability (e.g., as a capacity) and view the 
amount of their effort and ability as being inversely related. In other words, conceptions of 
ability may not always be the primary determinant of how individuals will perceive the relation 
between amount of effort and ability; perceptions of the source of effort are also important, and 
may vary independently from conceptions of ability. Thus, not only are perceptions of effort 
source and ability conceptions distinct constructs, but they may influence each other in a 
bidirectional manner: in some situations ability conceptions may lead to different perceptions of 
effort source, and in other situations information about effort source may lead to different ability 
conceptions. Although not tested in the present studies, this bidirectional relation seems 
theoretically plausible based on previous research. See Figure 1 for a visual depiction of the 
literature review and theoretical model guiding the present studies. 
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Figure 1. A model of what influences students’ perceptions of the relation between effort and 
ability. This model is situated within a particular achievement situation. The red arrow is what I 
tested in the present dissertation studies. 
 
It may be useful to identify what types of information shift students’ perceptions of effort 
source because this information may at times override students’ conception of ability to 
influence how they perceive the relation between amount of effort and ability at that moment. 
For example, verbal, written, or visual cues that indicate that someone is working hard because 
they feel the task is challenging for them or they are struggling with the task, such as hearing a 
fellow student discuss how difficult the task is for them, or observing a fellow student get visibly 
frustrated with the task, might prime students to think in terms of task-elicited effort. Conversely, 
information that provides insight into someone’s motivations or that indicate that someone is 
working hard because of goals they have set for themselves, because they want to learn or 
perform well, or because they are particularly interested in or place value on some aspect of the 
task, might prime students to think in terms of self-initiated effort. 
In conclusion, although much of the literature reviewed earlier that empirically tested 














about ability influence how they perceive the relation between amount of effort and ability, 
studies by Heyman and colleagues (Heyman et al., 2003; Heyman & Compton, 2006) and 
Muenks and colleagues (in press) suggest that students’ perceptions about the type of effort 
exerted may also influence perceptions of this relation. Adding perceptions of the source of 
effort, a somewhat novel variable to apply to the literature on academic effort and ability, as an 
extension to both Nicholls (1978, 1984) and Dweck’s (Dweck & Master, 2009) theories may 
provide more targeted and complete predictions of students’ evaluations of their own and others’ 
abilities.  
Gaps in the Literature 
Although the research reviewed above provides valuable insight into how individuals 
perceive the relation between academic effort and ability and how ability evaluations are 
influenced by social comparison information, there are several notable gaps in the literature that 
future research should address. As discussed previously, much previous work conducted within 
the framework of both Nicholls (1978, 1984) and Dweck’s (1999; Dweck & Master, 2009) 
theories focuses on how students’ conceptions of ability influence how they relate quantity of 
effort to ability (e.g., Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1984; Hong et al., 1999) without directly measuring 
or manipulating students’ perceptions about effort. More specifically, no previous studies except 
Muenks et al. (in press) examined how the source of effort might play a role. As discussed 
throughout this review, these perceptions might be important predictors of how students perceive 
the relation between quantity of effort and ability, and thus how they evaluate their own and 
others’ academic abilities in school. 
Koriat and colleagues (e.g., Koriat et al., 2006; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Koriat et al., 
2009) examined data-driven and goal-driven functions of effort, but applied them to specific, 
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task-based metacognitive outcomes (e.g., JOLs). These researchers examined the impact of 
situational task demands on the correlation between study time and individuals’ judgments of 
learning for a particular task. However, they did not examine how individuals’ perceptions of 
effort source might influence students’ self-evaluations of ability. It is important to examine 
these more general self-beliefs, which predict a wide range of motivation- and achievement-
related outcomes (e.g., Dweck, 2002; Wigfield et al., 2015; Bandura, 1997; Weiner, 1986; Eccles 
et al., 1983). Thus, it may be useful to manipulate students’ beliefs or perceptions about effort 
source explicitly in order to examine whether these beliefs influence students’ evaluations of 
their own abilities. 
Heyman and colleagues (Heyman et al., 2003; Heyman & Compton, 2006) found that 
information about effort (i.e., feelings of ease/difficulty versus trying hard/not trying hard) might 
differentially influence children’s ability evaluations of other people. However, they did not 
specifically examine individuals’ perceptions of task-elicited and self-initiated effort. They also 
utilized a sample of young children who may not fully understand or be able to differentiate 
between the concepts of effort and ability, so there are developmental concerns with interpreting 
the results. Muenks et al. (in press) addressed these concerns by examining how task-elicited and 
self-initiated source of effort cues impacted college students’ ability evaluations of others. 
However, they did not examine how these cues influenced participants’ evaluations of 
themselves. 
Given these gaps, it is important to extend extant literature in several ways, which I did in 
the proposed dissertation studies. First, participants’ perceptions of task-elicited and self-initiated 
effort were manipulated directly: participants were told that they worked hard because of the 
subjective difficulty of the task or because they were self-motivated. Second, I examined how 
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these perceptions of effort source influenced students’ evaluations of ability, rather than their 
judgments of learning for a specific task. Third, because students’ evaluations of themselves 
were much more proximal predictors of their motivation and achievement in school than their 
evaluations of others, I focused on students’ self-evaluations of ability. Finally, I asked students 
to make self-evaluations as compared to other individuals, incorporating social comparison 
processes into the studies. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to address these gaps in the literature, the purpose of 
the present dissertation studies was to examine how perceived effort source (i.e., whether effort 
is perceived as being task-elicited or self-initiated) influenced students’ ability evaluations of 
themselves as compared to another student. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, I 
examined this in two studies: one that utilized a vignette methodology (Study 1) and the other 
that placed participants in a more realistic scenario by having them complete an actual task 
(Study 2). Vignettes have been used extensively in the literature on students’ perceptions of 
effort and ability (Kun et al., 1974; Kun, 1977; Droege & Stipek, 1993; Karabenick & Heller, 
1976; Surber, 1980; Wimmer et al., 1982; Harari & Covington, 1981; Juvonen & Murdock, 
1995), and are a useful methodological tool to examine students’ cognitive processes in 
academic situations while controlling for potentially confounding variables. However, given that 
vignettes do have disadvantages, such as asking participants to imagine a hypothetical scenario 
that they may or may not experience in real life, in the second study participants completed a 
mathematics task and were asked to think about the effort they actually exerted. 
In the present studies I utilized a sample of college students. College students are the 
chosen population for the present studies for several reasons. First, using a sample of older 
students (who are all over the age of 18) helped to control for any confounding effects of age or 
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developmental level. As discussed previously, scholars disagree as to the exact age when 
individuals are able to differentiate between concepts of effort and ability (e.g., Karabenick & 
Heller, 1976; Surber, 1980), with at least one study indicating that even high school aged 
students might not yet fully understand the inverse relation between effort and ability (Harari & 
Covington, 1981). Thus, it is important to utilize a sample of adult students who researchers 
agree have formed a mature understanding of the concepts of effort and ability. 
Second, many previous studies on effort source have utilized college student samples 
(e.g., Koriat et al., 2006; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Muenks et al., in press). Findings from the 
Koriat studies indicate that college students are sensitive to both data-driven and goal-driven 
regulation, and are able to attribute their effort to both sources. Muenks et al. (in press) found 
that college students appear to make different ability evaluations of other students depending on 
whether their effort is framed as task-elicited or self-initiated. Thus, effort source appears to be a 
useful and interesting construct to examine within this population. However, more research is 
needed to determine the processes by which effort source influences college students’ 
perceptions of the relation between effort and ability. 
Third, research suggests that college students use social comparison processes when 
forming evaluations of their abilities (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1983; Wood, 1989; Wheeler, 1966; 
Wheeler, Koestner, & Driver, 1982), and that college students’ self-evaluations of ability are 
particularly important predictors of their adjustment to college, grades, retention, and career 
prospects (e.g., Robbins, Lauver, Le, Davis, & Langley, 2004; Zajacova, Lynch, & Espenshade, 
2005; Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001; Lent, Brown, & Larkin, 1986). Thus, it is important to 
examine how effort source may influence self-evaluations within this population. 
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Both studies took place in the domain of mathematics. I chose to situate both studies 
within the same academic domain because previous researchers have found differences in how 
individuals conceptualize ability across different domains, such as math and reading (e.g., 
Grouws & Lembke, 1996; Buehl & Alexander, 2001). Thus, keeping both studies within the 
domain of math controlled for any confounding influences of domain on students’ ability 
evaluations. Also, math is a domain for which most people believe an underlying ability exists 
(e.g., Burns & Isbell, 2007; Burkley, Parker, Stermer, & Burkley, 2010), whereas people may not 
hold that same belief about other college course domains, such as history and psychology. Since 
I asked students to evaluate their own domain-specific ability from their hypothetical effort in a 
specific college course (Study 1) or real effort on a task (Study 2), I figured math would be a 
good domain to utilize. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed previous theory and research on evaluations of ability and 
effort in various contexts, as well as how individuals conceptualize the relation between the 
quantity of academic effort and ability. I used social comparison theory and attribution theory as 
broad frameworks, and explored in depth two theories that make predictions about how students 
perceive the relation between effort and ability: one that is primarily developmental and 
situational in nature (Nicholls, 1978, 1984), and the other that focuses on individual differences 
(Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Master, 2009). Both of these theories and the accompanying empirical 
work focused on how conceptions of ability influence perceptions of the effort-ability relation 
but do not emphasize beliefs or perceptions about effort. Researchers from cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Koriat et al., 2006) introduced the concepts of data-driven and goal-driven effort but 
applied these concepts only to specific, metacognitive outcomes. Other recent work with young 
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children (Heyman & Compton, 2006) examined how contextual effort cues influenced ability 
evaluations, but did not explicitly examine the role of task-elicited and self-initiated effort. 
Finally, Muenks et al. (in press) examined how source of effort cues influenced ability 
evaluations of others, but not ability evaluations of the self. The present studies therefore sought 
to apply the ideas of task-elicited and self-initiated effort to college students’ own self-
evaluations. Ultimately, this work could help researchers, educators, and parents better 
understand how students make assessments about their own and others’ effort and ability, which 




Chapter 3: Methods 
Study 1 
 Design. The purpose of this study was to examine how information about effort source 
(i.e., whether it is described as task-elicited or self-initiated) influenced students’ perceptions of 
the relation between levels of effort and ability, and, by extension, their evaluations of their own 
abilities as compared to those of other hypothetical students. Information about effort source was 
manipulated using vignettes, and participants evaluated their own abilities with a Likert-type 
scale. This study utilized a 2 x 2 x 2 experimental design with one between-subjects factor, 
source of effort condition (task-elicited, self-initiated), and two within-subjects factors, level of 
effort (high, low) and score (high, low). Each participant was randomly assigned to either the 
task-elicited or self-initiated condition, but received all combinations of level of effort and score 
conditions in randomized order. 
 Participants. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, undergraduate students were the target 
population. The sampling frame included undergraduate students enrolled at the University of 
Maryland, College Park. I used non-probability sampling, specifically convenience sampling, in 
order to recruit my participants. I recruited participants for Studies 1 and 2 simultaneously and 
used slightly different recruitment strategies for each study. Because I received a University of 
Maryland College of Education SPARC grant worth $1,000, I recruited participants for Study 1 
through the University of Maryland Paid SONA system and paid them $4 for their participation.  
The desired sample size for Study 1 was based on a power analysis conducted with 
G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007, 2009). As described in more detail 
below, the main analysis I ran was a 2 (effort source: task-elicited, self-initiated) x 2 (effort level: 
high, low) x 2 (score: high, low) x 3 (evaluation order: first, second, third) ANOVA with one 
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between-subjects factor and three within-subjects factors. I was specifically interested in a three-
way interaction between effort source, effort level, and evaluation order. However, a previous 
study I conducted (Muenks et al., in press) with the same analysis yielded a very large effect size 
that would have resulted in an extremely small required sample size had I used it for this power 
analysis. I therefore decided to examine the required sample size I would need if I wanted to 
examine simple main effects between the effort source conditions (i.e., task-elicited, self-
initiated) within each effort level condition (low, high), which is a more precise analysis. I 
conducted similar analyses in Studies 1a and 1b of Muenks et al. (in press) when I examined 
differences between effort source groups (task-elicited, self-initiated, and a control condition) 
within a particular score condition using t-tests. I decided to identify the smallest effect size from 
those t-tests and use that as the effect size in my current power analysis. I chose to do this 
because I wanted enough power to detect smaller simple main effects in addition to the overall 
main effects and interactions from the ANOVA. 
Thus, the statistical test chosen within G*Power was “Means: Difference between two 
independent means (two groups)” which is part of the t-test family. This was a two-tailed t-test. 
The effect size d was calculated using an online t-test calculator (Becker, 2014). I calculated the 
effect sizes of all of the simple main effects between effort source groups within particular score 
conditions in Studies 1a and 1b of Muenks et al. (in press) by entering the t values and degrees of 
freedom into the online t-test calculator. The smallest effect size I found was in Study 1b and 
corresponded to a t-test examining the difference between the control group and the self-initiated 
group within the “no score” score condition. The effect size d for this analysis was 0.40, so this 
is what I entered into G*Power for the present power analysis. Power was set to 0.80 and alpha 
was set to .05 (Cohen, 1992). The Allocation ratio N2/N1 was left at 1, as I assume the number 
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of participants in the effort source groups will be equal. After all the input parameters were 
entered, the total required sample size was 196 participants, which is approximately 98 
participants per effort source group. 
A total of 210 undergraduate participants completed the study. Due to an error in 
scheduling, one participant completed the study twice, so the data from the second time the 
participant completed the study was excluded from the analyses. The sample was 67.8% female, 
and the average age of participants was 20.29 years (SD = 1.82 years). The ethnic breakdown 
was 38.6% White, 26.2% Black, 22.9% Asian or Asian American, 7.1% Bi-racial or multi-racial, 
and 5.2% Hispanic. Students’ majors were in the following categories: 24.3% Behavioral and 
Social Sciences, 21% Computer, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences, 11.4% Public Health, 11% 
Arts and Humanities, 10.5% Engineering, 9.5% Business, 4.3% Agriculture/Natural Resources, 
2.9% Education, 1.9% Journalism, 1.4% Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, 1.4% Public 
Policy, and .5% stated they did not have a major. 
 Vignettes and dependent measures. Information about effort level, effort source, and 
score was manipulated using vignettes. For each vignette, participants were asked to imagine a 
past scenario in which they were sitting in a college-level mathematics class next to another 
student of the same gender, and the professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to 
complete on their own in a certain amount of time. They then received effort level information. 
In the high effort conditions, they were asked to imagine that they spent the full amount of time 
on the task and worked hard, whereas the other student only spent a few minutes on the task and 
did not work hard. In the low effort conditions, they were asked to imagine the opposite: that 
they did not work hard, but the other student did. They were then asked to evaluate their math 
ability compared to the other student’s using a 9-point Likert scale (1 = the other student’s ability 
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is much higher; 5 = they have the same ability; 9 = their ability is much higher). This was the 
first ability evaluation.  
The next piece of information participants received depended on which source of effort 
condition they were in. Participants in the task-elicited group were told that the target person 
(themselves or the other student) who worked hard did so because they felt that the problems 
were very difficult, whereas the person who did not work hard did so because they felt that the 
problems were very easy. Those in the self-initiated group were told that the person who worked 
hard did so because he or she was motivated to engage in the task, whereas the person who did 
not work hard did so because he or she was not motivated to engage in the task. After receiving 
this information, participants were asked to make another ability evaluation comparing their 
math ability against the other student’s, using the same item as before. This was the second 
ability evaluation. 
Finally, participants were told score information: In the high score conditions, they were 
told that they received a higher score than the other student, whereas in the low score conditions, 
they were told that they received a lower score than the other student. They were asked to make 
an evaluation of their ability compared to the other student’s using the same ability item as 
before. This was the third ability evaluation. See Appendix A for the full set of vignettes. 
This sequential design allowed me to examine how participants’ self-evaluations changed 
with each new piece of information—whether they increased, decreased, or stayed the same. I 
was therefore able to isolate the effects of each individual piece of information on participants’ 
self-evaluations, which allowed me to specifically examine how effort source information 
influenced participants’ ability evaluations given the amount of effort they exert, and how score 
information influenced participants’ ability evaluations given the amount of effort they exert and 
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the source of their effort. A similar design was used in Karabenick and Heller (1976) and Study 2 
of Muenks et al. (in press). See Figure 2 for a visual depiction of the design for the Study 1 
vignettes. 
 
Figure 2. Design for the Study 1 vignettes. Boxes with black text correspond to the information 
participants received, while those with gray text correspond to the ability evaluations they were 
asked to make after receiving each piece of information. 
 
Participants may evaluate their own ability differently based on the domain of the task 
and the gender of the comparison other (e.g., Bornholt, Goodnow, & Cooney, 1994). Thus, all 
vignettes took place in the domain of mathematics and participants were always asked to make 
comparisons of themselves with other students with gender-matched names in order to best 
control for these variables. In each vignette, participants were asked to imagine they were either 
in a college-level calculus or statistics class. I chose calculus and statistics because these are 
introductory-level math classes that most students (regardless of major) could realistically 
imagine taking. 
Additional measures. In addition to the vignettes, participants completed four other 
measures: a measure of their beliefs about their math ability prior to the task, a measure of their 
social comparison orientation, a measure of the amount of social comparison information they 
perceive is available to them in their day-to-day lives, and a measure of their beliefs about 
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intelligence. The last three measures were given at the very end of the study. I measured these 
variables so that I could examine any differences in these variables between the two effort source 
groups, and include them as covariates in the analyses. 
Beliefs about math ability. Participants responded to the following question prior to 
reading the vignettes: How would you evaluate your own mathematics ability? They responded 
using a slider scale that ranges from 1-100; the anchors were “very low” to “very high”. 
Social comparison orientation. Participants responded to four items about their social 
comparison orientation specifically for school. A sample item is, “I often compare myself to 
other students in my classes to determine how well I am doing academically.” Participants 
indicated their agreement or disagreement with each item on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (I 
disagree strongly) to 5 (I agree strongly).2 These items had good internal consistency with this 
sample (α = .89). 
Social comparison information available. Participants were asked to respond the item, 
“In general, how much information is available to you about how others are doing in your 
college classes?” (from 1 = very little to 5 = a lot). 
Beliefs about intelligence. We used Dweck’s (1999) Theories of Intelligence (TOI) scale 
to measure participants’ general beliefs about the fixedness of intelligence. The version we used 
consists of eight items. Sample items are, “You have a certain amount of intelligence and you 
can’t really do much to change it” and “You can learn new things, but you can’t really change 
your basic intelligence.” Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with each item on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly 
agree). These items had excellent internal consistency with this sample (α = .95). 
                                                
2 For both studies, participants also completed a modified version of the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation 
Measure (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), but analyses pertaining to those items are not reported here. 
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 Procedure. Participants entered the laboratory and were asked to sit in front of a 
computer. The experimenter (i.e., either me or an undergraduate research assistant) went over the 
consent form with the participant and asked if he or she had any questions before beginning the 
study. The experimenter then clicked on a bookmark that was saved within the browser of one of 
two versions of the study: Version 1 was for males, and Version 2 was for females. I did not ask 
participants to report their own gender before participating in the study due to concerns about 
stereotype threat, which can impact especially females’ performance on math tasks and beliefs 
about their ability in math (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995). The experimenter then entered an ID 
number into the computer for each participant, and informed the participant that the study should 
take approximately 20 minutes. Once the study began, participants saw the following on the 
screen: 
Welcome! 
Before we begin, please answer the following question. 
How would you evaluate your own mathematics ability? 
After they make an evaluation of their mathematics ability using the slider scale (described 
above), they were shown the following instructions: 
Please read the following hypothetical scenarios. 
Although the scenarios will seem similar to one another, there are some key differences, 
so it is important that you read each one carefully. 
In each scenario, you will be asked to imagine that you are in a college level class next to 
another student. You will be given some information and then asked to evaluate your 
own ability as compared to the other student. You will then be given additional pieces of 
information and asked to evaluate your own ability as compared to the other student after 
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each piece of information is presented. You will make a total of three evaluations per 
scenario. Please make your evaluations based on what you think is most likely given the 
information. 
Finally, at the end of the study, you will be asked to indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with a few additional statements about yourself. 
There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your opinions. 
Participants then completed a total of eight vignettes using the web-based survey tool Qualtrics: 
two vignettes for each combination of the within-subjects factors (i.e., high effort-low score, 
high effort-high score, low effort-low score, and low effort-high score). So for example, there 
were two high effort-low score vignettes, two high effort-high score vignettes, and so on; this 
helped to increase reliability. Small details, such as the type of mathematics classroom (i.e., 
calculus or statistics), exact timing information, and name of the other student were changed 
between these two vignettes in order to reduce repetition. The order of presentation of all eight 
vignettes was randomized for each participant (e.g., participants did not necessarily get the two 
vignettes that were similar directly after one another). In order to give participants a break from 
reading so many similar vignettes, participants were given a two-minute break after the first four 
vignettes they read. During this break, they were asked to list as many United States state 
capitals as they can in two minutes by typing them into a text box. After two minutes had passed, 
they were able to continue reading and responding to the vignettes. 
After responding to all eight vignettes, participants completed the social comparison 
orientation scale and the amount of social comparison available item. They also completed the 
Theories of Intelligence scale. Participants then responded to questions asking about their major, 
age, gender, and ethnicity. Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the study via 
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information on the computer screen. See Appendix A for the full set of demographic questions 
and the debriefing information. 
Data analysis plan. In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (see Chapter 1), I ran a 2 (effort 
source: task-elicited, self-initiated) x 2 (effort level: high, low) x 2 (score: high, low) x 3 (ability 
evaluation order: first, second, third) ANCOVA, with repeated measures on the last three factors. 
Students’ self-evaluations of ability were the dependent variables. Students’ initial beliefs about 
math ability, students’ social comparison orientation, social comparison information available, 
and theories of intelligence were entered as covariates in each analysis. I was able to examine 
whether participants’ ability evaluations increased or decreased after they received information 
about effort source (i.e., between the first and second ability evaluation) in both the low and high 
effort conditions. I was also able determine whether participants endorsed an overall positive or 
negative relation between effort and ability by examining whether they evaluated their own 
ability (as compared to the other hypothetical student) higher when they exerted low effort 
(which is consistent with an inverse relation) or when they exerted high effort (which is 
consistent with a positive relation). 
I looked at all main effects and interactions, but was particularly interested in specific 
interactions and planned comparisons that directly tested my hypotheses (see below). All 
significant main effects and interactions were followed up with various post hoc tests to 
determine whether the means significantly differed from each other. Because I ran so many 
statistical tests, the experiment-wise error rate may have been high, which means that there was 
an increased chance of making a Type I error (e.g., getting at least one p-value that was less than 
.05, even if it does not reflect an actual difference between means). There are several different 
ways of dealing with the experiment-wise error rate. One of the most common ways to deal with 
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this problem is to use the Bonferroni correction (e.g., Bland & Altman, 1995), in which 
researchers use a modified alpha value (α/k, where k is the number of statistical tests conducted). 
However, critics of Bonferroni correction argue that it is too conservative, reduces power, and 
results in a very high Type II error rate (e.g., Nakagawa, 2004). Nakagawa (2004) recommends 
that, in order to mitigate this concern, researchers should not place all emphasis on statistical 
significance (i.e., p values), but should also report effect sizes. Standardized effect sizes are 
measures of the strength of experimental effects. They are comparable across studies even with 
different sample sizes, which allows researchers to determine the practical importance of the 
results. Thus, in the present studies, I reported not only the p-values for all of my analyses but 
also the partial eta squared, which is an indicator of effect size (e.g., Nakagawa, 2004). 
Additionally, because the effects I examined all have a priori theoretical justification, I did not 
haphazardly search for significant effects in the data but focused on specific hypothesized 
interactions. 
In order to test my hypotheses, I was specifically interested in two analyses. First, I 
examined the effort source x effort level x ability evaluation order three-way interaction because 
I wanted to see how participants’ ability evaluations changed after they received effort source 
information (i.e., between the first and second evaluations) based on effort level and effort 
source information. As stated in the hypotheses for this study, I expected to find that participants 
in the task-elicited, low effort condition would increase their ability evaluations from the first to 
the second evaluation, whereas participants in the task-elicited, high effort condition would 
decrease their ability evaluations from the first to the second evaluation. In contrast, I expected 
that participants in the self-initiated, low effort condition would decrease their ability evaluations 
from the first to the second evaluation, whereas participants in the self-initiated, high effort 
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condition would increase their ability evaluations from the first to the second evaluation. Second, 
in order to test whether participants in each effort source condition endorsed an overall positive 
or inverse relation between effort and ability, I calculated the difference between the estimated 
mean of participants’ ability evaluations after receiving effort source information (i.e., the 
second ability evaluation) in the high effort condition versus the low effort condition. Difference 
scores were not calculated for each individual participant; thus, there is only a single difference 
score for each effort source condition (task-elicited and self-initiated). I expected that the 
difference score for the task-elicited condition would be significantly negative, which suggests 
and inverse relation between effort and ability, whereas the difference score for the self-initiated 
condition would be significantly positive, which suggests a positive relation between effort and 
ability. This pattern of effects would support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Although not part of my focal hypotheses, I also expected to find some additional main 
effects and interactions. Based on results from Muenks et al. (in press) Study 2, which used a 
similar design, I expected to find a main effect of score: participants would evaluate their own 
abilities higher overall when they receive a high score as opposed to a low score. I also expected 
to find a score x ability evaluation order interaction: if participants received a high score their 
evaluations would increase from the second to the third evaluation (i.e., after receiving score 
information), whereas if they received a low score their evaluations would decrease from the 
second to the third evaluation. These results would be consistent with prior research (e.g., Kun, 
1977; Heyman et al., 2003). Finally, I explored significant covariate main effects and 
interactions, in order to determine whether the covariates moderated any of my effects; I did not 
have any specific hypotheses regarding these main effects or interactions. 
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Study 2 
 Design. The purpose of Study 2 was to extend Study 1 by examining how effort source 
information influenced ability evaluations in a more realistic situation. Rather than using 
vignettes, participants were asked to complete a math task, and were told that another 
(hypothetical) student of the same gender completed the same task (see detailed description and 
rationale for the task below). They were asked to report how much effort they exerted on the task 
and were told that the other student either exerted more or less effort than they did. Their effort 
(along with the other student’s) was framed as either task-elicited or self-initiated (or neither in 
the control condition), and they were asked to make an evaluation of their own math ability 
compared to the other student’s. This study utilized a 3 x 2 experimental design with two 
between-subjects factors, source of effort (task-elicited, self-initiated, control) and level of effort 
(high, low). Each participant was assigned to one of six conditions: task-elicited-low effort, task-
elicited-high effort, control-low effort, control-high effort, self-initiated-low effort, or self-
initiated-high effort. 
Participants. The population and sampling frame for Study 2 was the same as in Study 
1, explained above. However, the sampling plan was different. Rather than paying participants 
cash for their participation, I utilized the University of Maryland SONA system for 
undergraduate recruitment, which is a system that allows undergraduates to receive course credit 
for participating in research studies. All participants received 0.5 course credits for this 30-
minute study. 
The desired sample size was based on a power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1 
(Faul et al., 2007, 2009). The statistical test chosen for the a priori power analysis was 
“ANCOVA: Fixed effects, main effects and interactions”, since the focal analysis of the current 
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study was examining differences in ability evaluations between the six groups. Power was set to 
0.80 and α was set to .05 (Cohen, 1992). The number of groups was 6 (task-elicited-high effort, 
task-elicited-low effort, self-initiated-high effort, self-initiated-low effort, control-high effort, 
control-low effort) and the numerator df was set to 2, which was calculated with the formula 
numerator df = (# levels in first factor – 1)(# levels in second factor – 1) (G*Power, 2014). The 
number of covariates was set to 3 (effort distance, initial self-evaluation of math ability, and 
social comparison orientation—all explained below3). The effect size f was set to 0.25, which is 
considered a medium effect. A previous study I conducted with a similar analysis yielded a very 
large effect size (Muenks et al., in press) but I wanted to be conservative and have enough power 
to detect a medium effect. Thus, the total sample size needed was 158 participants, or 
approximately 26 participants per group. 
A total of 172 undergraduate students participated in the study. Three participants were 
excluded from the analyses due to not completing the study: One participant voluntarily quit the 
study after only a few minutes, and two other participants were not able to complete the study 
due to technological issues. An additional nine participants were excluded from the analyses 
because they had a value of ‘0’ on the “Effort Distance” variable (explained in more detail 
below). Thus, the final sample consisted of 160 undergraduate participants. The sample was 
78.1% female, and the average age of participants was 19.49 years (SD = 1.45 years). The ethnic 
breakdown was 52.5% White, 25% Asian or Asian American, 10.6% Black, 7.5% Bi-racial or 
multi-racial, and 4.4% Hispanic. Students’ majors were in the following categories: 36.3% 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 26.3% Computer, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences, 14.4% 
Public Health, 4.4% Other, 3.8% Agriculture/Natural Resources, 3.1% Arts and Humanities, 
                                                
3 I added two additional covariates to the final analyses: amount of social comparison information available and 
theories of intelligence. 
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2.5% Business, 2.5% Journalism, 1.9% Engineering, 1.3% Education, and 3.8% indicated they 
did not have a major. 
Measures.  
Dependent measures. After completing the task and going through the effort source and 
effort level manipulations (explained in more detail below), participants evaluated their own 
math abilities at three levels of specificity: Their ability on the specific fraction task, their 
general fraction ability, and their general math ability. In each case, they were told, “Now, please 
evaluate your own [ability on this specific fraction task, general fraction ability, general math 
ability] compared to the other participant’s” on a 9-point Likert scale from 1 = [His/her] ability is 
much higher, 5 = Our abilities are the same, 9 = My ability is much higher. 
Beliefs about math ability. Participants responded to the same question as in Study 1 
measuring their belief about their math ability. 
Social comparison orientation. Participants completed the same social comparison 
orientation items described in Study 1. These items had good internal consistency with this 
sample (α = .85). 
Social comparison information available. Participants were asked to respond the item, 
“In general, how much information is available to you about how others are doing in your 
college classes?” (from 1 = very little to 5 = a lot). 
Beliefs about intelligence. Participants completed Dweck’s (1999) eight-item Theories of 
Intelligence (TOI) scale described in Study 1. These items had excellent internal consistency 
with this sample (α = .95). 
 Materials and procedure. Participants entered the laboratory and were placed in front of 
a computer. The experimenter (i.e., either me or an undergraduate research assistant) went over 
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the consent form with the participant and asked if he or she had any questions before beginning 
the study. The experimenter then clicked on a bookmark that was saved within the browser of 
one of two versions of the study: Version 1 was for males, and Version 2 was for females. As in 
Study 1, participants were not asked to report their own gender in order to reduce concerns about 
stereotype threat. The experimenter then entered an ID number into the computer for each 
participant, and informed the participant that the study should take approximately 30 minutes to 
complete. Once the study began, participants saw the following on the screen: 
Welcome! 
Before we begin, please answer the following question. 
How would you evaluate your own mathematics ability? 
After the participants evaluated their own math ability using the same item and scale as in Study 
1 (see above), they received the following instructions: 
You will now be asked to complete a math task having to do with modifying recipes. 
This is the same math task that another [male/female] undergraduate participant 
completed a few days ago. 
For this task, you will be provided with four different recipes. Each recipe will include a 
list of ingredients with specific quantities. You will then be asked to change those 
quantities, for example by doubling or halving the recipes, without using a calculator. 
Please reduce the fraction to its simplest form. For all fractions greater than 1, you will 
need to provide your answers as mixed numbers (e.g., 1 ¼), rather than improper 
fractions (e.g., 5/4) or decimals (e.g., 1.25). 
Participants were told that another undergraduate participant of the same gender completed the 
task a few days ago because they were later asked to compare their ability to that of the other 
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participant. Participants’ perceptions of effort source were experimentally induced both before 
and after the task. Before the task, participants in the task-elicited conditions were shown the 
following sentence on their screen: “A lot of people work hard on this task because it is 
difficult.” Participants in the self-initiated conditions were shown: “A lot of people work hard on 
this task because they feel motivated to complete it.” Participants in the control conditions were 
shown: “A lot of people work hard on this task.” The purpose of including this information at the 
beginning of the study was so that participants can begin to think about effort source while they 
were actually working on the task. Finally, all participants were told: “Please complete this task 
in one sitting, without stopping. You may use a pen and paper, but please do NOT use a 
calculator. Click ‘Continue’ to begin.” 
Participants then completed the task, using as much time as needed. The task itself 
consisted of four different baking or cooking recipes, each with a list of approximately 10-13 
ingredients with specific quantities (see Appendix B for the full set of recipes). A photo of the 
food accompanied each recipe so that the task seems more realistic. Participants were asked to 
change the quantities of the ingredients based on various ratios, for example by doubling or 
halving the recipe, without using a calculator. For example, they were told something like, “This 
recipe calls for 12 servings, and you would like to make 4 servings.” Then, they saw a list of 
ingredients, such as “2 1/3 cup butter” and were asked to provide the new ingredient quantity in 
the same unit as a mixed number. 
I chose to have participants complete a fraction recipe task because it seemed challenging 
yet still possible for a general college student population to complete successfully. Most college 
students have developed skills related to multiplying and dividing fractions, but these tasks can 
be made more difficult by including more unusual fractions. I wanted the task to be difficult 
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enough that I could realistically induce perceptions of task-elicited effort for participants in the 
task-elicited condition, but I also wanted the task to be motivating enough that I could 
realistically induce perceptions of self-initiated effort for participants in the self-initiated 
condition. I thought that a fraction task related to cooking and baking recipes could be useful in 
real life, and thus participants could be motivated to complete the task. I did not want to ask 
participants to engage in a complex calculus or algebra task because I wanted the task to be 
accessible to students at all levels of math, and also because I did not necessarily think a calculus 
or algebra task would be very motivating. I pilot tested this recipe task in May 2014 with several 
graduate students, professors, and other adults (N = 13), who gave useful suggestions to improve 
the task. Participants in this pilot study were also asked several questions regarding their feelings 
about the task on a 1-100 scale. They indicated that they took the recipe task seriously (M = 
82.31, SD = 14.23) and felt motivated to engage in the recipe task (M = 73.54, SD = 14.19), and 
several participants gave verbal feedback indicating that they felt the task was challenging. I 
therefore felt confident that I could experimentally induce perceptions of either task-elicited or 
self-initiated effort on the task. 
 After participants completed the calculations for all four recipes, they reported the level 
of their effort. On the computer screen, they were asked, “On a scale from 1 to 10, how much 
effort did you feel that you exerted on this task?” (from 1 = very little effort at all to 10 = a great 
deal of effort). Next, participants in the task-elicited and self-initiated conditions were asked to 
respond to a total of five open-ended questions about their effort on the task. These questions 
were intended to induce participants’ perceptions of their own effort as either task-elicited or 
self-initiated. Participants in the control conditions did not respond to any open-ended questions. 
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Participants in the task-elicited conditions answered questions such as, “What specific 
aspects of this task were most difficult?” and “What specific aspects of this task were easiest?” 
They were required to provide a response that was at least 50 characters long for each question 
so that they had to write down at least one sentence. All of the questions in the task-elicited 
condition were focused on the perceived properties of the task itself, not the individual, and thus 
were intended to put participants in the mindset of task-elicited effort. The rationale behind this 
manipulation strategy is that, by coming up with and writing responses to these questions, 
participants would perceive their own effort (however much they exerted) as arising primarily 
from the perceived demands of the task. 
Participants in the self-initiated conditions answered questions focused on the 
individual’s own motivation, such as, “What, specifically, increased your motivation during the 
task?” and “What, specifically, decreased your motivation during the task?” They were also 
required to provide a response that was at least 50 characters long for each question. These 
questions emphasized the motivation (or lack of motivation) from the self rather than the 
perceived demands of the task. Coming up with responses to these open-ended questions was 
intended to encourage participants to perceive their own effort on the task as being self-initiated. 
Originally I did not intend to code the responses to these questions nor using them in any 
analyses because the responses themselves were not of interest to the hypotheses of the study. 
Simply having the participants write out their responses to these questions comprised the 
manipulation. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, I did end up coding some of the 
responses in order to make sense of the findings. See Appendix B for all questions. 
 Next, in order to incorporate the social comparison aspect of the design, participants were 
told: 
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Now, I want you to compare your ability to the other [male/female] undergraduate 
participant who completed the task a few days ago. But first, I want to give you some 
information about the participant’s effort. The other participant finished the task 
approximately 5 minutes [slower/faster] than you. You indicated the level of your effort 
as a ___, and the other participant indicated [his/her] level of effort as a ___. 
In the high effort conditions, participants were told that the other participant finished the task 
five minutes faster than they did and reported that he or she exerted less effort than they did. In 
the low effort conditions, participants were told that the other participant finished the task five 
minutes slower than they did and reported that he or she exerted more effort than they did. 
Participants were told both of these pieces of information (i.e., that the other participant spent 
more or less time than them on the task and that they self-reported exerting more or less effort), 
because it seemed more convincing to include both pieces of information than simply one or the 
other. Some participants may not have taken others’ self-reports of effort seriously, so it may be 
useful to have a more “objective” measure of effort (i.e., time). At the same time, some 
participants may not necessarily have associated time with effort (i.e., they may believe it is 
possible for someone to spend a lot of time on a task but still not work very hard), so having a 
self-report measure of effort in addition to the time might have been more convincing. 
Participants were always told that the other participant finished five minutes faster or slower than 
them. Pilot testing on the task indicated that participants spent, on average, twenty minutes on 
the task. Five minutes therefore seemed like a reasonable amount of time to vary between the 
conditions because it is a large enough difference to convince participants that the amount of 
time they spent on the task was clearly differentiated from the other participant’s, but not so 
large that it was unrealistic. 
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In terms of the self-report information, in most cases, participants were told that the other 
participant either rated their own effort as three points higher than them or three points lower 
than them. For example, in the high effort conditions, participants who rated their own effort as a 
five on the 10-point scale were told that the other participant rated their effort as a two. In the 
low effort conditions, participants who rated their own effort as a five were told that the other 
participant rated their own effort as an eight (see Appendix B for more detailed information 
about this manipulation). Three seemed like a reasonable distance as it spanned about one third 
of the total scale. Post hoc analyses revealed that a difference of three on the 1-10 scale was 
equivalent to a difference of about 3.7 standard deviations; thus, to participants, this should seem 
like a large and meaningful difference in effort level. 
In some cases, however, I was not able to create a distance of three between the reported 
levels of effort. In the high effort conditions if the participant rated their effort as either a three, 
two, or one, or in the low effort conditions if the participant rated their effort as either an eight, 
nine, or ten, they were told that the other participant rated their effort as the extreme of the scale 
(either a one or a ten), and thus the “distance” between the two individuals’ effort was less than 
three. In the extreme case that a participant rated their effort as a one in one of the high effort 
conditions or a ten in one of the low effort conditions, they were told that the other participant 
exerted the same amount of effort as they did. These participants (N = 9) were removed from the 
analyses, as described above. Additionally, in order to control for the distance between the two 
participants’ level of effort, I created a variable called “effort distance” (which was simply the 
distance between the participant’s own rating of effort and the hypothetical participant’s rating) 
to use a covariate in my analyses. 
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At the end of the study, participants were asked to evaluate their own ability compared to 
the other participant’s. They made three ability evaluations in a fixed order: 1) their ability on 
this specific fraction task, 2) their general fraction ability, and 3) their general math ability. 
These evaluations were treated as three separate dependent variables in the analyses. I expected 
that I would see the biggest differences between conditions in participants’ more specific ability 
evaluations (as it is unlikely that there will be major changes in their overall math ability self-
concepts based on this 30-minute task) and so the two more specific evaluations are of most 
interest. Thus, I chose to have participants make the specific evaluations first and then the more 
general one. After evaluating their ability, participants completed the social comparison 
orientation scale, the item about social comparison information available, and the Theories of 
Intelligence scale. Participants concluded the study by providing demographic and general 
academic information and were thoroughly debriefed via information on the computer screen 
(see Appendix B for demographic questions and debriefing information). See Figure 3 for a 
visual depiction of the experimental design of Study 2 (note that this does not include the 
additional measures). 
 
Figure 3. Experimental design for Study 2. 
 Data analysis plan. Hypothesis 1, which is that when students perceive their own effort 
as task-elicited they will evaluate their ability higher when they exert less effort (and vice versa), 
and Hypothesis 2, which is that when students perceive their own effort as self-initiated they will 
evaluate their ability higher when they exert high effort (and lower when they exert low effort; 














(effort level: high, low) ANCOVAs. I ran a separate ANCOVA for each of the three dependent 
variables (i.e., self-evaluations for ability on specific fraction task, general fraction ability, and 
general math ability). Effort distance, students’ initial beliefs about math ability, students’ social 
comparison orientation, social comparison information available, and theories of intelligence 
were entered as covariates in each analysis. 
Unlike in Study 1, I was not able to examine whether participants individually endorsed a 
positive or inverse relation between effort and ability, because they were simply asked to 
evaluate their ability as compared to the other participant. I then compared across groups (i.e., I 
looked at whether participants in the task-elicited low effort group rated their abilities higher 
than participants in the task-elicited high effort group) to get a sense for the overall relation 
between effort and ability. If participants in the low effort groups evaluated their own task-
specific/fraction/math ability (as compared to the “other” hypothetical participant) higher than 
participants in the high effort groups, that is consistent with an inverse relation between effort 
and ability. If participants in the high effort groups evaluated their own ability (as compared to 
the “other” participant) higher than participants in the low effort groups, that is consistent with a 
positive relation. 
I looked at the main effects and interaction for each ANCOVA (i.e., effort source, effort 
level, effort source x effort level). Significant main effects and interactions were followed up 
with post hoc tests to determine whether the means significantly differed from each other. As in 
Study 1, I reported not only the p-values for all of my analyses but also the partial eta squared, 
which is an indicator of effect size (e.g., Nakagawa, 2004). 
Although I had three separate dependent variables (i.e., self-evaluations for ability on the 
specific fraction task, general fraction ability, and general math ability) and ran three separate 
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analyses, I expected to find similar results for all three ANCOVAs. As discussed briefly above, I 
expected the results would be strongest for the more specific evaluations (i.e., ability on the 
specific fraction task, general fraction ability) and less strong for the more general evaluation 
(i.e., math ability). However, I did expect to find an interaction between effort source and level 
of effort in all three analyses. Specifically, I expected that participants in the task-elicited high 
effort condition would evaluate their own ability (as compared to the other student in the 
vignette) lower than participants in the task-elicited low effort condition (which is consistent 
with an inverse relation between level of effort and ability). In contrast, I expected that 
participants in the self-initiated high effort condition would evaluate their own ability (as 
compared to the other student) higher than participants in the self-initiated low effort condition 
(which is consistent with a positive relation between level of effort and ability). I expected that 
participants in the control high effort condition would evaluate their own ability (as compared to 
the other participant) lower than participants in the control low effort condition (consistent with 
conceiving of an inverse relation between level of effort and ability), but I expected that the 
mean evaluations would fall in between those of the other two groups (similar to the pattern 
found in Muenks et al., in press). These interactions would support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Finally, as a supplemental analysis, I explored covariate main effects, in order to 
determine whether any of the covariates were significantly related to participants’ ability 
evaluations. 
Summary 
The current studies are among the first to examine whether undergraduate students’ 
perceptions of the source of effort influence the direction of the relation between level of effort 
and ability. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, this issue is important to address because how 
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students think about the relation between level of effort and ability has important implications for 
their ability evaluations of themselves and others, which have critical motivational 
consequences. Additionally, they build on Muenks et al. (in press) by examining participants’ 
own ability evaluations as an outcome, rather than their evaluations of others. These studies more 
directly connect participants’ evaluations of others to their evaluations of themselves, and thus 
provide additional information about the importance of perceptions of effort source in the 
formation of these self-beliefs. 
 Study 1 consisted of a series of vignettes that participants responded to on the computer. 
They were asked to imagine themselves in academic situations where they were completing a 
task at the same time as another student. They were given information about how much effort 
they (and the other student) put forth on the task, the source of their (and the other student’s) 
effort, and the scores that both they and the other student received on the task. They made 
evaluations of their own ability compared to the other student after receiving each piece of 
information. 
 Study 2 extended Study 1 by having participants actually complete an academic task that 
they were told another participant had previously completed. They were given information about 
how much effort they put forth compared to the other student, and their perceptions of the source 
of their own effort were manipulated. They were then asked to make evaluations of their own 
ability compared to the other student. This study provided an important extension to Study 1 by 
examining whether source of effort information influenced students’ self-evaluations in more 
realistic academic contexts.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Study 1 
 Overview of the main analyses. As discussed in Chapter 3, in order to test Hypotheses 1 
and 2, I ran a 2 (effort source: task-elicited, self-initiated) x 2 (effort level: high, low) x 2 (score: 
high, low) x 3 (ability evaluation order: first, second, third) ANCOVA, with repeated measures 
on the last three factors. I included four covariates into this analysis: students’ initial beliefs 
about math ability (e.g., the item “How would you evaluate your own mathematics ability?” that 
participants responded to before beginning the study), students’ social comparison orientation 
(measured with four items at the end of the study; see Chapter 3), reported amount of social 
comparison information available (e.g., the item “In general, how much information is available 
to you about how others are doing in your college classes?” that participants responded to at the 
end of the study), and theories of intelligence. I also reported any significant main effects or 
interactions of these covariates with the experimental conditions. 
 In order to test whether individuals endorsed an overall positive or inverse relation 
between effort and ability, I also calculated the difference score between participants’ ability 
evaluations after receiving effort source information (i.e., the second ability evaluation) in the 
high effort condition versus the low effort condition for participants in both the task-elicited and 
self-initiated groups. 
 Before conducting the main ANCOVA, I examined mean differences on the four 
covariates for participants in the different effort source groups, and also examined whether there 
were any effects of domain (i.e., calculus versus statistics) for the vignettes. I describe these 
analyses below. I then discuss the results of the ANCOVA and the calculation of difference 
scores.  
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Mean differences on covariates for between-subjects groups. The four covariates, as 
discussed above, were students’ initial beliefs about their mathematics ability, their social 
comparison orientation, the amount of social comparison information available to them in 
general, and their theories of intelligence. Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations for 
all the covariates in Studies 1 and 2. Before conducting the main ANCOVA, I examined whether 
participants in the task-elicited (N = 105) and self-initiated (N = 105) groups differed on the 
levels of these variables by conducting a series of independent samples t-tests. There were no 
differences for initial ability evaluation, t(208) = -.11, p = .91, social comparison orientation, 
t(208) = .61, p = .54, or theories of intelligence, t(208) = -.096, p = .92, but there was a 
statistically significant difference for the amount of social comparison information available, 
t(208) = 2.25, p = .03. Participants in the task-elicited group reported that significantly more 
social comparison information was available to them (M = 3.29, SE = .10) than participants in 
the self-initiated group (M = 2.96, SE = .11). 
Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of all covariates for Studies 1 and 2 
 Study 1 Study 2 
 M SD M SD 
Ratings of mathematics ability 71.42 17.94 68.32 18.39 
Social comparison orientation 3.72 0.96 3.75 0.85 
Social comparison information available 3.12 1.06 2.99 1.11 
Theories of intelligence 2.82 0.99 2.72 1.07 
Effort distance (Study 2 only)   2.60 0.81 
 
 Domain effects. As discussed in Chapter 3, participants completed two vignettes per 
condition in order to increase reliability. So for example, participants in the task-elicited 
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condition responded to two high effort-low score vignettes, two high effort-high score vignettes, 
and so on. Small details, such as the type of mathematics classroom (i.e., calculus or statistics), 
exact timing information, and name of the other student were changed between the two vignettes 
in order to reduce repetition. Before averaging the two vignettes together, I wanted to examine 
whether these small changes between the two vignettes, including type of mathematics 
classroom (i.e., domain), influenced the results. To do this, I ran a 2 (effort source: task-elicited, 
self-initiated) x 2 (effort level: high, low) x 2 (score: high, low) x 2 (domain: calculus, statistics) 
x 3 (ability evaluation order: first, second, third) ANCOVA, with repeated measures on the last 
four factors (and all four covariates), in order to examine whether there were any main effects or 
interactions with domain. 
Results indicated a significant four-way interaction between effort level x ability 
evaluation order x domain x effort source condition, F(2, 408) = 23.95, p < .001, η2p = .11, with 
a medium effect size. However, this interaction is not interpretable and thus I will not discuss it 
here. I decided to simplify the main analysis by removing domain as a within-subjects factor. 
Instead, I averaged the two vignettes within the same effort level-score condition. Thus, the final 
analysis was, as discussed above, a 2 (effort source: task-elicited, self-initiated) x 2 (effort level: 
high, low) x 2 (score: high, low) x 3 (ability evaluation order: first, second, third) ANCOVA, 
with repeated measures on the last three factors, and four covariates. 
 Results from main ANCOVA. There were main effects of score, F(1, 204) = 17.80, p < 
.001, η2p = .08, and order, F(2, 408) = 6.71, p = .001, η2p = .03, that were qualified by a score x 
order interaction, F(2, 408) = 30.26, p < .001, η2p = .13. As expected (see Chapter 3), when 
participants were told that they scored higher than the other participant before the third ability 
evaluation, they tended to evaluate their math ability higher on the third evaluation (M = 7.59, SE 
 93 
= .06) than the second evaluation (M = 5.14, SE = .04). And, when participants were told that 
they scored lower than the other participant before the third ability evaluation, they judged their 
math ability lower on the third evaluation (M = 2.80, SE = .07) than the second evaluation (M = 
5.19, SE = .05). This interaction had a medium effect size. 
 There was also a significant effort level x effort source interaction, F(1, 204) = 93.73, p < 
.001, η2p = .32, with a large effect size, where participants in the task-elicited condition rated 
their ability higher in the low effort (M = 6.37, SE = .09) versus the high effort (M = 4.00, SE = 
.10) condition, t(208) = 17.62, p < .001, while participants in the self-initiated condition did not 
differ in their ability judgments between the low effort (M = 5.28, SE = .09) and the high effort 
(M = 5.06, SE = .10) condition, t(208) = 1.64, p = .10. In order to qualify this further, as 
expected, there was a significant effort source x effort level x ability evaluation order three-way 
interaction, F(2, 408) = 141.88, p < .001, η2p = .41, with a large effect size. As expected, 
participants in the task-elicited, low effort condition increased their ability evaluations from the 
first (M = 6.30, SE = .13) to the second (M = 7.04, SE = .12) evaluation (once they received 
effort source information), while participants in the task-elicited, high effort condition decreased 
their ability evaluations from the first (M = 4.06, SE = .14) to the second (M = 3.29, SE = .13) 
evaluation. In contrast, participants in the self-initiated, low effort condition decreased their 
ability evaluations from the first (M = 5.64, SE = .13) to the second (M = 4.61, SE = .12) 
evaluation, whereas participants in the self-initiated, high effort condition increased their ability 
evaluations from the first (M = 4.64, SE = .14) to the second (M = 5.74, SE = .13) evaluation. See 
Table 2 in Appendix C for means and standard errors for this interaction, Figure 4 for a depiction 




Figure 4. Effort source x effort level x ability evaluation order three-way interaction for Study 1. 
The y-axis represents students’ self-evaluations of ability as compared to the other hypothetical 
student, and is centered at the midpoint. Values greater than zero indicate that the participant 
rated their ability higher than the “other” participant, and values less than zero indicate that the 
participant rated their ability lower than the “other” participant. The numbers on the x-axis 
indicate the ability evaluation order (i.e., first, second, or third evaluation). Before the first 
evaluation participants received effort level information (low effort or high effort), before the 
second evaluation participants received effort source information (task-elicited or self-initiated), 
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Figure 5. Students’ self-evaluations of ability as compared to the other hypothetical student after 
receiving effort source information (i.e., the second evaluation) for Study 1. The y-axis 
represents students’ self-evaluations of ability as compared to the other hypothetical student, and 
is centered at the midpoint. Values greater than zero indicate that the participant rated their 
ability higher than the “other” participant, and values less than zero indicate that the participant 
rated their ability lower than the “other” participant. 
 
 Covariate main effects and interactions. There were main effects of students’ initial 
ability evaluation, F(1, 204) = 16.97, p < .001, η2p = .08, and total social comparison information 
available, F(1, 204) = 16.40, p < .001, η2p = .07, and these effect sizes were small. Students who 
had higher initial evaluations of their math ability and higher social comparison orientation had 
higher self-evaluations of ability on average. There were significant score x social comparison 
orientation, F(1, 204) = 10.47, p = .001, η2p = .05, and score x TOI, F(1, 204) = 4.38, p = .04, η2p 
= .02, interactions, with small effect sizes. The higher students’ social comparison orientation 
and the more they tended toward an incremental theory, the larger the differences in ability 



























significant order x initial ability evaluation, F(2, 408) = 6.66, p = .001, η2p = .03, and order x 
amount of social comparison information available, F(2, 408) = 3.64, p = .03, η2p = .02, 
interactions, with small effect sizes. Students with higher initial ability evaluations and with 
higher amounts of social comparison information available rated their abilities higher on the first 
evaluation and then decreased for the second and third evaluations on average, while students 
with lower initial ability evaluations and with lower amounts of social comparison information 
available rated their abilities lower on the first evaluation and then increased for the second and 
third evaluations on average. There was a significant effort level x order x TOI interaction, F(2, 
408) = 3.31, p = .04, η2p = .02, with a small effect size. Students who tended toward an entity 
theory maintained consistently high evaluations of ability on average in the low effort condition 
and low evaluations of ability on average in the high effort condition, whereas students who 
tended toward an incremental theory changed their evaluations more on average after each piece 
of information was presented. Finally, there was a significant score x order x social comparison 
orientation interaction, F(2, 408) = 8.05, p < .001, η2p = .04, with a small effect size. Students 
with higher social comparison orientation decreased their ability evaluations more after receiving 
score information in the low score condition on average, and increased their evaluations more 
after receiving score information in the high score condition. 
Calculation of difference scores. In order to examine whether participants in the task-
elicited and self-initiated conditions endorsed an overall positive or inverse relation between 
effort and ability, I took the average value for the second evaluation (i.e., after receiving effort 
source information) in the high effort condition and then subtracted the average value for the 
second evaluation in the low effort condition. I did this calculation for both groups. 
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 For the task-elicited group, the estimated mean for the second evaluation in the high 
effort condition was 3.29 (SE = .13), and the estimated mean for the second evaluation in the low 
effort condition was 7.04 (SE = .12). Thus, the difference score is 3.29 – 7.04 = -3.75 (Cohen’s d 
of the difference between groups = 2.94). For the self-initiated group, the estimated mean for the 
second evaluation in the high effort condition was 5.74 (SE = .13), and the estimated mean for 
the second evaluation in the low effort condition was 4.61 (SE = .12). Thus, the difference score 
is 5.74 – 4.61 = 1.13 (Cohen’s d of the difference between groups = .89). The fact that 
participants in the task-elicited condition had a negative value and those in the self-initiated 
condition had a positive value suggests that participants in the task-elicited condition endorsed 
an overall inverse relation between effort and ability, while those in the self-initiated condition 
endorsed an overall positive relation between effort and ability. This pattern of results supports 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Additionally, the effect size of the inverse relation between effort and 
ability found in the task-elicited condition is larger than the effect size of the positive relation 
between effort and ability found in the self-initiated condition. 
Study 2 
 Overview of the main analyses. As discussed in Chapter 3, in order to test Hypotheses 1 
and 2, I ran three 3 (effort source: task-elicited, self-initiated, control) x 2 (effort level: high, low) 
ANCOVAs, one for each ability evaluation at each level of specificity (i.e., self-evaluations for 
ability on a specific fraction task, general fraction ability, and general math ability). Each 
analysis included five covariates: effort distance (described in Chapter 3), students’ initial beliefs 
about math ability, students’ social comparison orientation, social comparison information 
available, and theories of intelligence. Before conducting the ANCOVAs, I examined mean 
differences on the covariates between the six between-subjects groups. Those analyses are 
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described first, followed by each of the three ANCOVAs. I also examined main effects of the 
covariates on students’ ability evaluations. Finally, I conducted a 3 (effort source: task-elicited, 
self-initiated, control) x 2 (effort level: high, low) x 3 (type of ability evaluation: task, fraction, 
math) ANCOVA with the same five covariates to examine whether the effects significantly 
differed based on the type of ability evaluation. 
Mean differences on covariates for between-subjects groups. The five covariates, as 
discussed above, were effort distance, students’ initial beliefs about their mathematics ability, 
their social comparison orientation, the amount of social comparison information available to 
them in general, and theories of intelligence. I examined whether participants in the task-elicited-
low effort (N = 21), task-elicited-high effort (N = 27), self-initiated-low effort (N = 28), self-
initiated-high effort (N = 27), control-low effort (N = 28), and control-high effort (N = 29) 
groups differed on the levels of these variables by conducting a series of one-way ANOVAs. 
There were no differences for effort distance, F(5, 159) = .96, p = .44, initial ability evaluation, 
F(5, 159) = .96, p = .45, amount of social comparison information available, F(5, 159) = .93, p = 
.46, or theories of intelligence, F (5, 159) = .63, p = .68, but there was a marginally significant 
difference for social comparison orientation, F(5, 159) = 2.27, p = .05. Post hoc tests indicated a 
significant difference between participants in the task-elicited, low effort condition (M = 3.42, SE 
= .25) and the self-initiated, low effort condition (M = 4.15, SE = .10), Tukey’s mean difference 
= -.74, SE = .24, p = .03. This finding suggests that participants in the self-initiated low effort 
condition reported a stronger social comparison orientation than participants in the task-elicited 
low effort condition; no other differences were significant. 
ANCOVA results: Self-evaluations for ability on the specific fraction task. There was 
a main effect of effort level, F(1, 149) = 33.35, p < .001, η2p = .18, with a medium effect size, 
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which was qualified by an effort source x effort level interaction, F(2, 149) = 5.45, p = .01, η2p = 
.07, with a small effect size. In the task-elicited condition, participants’ ability evaluations in the 
low effort (M = 5.42, SE = .38) and high effort (M = 5.12, SE = .34) conditions did not 
significantly differ, t(46) = .59, p = .56. In the control and self-initiated conditions, participants 
in the low effort groups (for control: M = 6.05, SE = .33; for self-initiated: M = 6.31, SE = .34) 
rated their abilities significantly higher than participants in the high effort groups (for control: M 
= 3.66, SE = .32; for self-initiated: M = 4.14, SE = .34), t(55) = 5.20, p < .001, for control, t(53) = 
4.51, p < .001, for self-initiated, contrary to hypotheses (see Table 3 in Appendix C and Figure 
6). These findings suggest that participants in the control and self-initiated conditions rated their 
abilities higher when they exerted lower effort and lower when they exerted higher effort (which 
is consistent with an inverse relation between effort and ability), whereas those in the task-
elicited conditions did not. 
Additionally, there was a main effect of initial ability evaluation, F(1, 149) = 25.84, p < 
.001, η2p = .15, with a medium effect size. Students with higher initial math ability evaluations 
rated their abilities higher on the specific fraction task at the end of the study. 
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Figure 6. ANCOVA results for Study 2, specific fraction task. The y-axis represents students’ 
self-evaluations of ability on the specific fraction task as compared to the other hypothetical 
student, and is centered at the midpoint. Values greater than zero indicate that the participant 
rated their ability higher than the “other” participant, and values less than zero indicate that the 
participant rated their ability lower than the “other” participant. 
 
ANCOVA results: Self-evaluations for fraction ability. There was a main effect of 
effort level, F(1, 149) = 25.38, p < .001, η2p = .15, with a medium effect size, which was 
qualified by an effort source x effort level interaction, F(2, 149) = 3.44, p = .04, η2p = .04, with a 
small effect size. In the task-elicited condition, participants’ ability evaluations in the low effort 
(M = 5.64, SE = .37) and high effort (M = 5.30, SE = .33) conditions did not significantly differ, 
t(46) = .68, p = .50. In the control and self-initiated conditions, participants in the low effort 
groups (for control: M = 5.95, SE = .32; for self-initiated: M = 6.23, SE = .33) rated their abilities 
significantly higher than participants in the high effort groups (for control: M = 4.09, SE = .32; 
for self-initiated: M = 4.30, SE = .33), t(55) = 4.11, p < .001, for control, t(53) = 4.13, p < .001, 




































findings again suggest that participants in the control and self-initiated conditions rated their 
abilities higher when they exerted lower effort and lower when they exerted higher effort (which 
is consistent with an inverse relation between effort and ability), whereas those in the task-
elicited conditions did not. Because Hypotheses 1 and 2 were that participants in the task-elicited 
condition would rate their abilities higher when they exerted lower effort (and lower when they 
exerted higher effort; consistent with an inverse relation between effort and ability), and 
participants in the self-initiated condition would rate their abilities higher when they exerted 
higher effort (and lower when they exerted lower effort; consistent with a positive relation 
between effort and ability), these results do not support Hypotheses 1 or 2. 
Additionally, there was a main effect of initial ability evaluation, F(1, 149) = 28.44, p < 
.001, η2p = .16, with a medium effect size. Students with higher initial math ability evaluations 







































Figure 7. ANCOVA results for Study 2, fraction ability. The y-axis represents students’ self-
evaluations of general fraction ability as compared to the other hypothetical student, and is 
centered at the midpoint. Values greater than zero indicate that the participant rated their ability 
higher than the “other” participant, and values less than zero indicate that the participant rated 
their ability lower than the “other” participant. 
 
ANCOVA results: Self-evaluations for math ability. There was a main effect of effort 
level, F(1, 149) = 25.64, p < .001, η2p = .15, with a medium effect size. Participants in the low 
effort conditions (M = 5.84, SE = .17) reported significantly higher self-evaluations for math 
ability than participants in the high effort conditions (M = 4.65, SE = .16), t(158) = 5.10, p < 
.001. There were no other significant main effects or interactions, although the general pattern of 
results was similar to the findings for self-evaluations of ability on the specific fraction task and 
fraction ability. In the task-elicited condition, participants’ ability evaluations in the low effort 
(M = 5.46, SE = .32) and high effort (M = 4.93, SE = .28) conditions did not significantly differ, 
t(46) = 1.25, p = .22. In the control and self-initiated conditions, participants in the low effort 
groups (for control: M = 5.84, SE = .28; for self-initiated: M = 6.22, SE = .29) rated their abilities 
significantly higher than participants in the high effort groups (for control: M = 4.37, SE = .27; 
for self-initiated: M = 4.64, SE = .28), t(55) = 3.78, p < .001, for control, t(53) = 3.92, p < .001, 
for self-initiated, contrary to hypotheses (see Table 5 in Appendix C and Figure 8). 
Additionally, there were main effects of initial ability evaluation, F(1, 149) = 53.58, p < 
.001, η2p = .26, with a large effect size, and social comparison orientation, F(1, 149) = 5.83, p = 
.02, η2p = .04, with a small effect size. Students with higher initial math ability evaluations and 
lower social comparison orientation rated their math abilities higher at the end of the study. 
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Figure 8. ANCOVA results for Study 2, math ability. The y-axis represents students’ self-
evaluations of general math ability as compared to the other hypothetical student, and is centered 
at the midpoint. Values greater than zero indicate that the participant rated their ability higher 
than the “other” participant, and values less than zero indicate that the participant rated their 
ability lower than the “other” participant. 
 
 ANCOVA results: All ability evaluations. There was no main effect of type of ability 
evaluation, F(2, 298) = 1.74, p = .18, η2p = .01, or an effort source x effort level x type of ability 
evaluation interaction, F(2, 298) = 1.58, p = .18, η2p = .02. Thus, the pattern of results did not 

































Chapter 5: Discussion 
Overview 
 In this chapter, I will first discuss the results from Studies 1 and 2, and integrate these 
results with previous literature. I will then discuss both the theoretical and practical implications 
of my findings. Finally, I will discuss limitations of the present studies and ideas for future 
research to build on this work. 
Study 1 
 Results from Study 1 are consistent with my hypotheses and with prior research on the 
impact of perceived effort source on perceptions of others’ abilities (e.g., Muenks et al., in 
press). College students’ perceived effort source influenced their perceptions of the relation 
between their own effort and ability in mathematics, and the effect sizes were large. Specifically, 
when participants were asked to imagine that their effort was due to the subjective ease or 
difficulty of the task (i.e., task-elicited), they evaluated their own abilities higher when they 
exerted less effort than the other character in the vignette, and lower when they exerted more 
effort than the other character. In contrast, when participants were asked to imagine that their 
effort arose from their own motivation or lack of motivation (i.e., self-initiated), they tended to 
evaluated their own abilities higher when they exerted more effort than the other character in the 
vignette, and lower when they exerted less effort than the other character. Thus, participants in 
the task-elicited condition endorsed an inverse relation between their own effort and ability, 
whereas participants in the self-initiated condition endorsed a positive relation between their own 
effort and ability. These results were found after controlling for students’ initial beliefs about 
their math abilities, the extent to which participants are sensitive to social comparison 
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information (i.e., their social comparison orientation), the amount of social comparison 
information they report is available to them in their classes, and their theories of intelligence. 
 In the sequential information block of Study 2 of Muenks et al. (in press), participants 
were given effort level, effort source, and performance information about a single character and 
asked to make an ability evaluation of the character after each piece of information was 
presented. In the present study I used a similar methodology except that instead of using a single 
character, I gave participants effort level, effort source, and performance information about 
themselves as compared to another character, and asked them to evaluate their ability after each 
piece of information was presented. Thus in the present study I built on Study 2 of Muenks et al. 
(in press) by using a similar methodology but more directly connecting participants’ perceptions 
of effort source to their ability evaluations of themselves, which is important because self-beliefs 
about ability are critical influences on students’ motivation (e.g., Wigfield et al., 2015). That is, 
because students’ beliefs about themselves are much more proximal indicators of their 
motivation and choices than their beliefs about others (e.g., Nicholls & Miller, 1984), it is critical 
to make the connection between perceptions of effort source and one’s own ability evaluations in 
order to establish the motivational importance of the effort source construct. 
As expected, the results for Study 2 of Muenks et al. (in press) and the present Study 1 
were very similar. In both studies, the change in ability evaluations from the first to the second 
ability evaluation (the latter of which was made directly after participants received information 
about effort source) significantly differed for participants in the task-elicited and self-initiated 
conditions. In the task-elicited condition, participants’ ability evaluations of individuals who put 
forth low effort (either themselves or a hypothetical character) increased, and their evaluations of 
individuals who put forth high effort decreased. In the self-initiated condition, participants’ 
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ability evaluations of individuals who put forth low effort decreased, and their evaluations of 
individuals who put forth high effort increased. 
Calculating difference scores for this study allowed me to examine whether participants 
perceived an overall positive or inverse relation between their own effort and ability. In the task-
elicited condition, this number represents the difference in self-evaluations of ability in a 
situation where one perceives they worked hard because the task was difficult for them, and in a 
situation where one perceives they did not work hard because the task was easy for them. In the 
self-initiated condition, this number represents the difference in self-evaluations of ability in a 
situation where one perceives they worked hard because they were motivated to engage in the 
task, and in a situation where one perceives they did not work hard because they were not 
motivated. The difference score for the task-elicited condition was -3.75, which is consistent 
with an overall inverse relation between effort and ability, and the difference score for the self-
initiated condition was 1.13, which is consistent with an overall positive relation. 
Interestingly, the absolute value of the difference score for the task-elicited condition is 
larger than the absolute value of the difference score for the self-initiated condition. The effect 
size (based on adjusted means) for the task-elicited condition was also larger than the effect size 
for the self-initiated condition. Thus is appears that the inverse relation between effort and ability 
in the task-elicited condition is stronger than the positive relation between effort and ability in 
the self-initiated condition. This finding is consistent with Muenks et al. (in press) that found 
stronger evidence for task-elicited effort leading to a perceived inverse relation between effort 
and ability than for self-initiated effort leading to a perceived positive relation. 
The differences in absolute value could have occurred for several reasons. First, the 
vignettes in the present study describe a social comparison situation, which is an important 
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component of ego-involved contexts as defined by Nicholls (1984). Much work by Nicholls and 
colleagues (e.g., Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1984, 1987; Nicholls, 1978, 1984) has found that, on 
average, individuals tend to perceive an inverse relation between effort and ability in these 
contexts. Thus, perhaps for participants the general tendency was to perceive an inverse relation 
between effort and ability, which could explain why the absolute value of the inverse relation in 
the task-elicited condition was larger than the absolute value of the positive relation in the self-
initiated condition. This is also consistent with results from Muenks et al. (in press), which 
showed that in social comparison situations (Studies 1a and 1b), participants were relatively 
unlikely to perceive a strong positive relation between effort and ability, even in the self-initiated 
conditions. 
Furthermore, participants in the low effort condition rated their abilities higher than 
participants in the high effort condition after receiving information about performance outcomes 
(i.e., the third evaluation), regardless of their effort source condition. This implies that 
participants overall tend to view high effort as an indicator of low ability, and vice versa. Thus 
the fact that the absolute value of the inverse relation between effort and ability was larger than 
the absolute value of the positive relation between effort and ability is consistent with these 
results. 
Another possibility is that it may be more straightforward for participants to associate 
“finding a task difficult” with low ability than “being motivated on a task” with high ability. 
Even very young children understand that “finding a task difficult” is an indicator of low ability 
(e.g., Heyman & Compton, 2006; Heyman et al., 2003). However, “being motivated on a task” is 
not necessarily synonymous with high ability. While it seems possible that individuals with high 
ability might be motivated to work hard, and individuals who are motivated to work hard might 
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improve their abilities over time (see Muenks & Miele, under review), it is certainly also 
possible that individuals can be motivated to work hard on a task but still have low ability (e.g., 
Anderson & Butzin, 1974). 
However, the difference score was positive in the self-initiated condition, in contrast to 
the negative difference score in the task-elicited condition. Thus participants who were told to 
attribute their effort to self-initiated motivation or its lack were still more likely to endorse a 
positive relation between effort and ability than those who were told to attribute their effort to 
task difficulty or ease. Findings from the present study suggest that, on average, individuals’ 
perceptions that they worked harder on an academic task than someone else will only lead to the 
conclusion that they have less ability than that other person if they think that the reason for 
working hard is because the task was difficult for them. If instead individuals think that they 
worked harder because they were more motivated to engage in the task, they may conclude that 
they actually have more ability than the other person. The theoretical implications of these 
findings will be described in more detail below. 
Importantly, this research does not illuminate the underlying reasons why perceptions of 
self-initiated effort lead to positive relations between levels of effort and ability. Is it because 
individuals who perceive that effort is self-initiated shift into a definition of ability as a set of 
skills or competencies (see discussion of Dweck’s theory below), or does it simply reflect a naïve 
belief that smart people also tend to be motivated people? In the future researchers should 
explore these competing hypotheses in order to unpack this relation. 
 There was some evidence that participants used information from prior vignettes in their 
responses to later vignettes. Specifically, as can be seen in Figure 4, there were significant 
differences in the first evaluation between those in the task-elicited and self-initiated conditions 
 109 
that were in expected directions based on the effort source condition participants were in. This is 
interesting because the only information that participants received before making the first 
evaluation was whether they or the other character exerted more effort on the task, not the source 
of the effort. Thus participants in the task-elicited and self-initiated groups received the exact 
same information. However, it appears that when those in the task-elicited condition were told 
that they exerted less ability than the other character, they rated their ability significantly higher 
than participants in the self-initiated condition. And, when those in the task-elicited condition 
were told that they exerted more ability than the other character, they rated their ability 
significantly lower than participants in the self-initiated condition. It therefore seems plausible 
that after reading several of these vignettes participants assumed what the source of effort would 
be and their first evaluations fit with those assumptions accordingly. Or, perhaps after 
responding to a few vignettes that were specific to an effort source condition, participants 
developed a general view of effort and ability that influenced their responses even on the first 
evaluation. However, this finding is not particularly problematic to the study as a whole, as I still 
found robust results in the second ability evaluation, which is the evaluation of interest to my 
hypotheses (see Figure 5). Regardless of where participants started out on the first ability 
evaluation, after receiving information about the source of their effort, those in the task-elicited 
condition rated their abilities higher when they exerted low effort, and those in the self-initiated 
condition rated their abilities higher when they exerted high effort.  
Furthermore these results are consistent with findings from Muenks et al. (in press) that 
once clear performance information is provided (i.e., who actually performed better on the task), 
the differences between the task-elicited and self-initiated groups become negligible (see Figure 
4). Heider (1958) hypothesized that effort will improve performance up to the limit of one’s 
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ability; thus, if one knows at least two of these pieces of information (e.g., effort level, 
performance), he or she can make assumptions about the third (e.g., ability level). In the present 
study, once participants received performance information, they used that information along with 
effort level information to make their ability evaluations, and these two pieces of information 
together “trumped” any information about effort source. This is consistent with prior research 
showing that individuals use effort level and performance information as clear indicators of 
ability (e.g., Harari & Covington, 1981; Karabenick & Heller, 1976; Kun, 1977; Kun et al., 
1974; Nicholls, 1978; Surber, 1980; Wimmer et al., 1982). 
However, it is important to point out that in many academic situations in real life students 
do not have access to information about how well other students did on academic tasks (i.e., 
performance information). In these cases, participants may use other types of information, such 
as perceived effort source, to make evaluations of others’ abilities, and in turn, to make 
evaluations of their own abilities. Thus it is still important to study how participants make self-
evaluations of ability in social comparison contexts in the absence of explicit performance 
information. 
 There were also some supplemental findings from Study 1 that I will briefly mention. 
First, those in the task-elicited condition reported that significantly more social comparison 
information was available to them in school than those in the self-initiated condition (i.e., “In 
general, how much information is available to you about how others are doing in your college 
classes?”). I do not have a conjecture as to why this occurred, but perhaps it speaks to the failure 
of randomization in this study to equalize the two groups of participants on all extraneous 
variables. I ensured that this did not affect my results by using it as a covariate in all of my 
analyses. Second, when examining whether there were any effects of mathematics domain 
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(calculus or statistics), only a four-way interaction was significant, and the meaning behind this 
interaction was not interpretable. Perhaps future studies can clarify how students’ beliefs about 
effort and ability are different in different math-related courses at the college level. Finally, there 
were some main effects and interactions between the covariates (initial ability evaluations, social 
comparison information, amount of social comparison information available, and theories of 
intelligence) and the experimental conditions in the study. However, because the effect sizes of 
these interactions were small and none of the covariates moderated the focal interactions of 
interest, I will not discuss them in detail here. Future research could parse out whether some of 
these variables moderate the effects of effort source information on students’ ability evaluations. 
 The results from Study 1 build on work by Koriat and colleagues (e.g., Koriat et al., 
2006; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009) in several ways. First, whereas Koriat and colleagues 
manipulated task demands to elicit different types of effort (data-driven and goal-driven), in the 
present study I directly manipulated students’ perceptions of the source of their own effort as 
either task-elicited or self-initiated using hypothetical vignettes. Second, whereas Koriat and 
colleagues examined students’ judgments of learning (JOLs) for very specific tasks as their 
outcome of interest, in the present study I measured students’ beliefs about their own math 
abilities, which are very powerful and predict a wide range of motivation- and achievement-
related outcomes (e.g., Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Bouffard-Bouchard et al., 1991; Dennissen et 
al., 2007; Durik et al., 2006; Pajares, 1996a; Simpkins et al., 2006; Wigfield et al., 2015); this is 
an important extension of Koriat’s work. As a whole these results were consistent with Koriat’s 
work; in Koriat’s studies data-driven effort led to negative relations between level of effort and 
JOLs, and goal-driven effort led to positive relations between level of effort and JOLs, while in 
the current study perceptions of task-elicited effort led to negative relations between levels of 
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effort and ability, and perceptions of self-initiated effort led to positive relations between levels 
of effort and ability. 
This study also builds on work by Heyman and colleagues (e.g., Heyman et al., 2003; 
Heyman & Compton, 2006) by specifically examining task-elicited and self-initiated effort. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, Heyman and Compton (2006, Study 1) told 5-10 year old children that 
two characters exerted different levels of effort on a task (e.g., “Mary finished the puzzles very 
quickly. Sara finished the puzzles slowly.”). They had two conditions in their studies: a task 
difficulty condition (e.g., “Mary thought the puzzle was easy to do. Sara thought the puzzles were 
hard to do.”) and an effort condition (e.g., “Mary hardly tried at all. Sara tried and tried.”). 
Heyman and Compton (2006) found that in the task difficulty condition children were more 
likely to perceive an inverse relation between effort and ability (i.e., evaluate the character who 
finished puzzles more quickly as smarter) than in the effort condition. 
Although Heyman and Compton’s (2006) “task difficulty” condition was very similar to 
task-elicited effort, their “effort” condition was quite different from self-initiated effort as 
defined here and in Muenks et al. (in press). Specifically, in Heyman and Compton (2006), 
participants in the effort condition were simply told that the character worked hard, while in the 
present study and in Muenks et al. (in press), participants in the self-initiated condition were led 
to believe that effort was specifically due to one’s motivation or lack of motivation. Thus, the 
findings from this study and Muenks et al. (in press) were consistent with Study 1 in Heyman 
and Compton (2006) because both the task-elicited condition and the task difficulty condition 
produced an inverse relation between effort and ability. However, it also builds on this work by 
more directly manipulating participants’ perceptions of self-initiated effort. In the present study I 
found that perceptions of one’s effort as self-initiated led to perceptions of a positive relation 
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between effort and ability. This is an important extension of Heyman and colleagues’ work on 
how different ways of perceiving one’s effort influence evaluations of academic ability. 
Finally, in this study I extend Muenks et al. (in press) by showing that perceived effort 
source influences students’ evaluations of their own abilities and not just their evaluations of 
hypothetical others. This is a crucial step to make if I want to argue that students’ perceptions of 
effort source are motivationally important, since students’ perceptions of themselves are much 
more strongly tied to their own motivation than their perceptions of other people (e.g., Nicholls 
& Miller, 1984; Stapel & Blanton, 2004; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). As a whole, Study 1 provides 
important extensions to previous research on effort source. 
Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine how college students’ perceptions of the source 
of their own effort after completing an actual academic task influenced their self-evaluations of 
ability in math. I examined three levels of specificity in students’ evaluations: their ability on the 
specific fraction task they completed, their general fraction ability, and their general math ability. 
For all three ability evaluations I hypothesized that participants in the task-elicited, low effort 
group would have higher ability evaluations than participants in the task-elicited, high effort 
group (consistent with an overall inverse relation between effort and ability), whereas 
participants in the self-initiated, low effort group would have lower ability evaluations than 
participants in the self-initiated, high effort group (consistent with an overall positive relation 
between effort and ability). I also hypothesized that participants in the control, low effort group 
would have higher ability evaluations than participants in the control, high effort group 
(consistent with an inverse relation between effort and ability), but that the mean evaluations 
would fall somewhere in between the task-elicited and self-initiated groups. 
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These hypotheses were not confirmed. For all three ability evaluations (specific fraction 
task, fraction ability, and math ability), there were no differences in self-evaluations between 
participants in the task-elicited low effort group and participants in the task-elicited high effort 
group (see Figures 6-8). Thus participants in the task-elicited condition did not perceive either a 
positive or inverse relation between effort and ability. In contrast, for the self-initiated and 
control groups, participants in the low effort groups rated their abilities (as compared to the other 
participant) significantly higher than participants in the high effort groups. Thus self-initiated 
and control condition participants perceived an inverse relation between effort and ability (see 
Figures 6-8); these effect sizes were small. 
When attempting to understand these unexpected results, the first thing I did was explore 
the possibility that the mathematics task I used was too easy or not motivating enough, even for 
participants who reported working hard on the task. Although I designed the study with the 
assumption that not all participants would feel the same way about the task (i.e., I asked open-
ended questions such as, “Why was this task difficult OR easy?” and “Why were you motivated 
OR not motivated to complete this task?” which allowed participants to make their own 
judgments about the task), I did assume that participants who viewed the task as being easy 
and/or unmotivating would also report exerting low effort on the task, and participants who 
viewed the task as being difficult and/or motivating would also report exerting high effort on the 
task. That way, participants in the task-elicited groups could attribute their effort or lack of effort 
to the difficulty or ease (respectively) of the task, and participants in the self-initiated groups 
could attribute their effort or lack of effort to their own motivation or lack of motivation 
(respectively). It would be difficult to argue that participants in the task-elicited groups perceived 
their own effort as task-elicited if they reported working hard but did not report that they found 
 115 
the task difficult. Similarly, it would be difficult to argue that participants in the self-initiated 
groups perceived their effort as self-initiated if they reported working hard but were not 
motivated to engage in the task. 
In order to examine whether the mathematics task I used was too easy or not motivating 
enough, I coded whether participants in the task-elicited and self-initiated groups4 reported 
feeling overall that the task was difficult or that they were motivated (respectively), and then 
examined whether their reported levels of effort corresponded with these judgments. In the task-
elicited group, the first open-ended question was, “In general, why was this task difficult OR 
easy?” Eleven out of the 48 participants described the task as exclusively difficult (22.92%), 19 
participants described the task as exclusively easy (39.58%), and 18 participants described the 
task as being both difficult and easy (37.50%). The average effort rating was 6.09 (SD = 2.07) 
for participants who described the task as exclusively difficult, 5.00 (SD = 2.16) for participants 
who described the task as being exclusively easy, and 5.63 (SD = 2.03) for the participants who 
described the task as being both easy and difficult. Thus, although participants as a whole did not 
seem to find the task particularly difficult, the participants who reported exerting more effort 
described the task as being more difficult, while the participants who reported exerting less effort 
described the task as being easier. 
In the self-initiated condition, the first open-ended question was, “In general, why were 
you motivated OR not motivated to complete this task?” Again from students’ answers on this 
question I could code whether they were generally motivated or not motivated on the task. Only 
5 out of the 55 participants (9.09%) reported feeling exclusively unmotivated, while 44 reported 
being exclusively motivated (80%) and 6 reported being both motivated and unmotivated 
                                                
4 Recall that I did not give participants in the control group any open-ended questions, so they are not included here. 
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(10.91%). The average effort rating was 5.80 (SD = 2.95) for participants who reported being 
exclusively unmotivated, 6.43 (SD = 2.15) for participants who reported being exclusively 
motivated, and 6.17 (SD = 1.72) for participants who reported being both motivated and 
unmotivated. Thus, participants as a whole seemed motivated to engage in the task, and higher 
effort corresponded with higher motivation. Based on these analyses, I can conclude that 
participants’ level of effort did correspond with their reports of difficulty/ease of the task (in the 
task-elicited groups) and motivation/lack of motivation (in the self-initiated groups). Thus I can 
be fairly confident in asserting that the unexpected results for Study 2 did not occur simply 
because the task was too easy and/or unmotivating for all participants. 
Interestingly, there were participants in the task-elicited condition who reported feeling 
that the task was both easy and difficult, and participants in the self-initiated condition who 
reported feeling both motivated and unmotivated to engage in the task. Although I did not 
originally intend to code these open-ended questions, these findings do lead to questions about 
whether students do in fact perceive ease/difficulty or lack of motivation/motivation along a 
continuum, or whether it is possible to perceive both “extremes” simultaneously. If so, the 
relation between perceived effort source and self-evaluations of ability may be more complex 
than originally thought. In the future, researchers could delve into this more deeply.  
Next I investigated three additional possibilities that could describe the unexpected 
findings: (1) the open-ended questions in the self-initiated condition primed participants to think 
about social comparison and normative evaluation; (2) the open-ended questions gave 
participants in the task-elicited high effort group but not the self-initiated high effort group 
something tangible to attribute their effort to beyond their abilities; and (3) the priming sentences 
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at the beginning of the study could have influenced participants’ ability evaluations in 
unexpected ways. 
A first possible explanation for Study 2’s unexpected results is that the open-ended 
questions influenced how sensitive participants were to social comparison information, which 
then affected how they evaluated their abilities compared to the “other” participant. Nicholls 
(1984) theorized that as social comparison and normative evaluation become more salient in a 
particular context, students are likely to perceive these contexts as ego-involved, and view high 
effort as a sign of low ability (i.e., an inverse relation between effort and ability). I found in 
Study 2 that the content of the open-ended questions influenced the extent to which participants 
mentioned social comparison and normative evaluation in their responses. In particular, 
participants in the self-initiated groups (who were asked what made them more or less motivated 
during the task) were much more likely to bring up social comparison or normative evaluation 
than participants in the task-elicited groups (who were asked what made the task easy or 
difficult). Only 1 out of the 48 (2.08%) participants in the task-elicited groups mentioned social 
comparison or normative evaluation (“This task would have been easier for me personally if 
there were not other people in the room”), whereas 11 of the 55 (20%) participants in the self-
initiated groups mentioned social comparison or normative evaluation. In the self-initiated 
groups participants wrote things like, “My motivation was increased when another participant 
came into the room to do the same study. I wanted to make sure I did not seem like I was 
struggling or for her to get ahead of me when I got here well before she did”, “I would have been 
more motivated during the task if there was a reward for doing well or a ranking of performance. 
I strive to be in the top, so if I knew I was being ranked then there would have been an extra 
incentive to do well”, and “Wanting to complete it within 30 minutes since that was the 
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‘average’ time. I do not want to be ‘below average’/take longer than the average. I placed a 
competitiveness in the task when there wasn’t necessarily a reason to.” Thus, it appears that 
asking participants about what made them more or less motivated to complete the task in some 
cases led participants to focus on social comparison, competition, and normative evaluation, 
while asking participants what made the task easy or difficult for them did not elicit these same 
kinds of responses. 
Further evidence for this point comes from the social comparison orientation scale that 
participants completed at the end of the study. As discussed in Chapter 4, participants in the self-
initiated low effort condition reported a stronger social comparison orientation than participants 
in the task-elicited low effort condition (i.e., they were more likely to agree with statements such 
as, “I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life”). 
Because social comparison orientation was measured at the end of the study, the direction of this 
relation is not clear (i.e., Did participants who were more oriented toward social comparison to 
begin with just happen to be placed in the self-initiated groups, or did the self-initiated open-
ended questions prime participants to think more about social comparison, and thus affect their 
responses on the questionnaire?). Either way, this is a potential explanation for the unexpected 
results for Study 2. Specifically, because participants in the self-initiated groups were more 
attuned to social comparison, they were also more likely to perceive that they were in an ego-
involved context (e.g., Butler, 1987, 1988; Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1984, 1987; Nicholls, 1984). 
This may explain why they rated their abilities much lower than the “other” participant when 
they were told they worked harder than the other participant (and, conversely, why they rated 
their abilities much higher when they were told they worked less hard). In contrast, participants 
in the task-elicited groups were not attuned to social comparison and were therefore less likely to 
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perceive that they were in an ego-involved context (e.g., Butler, 1987, 1988; Jagacinski & 
Nicholls, 1984, 1987; Nicholls, 1984). This may explain why they did not necessarily rate their 
abilities much lower or much higher than the “other” participant when they were told that 
participant worked harder or less hard than they did. 
A second possible explanation has to do with attributions for effort in the task-elicited 
groups. It could be that asking participants to report what specifically about the task was difficult 
for them allowed them to think more deeply about their challenges with the task, and thus, were 
able to “explain” the high levels of effort they needed to exert. For example, when participants in 
the task-elicited conditions were asked what specific aspects of the task were most difficult, they 
wrote things like, “converting improper fractions to mixed numbers”, “dealing with larger 
numbers in the fractions”, and “dealing with unusual fractions.” Perhaps giving participants this 
opportunity to write about their challenges allowed them to maintain high evaluations of their 
abilities even when told that they worked harder than the other participant. For example, 
participants in the task-elicited high effort group may have thought something like, “I know I 
worked hard on this task, but it is not because I am bad at fractions. It is just because I am not 
used to converting improper fractions to mixed numbers.” In this sense they were able to 
attribute their hard work to more specific skills that might be lacking. Because participants in the 
self-initiated and control groups did not have this same opportunity, they may have just assumed 
that if someone worked less hard than they did, that other person was better at fractions or math 
than they were. This explanation is consistent with work by Weiner (1986) that being able to 
attribute failures to an external source can allow students to maintain high self-concepts of 
ability. Although participants in this study do not experience a failure per se, they still may feel 
negatively about their abilities if they are told they had to exert more effort on the task than 
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someone else (e.g., Nicholls & Miller, 1984). Thus, the open-ended questions gave participants 
in the task-elicited high effort group something tangible to attribute their effort to, which meant 
that their self-evaluations of ability were not negatively affected by the fact that they worked 
harder than the “other” participant. 
A third possible explanation is that the short priming sentence at the beginning of the 
study (“A lot of people work hard on this task because it is difficult” in the task-elicited 
condition, “A lot of people who hard on this task because they feel motivated to complete it” in 
the self-initiated condition, and “A lot of people work hard on this task” in the control condition) 
influenced the results. Specifically, participants in the task-elicited condition (but not the self-
initiated or control conditions) were told that others find the task difficult. Thus, these 
participants may have maintained more positive evaluations of their abilities even when they 
were told that they worked harder than someone else, because they assumed that most other 
people (perhaps even the person they were comparing themselves to) also found the task 
difficult. 
There are some additional differences between the two studies that I should point out. 
Although I do not have specific hypotheses as to why these differences could have contributed to 
the unexpected findings in Study 2, researchers should keep these differences in mind when 
designing future studies on effort source. These differences include: (1) Explicit versus implicit 
manipulation of effort source; (2) Perceiving effort source in oneself versus others; and (3) 
Imagining doing a task versus actually doing a task. 
First, it is possible that the results differed between the two studies because in Study 1 
effort source perceptions were explicitly manipulated with vignettes, whereas in Study 2 effort 
source perceptions were more implicitly manipulated with open-ended items. Given that real 
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classroom contexts are probably more similar to Study 2 (i.e., participants likely form 
perceptions of effort source implicitly rather than explicitly), and that the findings of Study 2 did 
not support our hypotheses, there is clearly a lot of work that researchers need to do in order to 
better understand how perceptions of effort source occur in real-world settings. 
Second, it seems likely that there are differences in how individuals perceive the source 
of their own effort versus the source of someone else’s effort. In Study 1 I manipulated students’ 
perceptions of the source of their own and others’ hypothetical effort, whereas in Study 2 I 
manipulated students’ perceptions of the source of their own, actual effort (and did not 
manipulate their perceptions of others’ effort). When students are thinking about their own 
effort, such as in Study 2, perceptions of task-elicited and self-initiated effort may be more 
overlapping (e.g., “This task is too hard so I am not motivated to complete it”), whereas it may 
be easier for students to perceive others’ effort as coming from only one source or the other. This 
relates to the literature on differences between “self” and “other” attributions that suggests that 
these attribution processes are similar in some ways but distinct in others, since individuals tend 
to have more information about themselves (e.g., thoughts, perceptions, emotions) than they do 
about others (e.g., Nicholls & Miller, 1984; Smith, 1984).  
Third, there are differences between imagining doing a task (as in Study 1) and actually 
doing a task (as in Study 2). When students read a vignette, they are only getting the information 
that is explicitly laid out in the vignette. However, when students actually do a task, they are 
getting a lot of additional information about their performance, their feelings while doing the 
task, their physiological states, and so on. This could affect how sensitive they are to 
experimental manipulations. Perhaps in Study 2 I was not able to manipulate participants’ 
perceptions of effort source because students had already formed strong perceptions, 
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assumptions, and beliefs about the task while they were actually engaged in it. In the future 
researchers should think of ways to design studies that will mitigate this problem or will allow 
more insight into the complexities of students’ perceptions and thoughts while they are actually 
doing a task. 
Although the effort source x effort level x type of ability evaluation interaction was not 
statistically significant and the effect size was small, it appeared that the results were stronger 
(i.e., the F values were larger) for more specific evaluations of ability (i.e., specific fraction task, 
fraction ability) than for more general evaluations of ability (i.e., math ability). This likely 
occurred because the participants only received feedback about the specific fraction task (e.g., 
“The other participant finished the task approximately five minutes faster than you”), rather than 
their fraction or math abilities more generally. This finding is consistent with work emphasizing 
the importance of specificity in self-judgments of academic abilities (e.g., Pajares, 1996b). 
Although results for evaluations of general math ability were not statistically significant, the 
pattern of results was similar to those for the other two ability evaluations (see Figures 6-8) that 
were contrary to expectations. Additionally, for all three evaluations of ability, there were main 
effects for initial ability evaluation; participants who rated their initial math ability higher also 
rated their task, fraction, and math abilities higher at the end of the study. Furthermore, 
participants with a lower social comparison orientation rated their math abilities higher, on 
average, than participants with a higher social comparison orientation. I did not examine whether 
any of the covariates moderated the effects in the present study; future researchers should 
explore this question. 
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In summary, results for Study 2 were contrary to prediction. These unexpected findings 
could have occurred for the reasons just described or possibly others. Future research should 
explore which, if any, of these possible explanations receive the most support. 
In Study 2 I built on previous research on effort source (e.g., Heyman et al., 2003; 
Heyman & Compton, 2006; Koriat et al., 2006; Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Muenks et al., in 
press) in similar ways to Study 1, but also extended Study 1 by having participants complete an 
academic task and connect their actual effort on this task to a particular source. This is an 
important extension to the vignette work because it provides more ecological validity, as it is 
more similar to what students will experience in “real” classrooms. However, given that the 
results from Study 2 were unexpected and inconsistent with hypotheses, it is not clear whether I 
was successful at manipulating students’ perceptions of the source of their own effort. Thus, I 
hesitate to make any strong conclusions about the extent to which students’ perceptions of the 
source of their own effort on a task influence the perceived relation between levels of their own 
effort and ability. 
In the future, researchers should think of new ways to explore this question. Perhaps task-
elicited effort could be manipulated through facial expressions that lead to the perception that 
one is struggling with a task (e.g., Koriat & Nussinson, 2009; Miele & Molden, 2010; Stepper & 
Strack, 1993), and self-initiated effort could be manipulated by providing participants with some 
kind of external reward. Researchers could also use a similar paradigm of having participants 
respond to open-ended items, but include a manipulation check at the end to investigate whether 
the manipulation was successful or not. Additionally, researchers could simply measure (rather 
than manipulate) participants’ perceptions of the source of their own effort and examine whether 
these perceptions are related to their ability evaluations. Further research is needed to help clarify 
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the role of students’ perceptions of effort source on their self-evaluations of ability in more “real-
world” contexts.   
Next I will turn to theoretical implications of the present set of studies. 
Theoretical Implications 
 Findings from the present studies provide support for and extensions of a number of 
different theories in the developmental, educational, social, and cognitive psychology literatures. 
I will discuss each of these theories in turn with respect to how the present studies relate to them. 
 Social comparison theory. Participants in the present studies were asked to make self-
evaluations of ability compared to another hypothetical student. I was particularly interested in 
these social comparison evaluations because, as discussed in Chapter 2, many researchers have 
found that college students use information about their peers, such as their beliefs or 
observations about the level of their peers’ effort and ability, to form their own self-assessments 
(e.g., Festinger, 1954; Wheeler & Suls, 2005). These studies provide support for the idea that 
perceived effort source is yet another variable that college students use in social comparison 
contexts to form evaluations of their own abilities. For example, when students are trying to 
determine how good they are at a particular task (e.g., their geometry homework), they may 
compare themselves with other students by thinking about why they or others worked hard (or 
not), in addition to how much effort they and others exerted on the task. This information may 
allow students to make more accurate judgments about their abilities compared to others. 
 Attribution theory. Findings from these studies provide several important extensions to 
attribution theory. First, in these studies I separated out the “intention” aspect of effort from the 
“exertion” aspect that Heider (1958) discussed in his original attribution theory. Specifically, the 
perceived source of one’s effort is similar to Heider’s (1958) conception of intention, which is 
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defined as the reasons for working hard. In the present studies individuals’ perceived effort 
source (i.e., intention) influenced the perceived relation between levels of effort (i.e., exertion) 
and ability. Thus, in the present studies I tested a model that separated out the two components of 
effort that Heider (1958) originally identified, and looked at how these two components 
interacted to predict perceptions of ability. Results of these studies therefore suggest that 
perceptions of the intention behind one’s effort (i.e., effort source) influence the perceived 
relation between effort exertion and ability level; this is an important extension of Heider’s 
(1958) theory. 
 Furthermore, results of these studies are relevant to Weiner’s (1986) attribution theory in 
which he categorizes effort, ability, task difficulty, and luck (the four most common attributions 
for academic success or failure) along particular dimensions. As I discussed in Chapter 2, Weiner 
(1979) defined immediate effort as being internal and unstable, and stable effort as being internal 
and stable. However, I found that there are other ways in which people can think about 
immediate effort (note that from now on when I talk about “effort” I mean immediate effort as 
defined by Weiner [1979]). As Weiner stated effort itself is internal and controllable in the sense 
that individuals have personal control over how much they exert at any given time. However, 
results of the present studies suggest that effort can be perceived as primarily arising from either 
the subjective ease or difficulty of the task (which is more external and uncontrollable) or their 
own motivation (which is more internal and controllable). Thus students’ perceptions of the 
source of one’s effort may differ somewhat from how immediate effort was originally delineated 
along the three dimensions in Weiner’s (1986) theory. One way that this theory could be 
modified is by differentiating between perceptions of how someone works hard and why 
someone works hard. These two components of effort can be characterized along different 
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dimensions. Although the act of actually exerting effort or energy on a task is clearly internal 
(which is consistent with the way Weiner originally defined it), perceptions of effort source may 
be more internal (self-initiated) or more external (task-elicited). Thus these findings suggest that 
there are multiple components to effort that should be categorized differently using Weiner’s 
(1986) dimensions. Again this is consistent with Heider’s (1958) theory in which he 
differentiated between effort intention and effort exertion. 
 Similarly, in his theory Weiner (1986) described ability as being internal, stable, and 
uncontrollable. However Nicholls’ (1984) and Dweck’s (1999) work, among others, suggests 
that there are differences in how individuals define or conceptualize ability across contexts, 
which suggest a modification of Weiner’s (1986) theory. Although some people do believe that 
ability is stable and uncontrollable, others believe that ability can be changed by effort, and 
therefore is unstable and controllable. In the present studies I made the assumption based on 
Nicholls’ and Dweck’s work that not everyone perceives the relation between levels of effort and 
ability in the same way that Weiner (1986) originally conceptualized them; Weiner (1985) also 
recognized this possibility (p. 551). In particular I found that perceived effort source can affect 
individuals’ perceptions of the relation between effort and ability, and thus the way that they 
define ability on the stable/unstable and controllable/uncontrollable dimensions, in particular 
contexts. Thus perhaps Weiner’s (1986) theory could be modified to include the possibility that 
there are individual differences in how ability is characterized along his dimensions. There is 
evidence that attribution theorists do allow for this possibility; in Graham and Williams (2009), 
the authors state: 
For attribution theorists, it is the three dimensions that are constant; the placement of a 
cause along a dimension will certainly vary between individuals. This is not a problem 
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for the theory. For example, effort can be judged as quite stable when it takes on a trait-
like quality (think of the attributions we make about the chronically lazy student). 
Similarly, ability can be perceived as unstable if perceivers believe that new learning can 
change one’s basic abilities. Carol Dweck’s research on theories of intelligence (see 
Dweck & Master, this volume) maps closely onto an attributional analysis of ability as 
stable versus unstable. (Graham & Williams, 2009, p. 14) 
 Nicholls’ theory of ability conceptions. As discussed in Chapter 2, Nicholls’ (1978, 
1984) theory of ability conceptions has two components: A developmental component, and a 
situational/contextual component. Although many researchers (e.g., Harari & Covington, 1981; 
Karabenick & Heller, 1976; Kun, 1977; Kun et al., 1974; Nicholls, 1978; Surber, 1980; Wimmer 
et al., 1982) found clear developmental progressions in children’s understanding of the relation 
between effort and ability, there was some debate in the literature about when children become 
able to fully differentiate between effort and ability and thus conceptualize an inverse relation 
between the two. In the present studies I chose to use a college student sample in order to ensure 
that all of the participants were cognitively mature enough to understand both a positive and an 
inverse relation between effort and ability, so that developmental level was not a confounding 
factor in my results. However, because I utilized a college student sample in the present studies, I 
am not able to contribute anything to the debate on when exactly children can conceptualize an 
inverse relation between effort and ability. I can only conclude that by late adolescence/early 
adulthood, students are able to conceptualize both a positive and inverse relation between effort 
and ability. 
 The second part of Nicholls’ theory is the situational component. Nicholls (1984) argues 
that the context or situation a student is in (such as a classroom) can influence how they 
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conceptualize ability. Specifically, an ego-involved situation that is characterized by an emphasis 
on competition and social comparison will promote a differentiated conception of ability and 
thus an inverse relation between levels of effort and ability, while a task-involved situation that is 
characterized by an emphasis on individual skill development will promote an undifferentiated 
conception of ability and a positive relation between effort and ability (e.g., Jagacinski & 
Nicholls, 1984, 1987). The contexts in both of the present studies were ego-involved in that they 
involved direct social comparison between two individuals, the participant themselves and 
hypothetical “other” participant. However, there were still differences in how participants 
perceived the relation between effort and ability based on effort source condition. Thus the 
present studies build on Nicholls’ work by showing that even within an ego-involved context 
college students can perceive a positive relation between effort and ability (and thus 
conceptualize ability as undifferentiated from effort), if they also perceive that their own and 
others’ effort is self-initiated (see also Muenks et al., in press). These findings suggest that 
perhaps Nicholls’ (1984) theory could be extended to include other types of variables (such as 
effort source) that influence students’ perceptions of the relation between effort and ability, 
above and beyond the context or situation they are in. More theoretical extensions of the present 
studies to both Nicholls’ (1984) and Dweck’s (1999) theories will be discussed after I talk about 
Dweck’s theory. 
 Dweck’s theory of individual differences in beliefs about intellectual ability. Dweck 
(1999) suggested that there are somewhat stable differences in how individuals conceptualize 
intellectual ability. Some individuals hold an entity theory and believe that ability is innate, 
fixed, and unaffected by effort. They are likely to endorse an inverse relation between effort and 
ability. Others hold an incremental theory and believe that ability is malleable and can be 
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substantially improved with effort. They are likely to endorse a positive relation between effort 
and ability. In the present studies I was not interested in directly testing how students’ theories of 
intelligence related to their perceived effort source; I therefore decided to control for theories of 
intelligence in my analyses. However, future research could explore the extent to which theories 
of intelligence might influence, or be influenced by, perceived effort source. Specifically, it 
seems possible that students’ theories of intelligence might influence how they perceive the 
source of their own or others’ effort. Perhaps students who hold entity theories are more sensitive 
to task-elicited information than those who hold incremental theories because they view task-
elicited effort as a sign that someone has reached the limits of his or her ability. Students who 
hold incremental theories, on the other hand, might be more sensitive to self-initiated effort 
information because they view self-initiated effort as a sign that someone is seeking to improve 
his or her ability. Additionally, as discussed above, it seems possible that effort source 
information may at least temporarily change students’ theories of intelligence. Perhaps 
perceiving that someone exerted high levels of task-elicited effort leads to the conclusion that his 
or her ability is fixed (because the task is too hard for that person), while perceiving that 
someone exerted high levels of self-initiated effort leads to the conclusion that his or her ability 
is malleable (because that person is choosing to exert effort beyond what is required by the task). 
In the future, researchers should explore to what extent individuals’ theories of intelligence 
might relate to their perceptions of task-elicited or self-initiated effort (see Muenks & Miele, 
under review). 
Overall, the most important way that the present studies build on both Nicholls (1984) 
and Dweck’s (1999) theories is by focusing on aspects of effort that might influence how college 
students conceptualize the relation between effort and ability in specific school contexts, and 
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thus, how they evaluate their own abilities as compared to others. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
both Nicholls (1984) and Dweck (1999) emphasize the impact of developmental, contextual, and 
individual difference factors on students’ conceptions of ability (i.e., 
differentiated/undifferentiated or entity/incremental), and how their conceptions of ability then 
influenced how they viewed the relation between effort and ability in particular situations. 
However, only a few studies have examined how students’ perceptions of effort influence this 
perceived relation (e.g., Heyman & Compton, 2006; Heyman, Gee, & Giles, 2003; Muenks et al., 
in press), and only one set of studies has examined perceived effort source (Muenks et al., in 
press). The findings of these studies suggest that above and beyond the context one is in (i.e., 
ego-involved or task-involved) or one’s theories of intelligence (i.e., entity or incremental), 
perceived effort source does in fact influence how students view effort in relation to ability and 
thus, how they evaluate the level of their own abilities in academic contexts. This provides a 
critical step forward for both theories by introducing a new construct that researchers should 
consider incorporating into future studies. I hope that this study will encourage researchers to go 
beyond a one-dimensional view of effort and consider the idea that every student does not think 
about the source of effort in the same way, and that these different ways of thinking about the 
source of effort can influence motivationally important constructs such as students’ beliefs about 
their own abilities. 
Educational Implications 
 The present studies fall under the category of “basic research” and so do not have 
immediate applications to educational practice regarding how to enhance students’ ability beliefs 
or motivation more generally. I am therefore hesitant to overstate the educational implications of 
this work. However, I do think that there are possibilities for future research to build on this 
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work with the goal of applying what we have learned about the way effort source information 
influences individuals’ judgments of their own and others’ ability to motivation interventions. 
Once researchers better understand the extent to which students’ perceptions of effort source 
influence their motivation, behaviors (i.e., persistence), and achievement, they could create new 
interventions or modify existing interventions designed to improve students’ perceptions of 
effort in adaptive ways. 
 For example, there are already many interventions designed to increase students’ “growth 
mindsets” or entity theories (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; Donohoe, Topping, & Hannah, 2012). 
In these interventions researchers teach children that their abilities are malleable and able to 
improve with effort. They emphasize that students should not be afraid of or shy away from 
working hard or exerting high effort on challenging academic tasks. Results from Study 1 
suggest that it may be important to not only emphasize the benefits of working hard, but also 
students’ perceptions about why they are working hard. If students could think about their effort 
as being self-initiated rather than task-elicited in contexts where they work hard, and as task-
elicited rather than self-initiated in contexts where they do not work hard, they may be able to 
maintain positive beliefs about their competence, especially when comparing themselves to 
others. However, researchers will need to do more work on which effort source perceptions are 
most motivationally beneficial in different contexts before implementing any interventions that 
include effort source in them. At the moment, especially considering the different results found 
in Studies 1 and 2, I would not recommend that researchers jump to any definitive conclusions 
about which perceptions are most adaptive for students. The present studies can help us better 
understand how students form evaluations of their own abilities, and specifically the role of 
effort source perceptions to these motivationally-important beliefs, but this work does not 
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directly tie students’ beliefs about effort source to behavioral (e.g., persistence) or achievement 
outcomes. Researchers need to make these links before creating new interventions or modifying 
old ones. This is an important area for future study (see below). 
 Interestingly, results from Study 2 suggest a potential place for intervention that might 
help college students maintain high self-evaluations of ability in situations where they perceive 
they had to work harder than someone else on a task. Specifically, in the task-elicited condition 
of Study 2, participants wrote about what aspects of the fraction math task were easy or difficult 
for them, and what would make the task easier or more difficult. Responding to these open-
ended items seemed to improve students’ self-evaluations of ability in the task-elicited, high 
effort group (as compared to those in the control, high effort group and the self-initiated, high 
effort group; see Figures 6-8). Thus, even though results from this study were unexpected, it 
seemed that having participants write about aspects of the task (as opposed to writing about their 
motivation or not writing at all) led to more positive self-evaluations of ability in situations 
where they were told that they worked harder than someone else. This finding suggests that 
writing about why a task was easy or difficult for students might mitigate the negative effects of 
finding out that they exerted more effort than someone else on the same task. As discussed 
above, this could have occurred because writing about the task might have primed a task-
involved or mastery-oriented mindset (e.g., Nicholls, 1984) or because writing about the task 
gave participants attributions for their hard work that did not reflect poorly on their self-
evaluations of ability. Future studies should continue to explore this effect. If it continues to 
hold, this could be another area for potential intervention. 
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Limitations 
 The present studies have several limitations. I will begin with limitations that involve 
both studies, and end with specific limitations of each study individually. First, for both studies I 
utilized college student samples from a large, public, mid-Atlantic university that were majority 
female (67.8% in Study 1 and 78.1% in Study 2). Thus, my findings are not generalizable to 
younger students (middle school, high school) or to students from different areas of the United 
States or the world. Furthermore, I may have had different results had I had more gender-
balanced samples or sample of majority men, especially because many researchers have found 
differences in male and female college students’ perceptions of their mathematics abilities (Sax, 
Kanny, Riggers-Piehl, Whang, & Paulson, 2015). Indeed, in the present studies, men initially 
rated their math abilities significantly higher than women, t(206) = 2.88, p = .004, for Study 1, 
t(158) = 3.27, p = .001, for Study 2. However, I controlled for this in the following ways: 1) by 
having participants in both studies compare their abilities to another student of the same gender; 
and 2) by controlling for students’ initial beliefs about their mathematics abilities. 
 Despite these limitations, I do believe that these samples were appropriate for the studies 
for several reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, college students’ beliefs about their 
academic abilities are particularly important predictors of their adjustment to college, grades, 
retention, and career prospects (e.g., Chemers et al., 2001; Lent et al., 1986; Robbins et al., 2004; 
Zajacova et al., 2005). Thus it is important for researchers to more deeply explore how college 
students form evaluations of their own abilities, which is why I chose college students as my 
population of interest. Second, despite the fact that the samples were not fully gender balanced, 
they were diverse in other ways. Specifically, both samples were quite ethnically diverse and 
also diverse in terms of students’ majors. The ethnic breakdown of students at the University of 
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Maryland is 53.4% White, 15.4% Asian, 12.5% Black, 8.8% Hispanic, and 9.9% Other (Forbes, 
2016). The ethnic breakdown of Study 1 was 38.6% White, 22.9% Asian, 26.2% Black, 5.2% 
Hispanic, and 7.1% Bi-racial or multi-racial, and the ethnic breakdown of Study 2 was 52.5% 
White, 25% Asian, 10.6% Black, 4.4% Hispanic, and 7.5% Bi-racial or multi-racial. Thus 
although both samples somewhat oversampled Black and Asian students and somewhat 
undersampled Hispanic and White students, the overall ethnic breakdown was quite 
representative of University of Maryland students as a whole. Furthermore, in both studies 
Behavioral and Social Sciences was the most common category of majors for participants, but 
only 24.3% of the participants in Study 1 majored in Behavioral and Social Sciences, and only 
36.3% of participants in Study 2 did. Thus, my samples included a majority of students who 
were not Behavioral/Social Science majors. 
Another limitation of the present studies is that they do not demonstrate that students 
spontaneously generate perceptions of effort source on their own in real classroom contexts. In 
Study 1 I told participants in the vignettes what information to focus on, which forced them to 
perceive effort in a particular way. I also forced them to make an ability evaluation. Although the 
vignettes were meant to describe realistic school-based scenarios, participants read these 
vignettes in a laboratory and it is certainly possible that they never actually experienced the 
situations described in the vignettes in their real lives. Participants may have been attuned to the 
information I provided them, and responded accordingly. However, they may not have actually 
held these effort source perceptions about themselves or other students had I studied this 
phenomenon in real classrooms. Aguinis and Bradley (2014) state, “One of the major criticisms 
regarding the use of Experimental Vignette Methodology (EVP) is that it is unrealistic and not 
easily generalizable… In fact, EVT studies are criticized for only showing that certain outcomes 
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can happen but not necessarily that they do happen outside of the experimental situation” (p. 
361, emphasis in original). Thus, a next critical step in research on perceived effort source is to 
study whether students form these perceptions naturally or spontaneously on their own in real-
world school contexts. Perhaps certain cues, such as students appearing outwardly discouraged 
or frustrated, would lead to the assumption of task-elicited effort, and other cues, such as 
students appearing enthusiastic about a task, would lead to the assumption of self-initiated effort. 
Additionally, perhaps students only use effort source information in situations where they 
experience a surprising or unexpected outcome (i.e., failing a test when they thought they would 
do well). In these cases students may be particularly motivated to look to their peers and use 
information about effort source and effort level in order to understand why the surprising 
outcome occurred. In the future researchers should challenge themselves to move beyond 
vignettes and explore how these processes work in real school contexts. Qualitative work might 
be particularly helpful in this regard. 
In Study 2 I tried to place participants in a more “real-world” situation by having them 
complete an actual task. However, this study occurred in a laboratory and I still manipulated 
perceptions of effort source rather than measuring whether students perceive their own and 
others’ effort as task-elicited or self-initiated naturally. Thus I was not able to conclude whether 
participants spontaneously generate these perceptions on their own. 
An issue that is always potentially problematic in psychological research is that self-
reports may be biased due to social desirability (e.g., Krumpal, 2013). Perhaps participants in 
Study 1 picked up on the differences in the vignettes and figured out what I “wanted” them to 
report, and responded accordingly (even if that is not how they would respond in “real-world” 
situations). It is difficult to test this or to know whether this occurred; in the future researchers 
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could try to design studies that minimize the influence of social desirability on participants’ 
responses, perhaps through more observational-based methods. I am less concerned about social 
desirability effects in Study 2 for two reasons. First, participants across all three effort source 
conditions were given the same effort level information and made the same ability evaluation. 
The only differences between the three conditions were the short priming sentence at the 
beginning of the task (e.g., “A lot of people work hard on this task because…”) and the open-
ended questions they responded to, which I doubt most participants would pick up on as being an 
important part of the manipulation. Second, the results from this study were unexpected and 
inconsistent with my hypotheses, so it is highly unlikely that participants correctly “guessed” 
what I was looking for and responded accordingly.  
Another possible limitation of Study 1 specifically is that students may have experienced 
fatigue due to responding to eight somewhat similar vignettes. However, I did make minor 
changes to the vignettes in order to reduce repetition. I also include a distractor task in the middle 
of these vignettes (i.e., I asked participants to name as many state capitals as they could in two 
minutes) in order to minimize this concern. Additionally, many studies have found that college 
students (and children) can handle multiple similar vignettes in a row (e.g., Harari & Covington, 
1981; Kun et al., 1974; Kun, 1997; Surber, 1980). Thus, I feel confident that the participants in 
my study read the vignettes carefully. 
 A limitation of Study 2 is that there was no manipulation check. Thus, I am unable to 
conclude whether the study did not work out as expected because I was simply unsuccessful at 
manipulating students’ perceptions of effort source, or because my hypothesis was incorrect. It 
would have been very helpful if I had included, at the end of the study, a question that 
participants had to respond to such as, “My effort or lack of effort on this task was mostly driven 
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by…” (1 = the ease/difficulty of the task to 10 = my own motivation/lack of motivation). I could 
have then examined whether participants in the task-elicited condition were more likely to report 
that they perceived their own effort as task-elicited, and participants in the self-initiated 
condition were more likely to report that they perceived their own effort as self-initiated. In the 
future, researchers should think about building manipulation checks into the designs of their 
studies on perceived effort source, especially when trying to manipulate these perceptions in 
novel ways. 
Another limitation of Study 2 is that I did not measure math anxiety. Given that I had a 
majority female sample, and that females are more likely than males to experience math anxiety 
(e.g., Goetz, Bieg, Lüdtke, Pekrun, & Hall, 2013), it is likely that there were participants in my 
sample that had high levels of math anxiety. These participants may have approached the 
fraction task very differently than participants with lower levels of math anxiety, and relations 
between perceived effort source and self-evaluations of ability could be different for this group. 
Specifically, perceptions of task-elicited effort may have been particularly salient for these 
highly anxious students, whereas perceptions of self-initiated effort may not have been salient; 
this could have affected the strength of the relation between perceptions of effort source and 
perceptions of the relation between effort and ability. Although randomization to groups should 
control for these differences, in the future researchers could either explicitly control for math 
anxiety or look at math anxiety as a moderator of the relations between variables. Furthermore, 
although I tried to minimize the experience of stereotype threat by not having participants report 
their gender before engaging in the task, it is possible that stereotype threat could have still 
affected the women in my sample; future research could further explore this. 
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Finally, it is possible that the recipe fraction task in Study 2 was simply not motivating 
for college students, especially for men, in the way I intended it to be. It is possible that many 
college students do not cook regularly and so they may not see a recipe fraction task as being 
particularly relevant to their daily lives. Thus their motivations on the task were likely more 
driven by social comparison/competition (see above) than actual interest in the task itself. Asking 
participants to complete a more interesting or motivating task may have made it easier for me to 
manipulate participants’ perceptions of their effort as being self-initiated. However, as discussed 
above, participants did appear to be generally motivated on the task, just perhaps for different 
reasons than I expected them to be. See below for more discussion of “motivation” in the self-
initiated condition. 
Remaining Questions and Future Directions 
As discussed in this chapter, I believe these studies made critical empirical contributions 
to the current literature on students’ perceptions of the relations between effort and ability. 
However, there are still many unanswered questions that future research should address to 
replicate, extend, and build on this work. 
One important remaining question is: Is it possible for one’s effort to be task-elicited and 
self-initiated at the same time? It certainly seems possible, and very likely, that students’ effort is 
both task-elicited and self-initiated when they are completing many academic tasks. In the 
present set of studies I argue that one’s effort can be perceived as primarily task-elicited or self-
initiated in a particular context or situation, and that these perceptions influence how students 
conceptualize the relation between effort and ability in those contexts. However, in the future 
researchers should study these perceptions in more ecologically valid contexts, such as real 
classrooms, and whether students’ perceptions do in fact differ across different situations. For 
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example, are there particular classrooms where students perceive their own or others’ effort as 
primarily task-elicited? Are there other situations where students perceive their own or others’ 
effort as primarily self-initiated? Or are students’ perceptions of their effort always an equal 
balance between being task-elicited and self-initiated? What are the implications of these 
different perceptions? 
Another remaining question is whether the “motivation” component of self-initiated 
effort can or should be separated into different components of motivation, such as intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2012). There are many reasons that students might be 
motivated to engage in a task, and that includes students being interested in the task or 
perceiving that the task having some sort of utility value, as well as students wanting to please 
their teachers/professors or wanting to show classmates how smart they are. These are all very 
different reasons for wanting to engage in a task. Does it matter whether participants’ effort is 
self-initiated for intrinsic reasons (i.e., interest in the topic) versus for extrinsic reasons (i.e., to 
get a good grade on a test or because they want to prove to someone else that they can complete 
a task)? Would this lead to different perceptions of the relation between effort and ability? For 
example, if participants’ effort is self-initiated because of intrinsic reasons, will there be a 
stronger positive relation between effort and ability than in participants’ effort is self-initiated 
because of extrinsic reasons? Or is the important part that participants simply perceive that their 
effort is motivated by themselves (in whatever capacity) and their desire to go beyond the basic 
requirements of the task? Future research could examine this by trying to manipulate students’ 
perceptions of self-initiated effort in more subtle and complex ways. 
Researchers could extend this work by examining other motivation and achievement 
outcomes in addition to students’ perceptions of their own abilities. Specifically, researchers 
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could look at how perceived effort source in a particular class context influences behavioral 
outcomes such as actual persistence on an academic task, or students’ grades in a class. 
Researchers could also investigate when it might be useful for students to perceive their own or 
others’ effort as task-elicited, and when it might be useful to perceive effort as self-initiated. As 
discussed above, researchers need to more directly connect students’ perceived effort source to 
motivationally beneficial outcomes in order to further explore the extent to which these 
perceptions are important. This type of work could be used to inform the creation or modification 
of actual interventions for students aimed to help increase their motivation in school. 
Researchers could also explore individual differences in students’ tendencies to perceive 
effort and task-elicited or self-initiated. Perhaps some students are more likely to assume their 
own and others’ effort is task-elicited, whereas other students are more likely to assume that their 
own and others’ effort is self-initiated even within the same context. Individual differences in 
perceived effort source could be related to students’ theories of intelligence (Dweck, 1999), with 
entity theorists being more likely to perceive effort as task-elicited and incremental theorists 
being more likely to perceive effort as self-initiated. Researchers could test this hypothesis. 
Additionally, this work could extend to include cultural differences, such as the extent to which 
Asian students may perceive effort differently than White students (e.g., Hsin & Xie, 2014).  
Researchers could also extend this work to younger students in order to explore the 
developmental progression of students’ perceptions of effort source in school contexts. Perhaps it 
is not until children are able to perceive an inverse relation between effort and ability that their 
perceptions of effort source influence their motivation. Or, perhaps even students who are able to 
perceive an inverse relation between effort and ability are still not able to pick up on the nuances 
of task-elicited and self-initiated effort until they are older. There is also the question of whether 
 141 
younger students spontaneously form these perceptions on their own in school contexts, or 
whether they would only be sensitive to effort source information if researchers explicitly gave 
them effort source information. This work could ultimately help inform interventions intended to 
target younger students. 
Researchers could also conduct longitudinal studies in order to examine: 1) whether 
students’ perceptions of effort source influence longer-term outcomes such as grades or 
standardized test scores; and 2) the extent to which students’ perceptions of effort source change 
over time and in different situations. These studies could help researchers understand whether 
students’ effort source perceptions in particular contexts are more strongly influenced by the 
situation one is in, or more stable individual differences. Or, perhaps in some contexts the 
situation and individual are equally important. It could also answer developmental questions 
about how these perceptions change over time. Additionally, if researchers found that these 
perceptions influenced longer-term outcomes than just students’ self-evaluations of ability, this 
would provide a strong rationale for researchers to try to intervene in how students think about 
the source of their own or others’ effort. 
With respect to the social comparison component of the study, in the future researchers 
could investigate how students make evaluations of themselves as compared to “generalized 
others” (i.e., “Everyone in the class is finishing this with less effort than I because they all find 
the task to be easy”) as opposed to a single individual. Perhaps the relation between perceived 
effort source and students’ self-evaluations of ability would be stronger in cases where students 
compare themselves to a group of peers versus a single peer; this is an important extension of the 
current studies. 
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Researchers could include “effort distance” as a variable in future studies instead of just 
controlling for it. It might be interesting to see how the difference between how much effort 
students perceive they exerted themselves versus how much effort students perceive that others 
exerted might influence students’ reasoning about effort and ability and their ability evaluations 
of others compared to themselves. For example, perhaps the larger the distance between my 
effort and someone else’s effort, the more strongly task-elicited perceptions are going to affect 
how I evaluate my ability compared to someone else. Future work could test whether effort 
distance might moderate the relation between perceived effort source and perceived relation 
between effort and ability. Furthermore, in studies where participants complete a task, 
researchers could actually measure students’ effort in a more objective way (such as time spent 
on task) in addition to having them rate their effort on a 1-10 point scale; it might be interesting 
to examine whether the findings are replicated using different conceptualizations of “effort”. 
Finally, related to this point, there is a broader issue of how researchers define and 
measure effort. One critical question for future researchers to explore in more depth is: What is 
effort, and what does it look like in school (e.g., time on task, concentration, help seeking)? Do 
researchers, school administrators, teachers, students, and parents have similar beliefs about what 
effort is and why it is important, or do these beliefs and assumptions differ? Many researchers 
who study effort or include effort as a variable in their studies often fail to define it, either 
because they assume that the definition is self-explanatory, or because there is no strong 
theoretical basis for a definition of effort. The present studies provide some evidence that effort 
can be conceptualized in different ways and that there are different aspects of effort (i.e., level 
and source) that are critical; however, there is a lot of work to be done on deeply understanding 
what effort is and how different people define it. 
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Conclusion 
In the present set of studies I investigated whether perceived effort source influenced 
students’ self-evaluations of ability as compared to others when responding to hypothetical 
vignettes (Study 1) and when completing an actual academic task (Study 2). Results from Study 
1 supported my hypotheses and prior research, whereas results from Study 2 did not. There are 
several possible explanations for these inconsistent findings. There are also many important 
theoretical and some practical implications of the results. Future work should address some of 
the limitations of the present studies and build on this work in order to increase our 




Appendix A: Vignettes and Demographic Questions for Study 1 
NOTE: Will create a “male” version and a “female” version of these vignettes and participants 
will ONLY view the vignettes that correspond to their gender. (Males will be comparing 
themselves to other males; females will be comparing themselves to other females). Also will 
include two vignettes per condition to increase reliability—a “Calculus class” version and 
“Statistics class” version, but will randomize them so that there are two Blocks to minimize the 
chances that participants get two vignettes of the same condition in a row. 
 
There will be a break after the first four vignettes that participants view. The break will be two 
minutes long and participants will be asked to name as many U.S. state capitals as they can in 
two minutes by typing them into a text box on the screen. After the break, they will be able to 




Before we begin, please answer the following question. 
 
How would you evaluate your own mathematics ability? (Slider scale from 1-100; anchors are 
“very low” and “very high”) 
 
Please read the following hypothetical scenarios. 
 
Although the scenarios will seem similar to one another, there are some key differences, so it is 
important that you read each one carefully. 
 
In each scenario, you will be asked to imagine that you are in a college level class next to another 
student. You will be given some information and then asked to evaluate your own ability as 
compared to the other student. You will then be given additional information and asked to 
evaluate your own ability as compared to the other student again. You will make a total of three 
evaluations per scenario. Please make your evaluations based on what you think is most likely 
given the information. 
 
Finally, at the end of the study, you will be asked to indicate your agreement or disagreement 
with a few additional statements about yourself. 
 




Vignette 1a: High effort, low score [Jennifer/John] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Jennifer. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Jennifer only 
took 5 minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
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Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Jennifer’s? 
(1 = Jennifer’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher)  
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you felt that they were very difficult, 
whereas Jennifer did not work hard on the problems because she felt that they were very easy. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Jennifer’s? 
(1 = Jennifer’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Jennifer received a 
90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Jennifer’s? 
(1 = Jennifer’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 1b: High effort, low score [Sarah/Matt] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Sarah. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Sarah only 
took 7 minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Sarah’s? 
(1 = Sarah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you felt that they were very difficult, 
whereas Sarah did not work hard on the problems because she felt that they were very easy. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Sarah’s? 
(1 = Sarah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Sarah received a 90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Sarah’s? 
(1 = Sarah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much higher) 
 
Vignette 2a: High effort, high score [Rebecca/Ben] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Rebecca. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Rebecca only 
took 5 minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
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Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Rebecca’s? 
(1 = Rebecca’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you felt that they were very difficult, 
whereas Rebecca did not work hard on the problems because she felt that they were very easy. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Rebecca’s? 
(1 = Rebecca’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Rebecca received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Rebecca’s? 
(1 = Rebecca’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 2b: High effort, high score [Emily/Samuel] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Emily. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Emily only 
took 7 minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Emily’s? 
(1 = Emily’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you felt that they were very difficult, 
whereas Emily did not work hard on the problems because she felt that they were very easy. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Emily’s? 
(1 = Emily’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Emily received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Emily’s? 
(1 = Emily’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 3a: Low effort, low score [Hannah/Joe] 
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Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Hannah. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took only 5 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas Hannah 
took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Hannah’s? 
(1 = Hannah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you felt that they were very easy, 
whereas Hannah worked hard on the problems because she felt that they were very difficult. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Hannah’s? 
(1 = Hannah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Hannah received a 
90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Hannah’s? 
(1 = Hannah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 3b: Low effort, low score [Stephanie/Adam] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Stephanie. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took only 7 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas 
Stephanie took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Stephanie’s? 
(1 = Stephanie’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you felt that they were very easy, 
whereas Stephanie worked hard on the problems because she felt that they were very difficult. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Stephanie’s? 
(1 = Stephanie’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Stephanie received a 
90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Stephanie’s? 




Vignette 4a: Low effort, high score [Christina/Jeff] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Christina. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took only 5 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas 
Christina took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Christina’s? 
(1 = Christina’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you felt that they were very easy, 
whereas Christina worked hard on the problems because she felt that they were very difficult. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Christina’s? 
(1 = Christina’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Christina received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Christina’s? 
(1 = Christina’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 4b: Low effort, high score [Grace/Ryan] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Grace. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took only 7 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas Grace 
took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Grace’s? 
(1 = Grace’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you felt that they were very easy, 
whereas Grace worked hard on the problems because she felt that they were very difficult. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Grace’s? 
(1 = Grace’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 




Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Grace’s? 





Vignette 1a: High effort, low score [Jennifer/John] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Jennifer. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Jennifer only 
took 5 minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Jennifer’s? 
(1 = Jennifer’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you were motivated, whereas Jennifer 
did not work hard on the problems because she was not motivated. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Jennifer’s? 
(1 = Jennifer’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Jennifer received a 
90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Jennifer’s? 
(1 = Jennifer’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 1b: High effort, low score [Sarah/Matt] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Sarah. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Sarah only 
took 7 minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Sarah’s? 
(1 = Sarah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you were motivated, whereas Sarah did 
not work hard on the problems because she was not motivated. 
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Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Sarah’s? 
(1 = Sarah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Sarah received a 90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Sarah’s? 
(1 = Sarah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much higher) 
 
Vignette 2a: High effort, high score [Rebecca/Ben] 
 
Imagine that were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Rebecca. The 
professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 minutes. 
You took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Rebecca only took 5 
minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Rebecca’s? 
(1 = Rebecca’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you were motivated, whereas Rebecca 
did not work hard on the problems because she was not motivated. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Rebecca’s? 
(1 = Rebecca’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Rebecca received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Rebecca’s? 
(1 = Rebecca’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 2b: High effort, high score [Emily/Samuel] 
 
Imagine that were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Emily. The 
professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 minutes. 
You took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems, whereas Emily only took 7 
minutes and did not work hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Emily’s? 
(1 = Emily’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you worked hard on the problems because you were motivated, whereas Emily did 
not work hard on the problems because she was not motivated. 
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Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Emily’s? 
(1 = Emily’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Emily received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Emily’s? 
(1 = Emily’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 3a: Low effort, low score [Hannah/Joe] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Hannah. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took only 5 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas Hannah 
took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Hannah’s? 
(1 = Hannah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you were not motivated, whereas 
Hannah worked hard on the problems because she was motivated. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Hannah’s? 
(1 = Hannah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Hannah received a 
90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Hannah’s? 
(1 = Hannah’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 3b: Low effort, low score [Stephanie/Adam] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Stephanie. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took only 7 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas 
Stephanie took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Stephanie’s? 




Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you were not motivated, whereas 
Stephanie worked hard on the problems because she was motivated. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Stephanie’s? 
(1 = Stephanie’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 70%, while Stephanie received a 
90%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Stephanie’s? 
(1 = Stephanie’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 4a: Low effort, high score [Christina/Jeff] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Calculus class next to another student, Christina. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 15 
minutes. You took only 5 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas 
Christina took the full 15 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Christina’s? 
(1 = Christina’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you were not motivated, whereas 
Christina worked hard on the problems because she was motivated. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Christina’s? 
(1 = Christina’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Christina received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Christina’s? 
(1 = Christina’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Vignette 4b: Low effort, high score [Grace/Ryan] 
 
Imagine that you were sitting in a college-level Statistics class next to another student, Grace. 
The professor gave everyone in the class a set of problems to work on individually for 20 
minutes. You took only 7 minutes and did not work very hard on the problems, whereas Grace 
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took the full 20 minutes and worked hard on the problems. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Grace’s? 
(1 = Grace’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Imagine that you did not work hard on the problems because you were not motivated, whereas 
Grace worked hard on the problems because she was motivated. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Grace’s? 
(1 = Grace’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
After class, the professor graded the problems. You received a 90%, while Grace received a 
70%. 
 
Based on this information, how would you evaluate your math ability compared to Grace’s? 
(1 = Grace’s ability is much higher; 5 = We have the same ability; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (Modified) 
 
Most people compare themselves from time to time with others. For example, they may compare 
the way they feel, their opinions, their abilities, and/or their situation with those of other people. 
There is nothing particularly ‘good’ or ‘bad’ about this type of comparison, and some people do 
it more than others. We would like to find out how often you compare yourself with other 
people. To do that we would like to ask you to indicate how much you agree with each statement 
below, by using the following scale. 
 
1. I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things. 
2. If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare what I have done with 
how others have done. 
3. I am not the type of person who compares myself often with others. (R) 
4. I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life. 
5. If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others think about it. 
6. I never consider my situation in life in relative to that of other people. (R) 
 
Scale: 1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly 
 
Additional Social Comparison Items 
 
1. I often compare myself to other students in my classes to determine how well I am doing 
academically. (1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
2. When I am uncertain of how well I am doing in a class, I try to figure out how well others 
are doing. (1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
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3. I like to have information about how well other students are doing in my classes. (1 = I 
disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
4. I frequently use information about how well other students are doing in my classes to 
figure out how well I am doing. (1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
5. In general how much information is available to you about how others are doing in your 
college classes? (1 = Very little, 5 = A lot) 
 
Theories of Intelligence Questionnaire 
 
Next, we are interested in your general beliefs about intelligence. There are no right or wrong 
answers. We are interested in your opinions. Please read each item carefully and rate the extent 
to which you agree or disagree with the item using the scale that appears below it. 
 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you really can’t do much to change it. 
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much. 
3. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level. 
4. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are. 
5. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. 
6. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence. 
7. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit. 




1. Please indicate your age: 
 
2. Please indicate your sex: 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
African-American, Black, African, Caribbean 
Asian-American, Asian, Pacific Islander 
European-American, Anglo, Caucasian 
Hispanic-American, Latino/a, Chicano/a 
Native American, American Indian 
Bi-racial, Multi-racial 
 
4. Which of these categories does your major best fit into? (Agriculture/Natural Resources; 
Architecture, Planning, and Preservation; Arts and Humanities; Behavioral and Social 
Sciences; Business; Computer, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences; Education; Engineering; 




Thank you for your participation in this study! 
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The purpose of this study is to examine whether undergraduate students’ thinking about their 
own effort (e.g., whether they believe it was driven by the task or initiated by their own 
motivation) influence how they evaluate their own academic ability in situations where they put 
forth high or low levels of effort. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two hypothetical 
vignette conditions. Half of the participants were told that high or low effort was caused by the 
subjective ease or difficulty of the task, whereas the other half of participants were told that high 
or low effort was caused by one’s own motivation or lack of motivation. We are curious to see 
whether these different cues about effort source influence whether students think about effort 
level as positively or negatively related to their ability. 
 
As part of this study, you completed a task in which you were asked to list US state capitals. This 
was simply a distractor task, and did not have anything to do with the main hypotheses of the 
study. 
 
Results from these studies can help researchers and educators better understand what types of 
effort information students use when forming self-evaluations of ability, which are important to 
students’ motivation and achievement in school. 
 
It is very important that other participants in this study come in without knowing exactly what 
we are studying so that their responses are completely honest. For this reason, please do not talk 
about this study with any of your classmates or friends who may participate in this study. Prior 
expectations may influence the findings unintentionally and thus make our efforts (and yours) 
potentially less useful and informative. 
 
If you have further questions, please direct your inquiries to Katherine Muenks 




Appendix B: Recipe Task, Manipulations, and Demographic Questions for Study 2 




Before we begin, please answer the following question. 
 
How would you evaluate your own mathematics ability? (Slider scale from 1-100; anchors are 
“very low” and “very high”) 
 
You will now be asked to complete a math task having to do with modifying recipes. This is the 
same task that another [female/male] undergraduate participant completed a few days ago. 
 
For this task, you will be provided with four different recipes. Each recipe will include a list of 
ingredients with specific quantities. You will then be asked to change those quantities, for 
example by doubling or halving the recipes, without using a calculator. Please reduce the 
fraction to its simplest form. For all fractions greater than 1, you will need to provide your 





Task-elicited condition: A lot of people work hard on this task because it is difficult. 
Self-initiated condition: A lot of people work hard on this task because they feel motivated to 
complete it. 
Control condition: A lot of people work hard on this task. 
 
Please complete this task in one sitting, without stopping. You may use a pen and paper, but 
please do NOT use a calculator. 
 
Click “Continue” to begin. 
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Recipe #1: Chocolate chip cookies [ADD PHOTO] 
 
This recipe calls for 12 servings, and you would like to make 4 servings. Please calculate new 
quantities for all of the ingredients given this change. It is very important that all of the 
ingredients are calculated correctly. Please note that some fractions may be unusual. 
 
Please reduce the fraction to its simplest form. For any fractions greater than 1, provide the new 
quantities for the ingredients as mixed numbers (e.g., 1 ¼), rather than improper fractions (e.g., 
5/4) or decimals (e.g., 1.25). Provide answers in the same ingredient units (e.g., cups, 
tablespoons, etc.) as the original recipe calls for. In your answer, write both the fraction and 
ingredient unit. 
 
Please write the new quantities in the spaces below the original quantities. When you are done, 
click “Continue.” Once you click “Continue”, you will not be able to go back. 
 
2 ¼ cups all-purpose flour 
1 ¼ teaspoon baking soda 
1 teaspoon salt 
¾ teaspoon vanilla extract 
2 1/3 cups butter 
2/3  cup granulated sugar 
3/5 cup packed brown sugar 
3 large eggs 
2 ½ cups semi-sweet chocolate chip morsels 
1 cup chopped nuts 
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Recipe #2: Chicken meatballs [ADD PHOTO] 
 
This recipe calls for 12 servings, and you would like to make 3 servings. Please calculate new 
quantities for all of the ingredients given this change. It is very important that all of the 
ingredients are calculated correctly. Please note that some fractions may be unusual. 
 
Please reduce the fraction to its simplest form. For any fractions greater than 1, provide the new 
quantities for the ingredients as mixed numbers (e.g., 1 ¼), rather than improper fractions (e.g., 
5/4) or decimals (e.g., 1.25). Provide answers in the same ingredient units (e.g., cups, 
tablespoons, etc.) as the original recipe calls for. In your answer, write both the fraction and 
ingredient unit. 
 
Please write the new quantities in the spaces below the original quantities. When you are done, 
click “Continue.” Once you click “Continue”, you will not be able to go back. 
 
¾ pound boneless, skinless chicken breasts 
2 bacon strips 
3 ½ slices sandwich bread 
2 3/4 teaspoons chili powder 
½ teaspoon cayenne pepper 
2/3 teaspoon kosher salt 
¼ cup whole milk 
1 large egg, lightly beaten 
5/6 small onion, finely chopped 
2 4/7 garlic cloves 
1/3 cup grated Parmesan cheese 
3/5 cup vegetable oil 
3 oz fresh flat-leaf parsley 
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Recipe #3: Three-bean chili [ADD PHOTO] 
 
This recipe calls for 24 servings, and you would like to make 4 servings. Please calculate new 
quantities for all of the ingredients given this change. It is very important that all of the 
ingredients are calculated correctly. Please note that some fractions may be unusual. 
 
Please reduce the fraction to its simplest form. For any fractions greater than 1, provide the new 
quantities for the ingredients as mixed numbers (e.g., 1 ¼), rather than improper fractions (e.g., 
5/4) or decimals (e.g., 1.25). Provide answers in the same ingredient units (e.g., cups, 
tablespoons, etc.) as the original recipe calls for. In your answer, write both the fraction and 
ingredient unit. 
 
Please write the new quantities in the spaces below the original quantities. When you are done, 
click “Continue.” Once you click “Continue”, you will not be able to go back. 
 
1 3/4 tablespoon olive oil 
1 2/3 medium onion, chopped 
2 peppers, finely chopped 
3 3/4 cloves garlic, minced 
1 7/8 tablespoons chili powder 
2 1/5 teaspoons ground cumin 
1 teaspoon dried oregano 
4 ½ teaspoons kosher salt 
14 oz. beer 
28 oz. crushed tomatoes 
1 ½ cups mixed dried beans 
3 1/4 cups water 
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Recipe #4: Onion rolls [ADD PHOTO] 
 
This recipe calls for 12 servings, and you would like to make 24 servings. Please calculate new 
quantities for all of the ingredients given this change. It is very important that all of the 
ingredients are calculated correctly. Please note that some fractions may be unusual. 
 
Please reduce the fraction to its simplest form. For any fractions greater than 1, provide the new 
quantities for the ingredients as mixed numbers (e.g., 1 ¼), rather than improper fractions (e.g., 
5/4) or decimals (e.g., 1.25). Provide answers in the same ingredient units (e.g., cups, 
tablespoons, etc.) as the original recipe calls for. In your answer, write both the fraction and 
ingredient unit. 
 
Please write the new quantities in the spaces below the original quantities. When you are done, 
click “Continue.” Once you click “Continue”, you will not be able to go back. 
 
3/5 cup milk 
5 2/3 tablespoons water 
3 1/3 tablespoons butter, softened 
1 ½ teaspoons salt 
3 tablespoons white sugar 
1 1/8 teaspoon onion powder 
3 3/4 tablespoons dried minced onion 
¼ cup instant potato flakes 
2 2/7 cups all-purpose flour 
¼ oz. yeast 
1 egg white 
4/5 tablespoon water 
6/7 cup dried minced onion 
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On a scale from 1 to 10, how much effort did you feel that you exerted on this task? (1 = very 
little effort at all, 10 = a great deal of effort) 
 




Now, please reflect on the recipe task that you just completed by responding to some open-
ended questions about the task. Please respond to each question using at least two sentences. 
There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your opinions. 
 
1. In general, why was this task difficult OR easy?  
2. What specific aspects of the task were most difficult? 
3. What specific aspects of the task were easiest? 
4. What would have made this task easier? 




Now, please reflect on the recipe task that you just completed by responding to some open-
ended questions about the task. Please respond to each question using at least two sentences. 
There are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in your opinions. 
 
1. In general, why were you motivated OR not motivated to complete this task? 
2. What, specifically, increased your motivation during the task? 
3. What, specifically, decreased your motivation during the task? 
1. What would have made you less motivated during the task? 






Level of Effort Manipulation 
 
Now, I want you to compare your ability to the other [female/male] undergraduate participant 
who completed the task a few days ago. But first, I want to give you some information about that 
participant’s effort.  
 
The other participant finished the task approximately 5 minutes [slower/faster] than you.  
 
You indicated the level of your effort as a ___, and the other participant indicated [his/her] level 
of effort as a ___. [3 points higher/lower] 
 
More effort condition: 
If they said 1, the other person said 1 (Distance = 0) 
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If they said 2, the other person said 1 (Distance = 1) 
If they said 3, the other person said 1 (Distance = 2) 
If they said 4, the other person said 1 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 5, the other person said 2 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 6, the other person said 3 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 7, the other person said 4 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 8, the other person said 5 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 9, the other person said 6 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 10, the other person said 7 (Distance = 3) 
 
Less effort condition: 
If they said 1, the other person said 4 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 2, the other person said 5 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 3, the other person said 6 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 4, the other person said 7 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 5, the other person said 8 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 6, the other person said 9 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 7, the other person said 10 (Distance = 3) 
If they said 8, the other person said 10 (Distance = 2) 
If they said 9, the other person said 10 (Distance = 1) 
If they said 10, the other person said 10 (Distance = 0) 
 
NOTE: Will try to equalize effort distance so that it is always 3. However, if some participants 
respond on the extremes of the scale (and thus the distance will need to be less than 3), I will 
create an “Effort Distance” variable and control for it by using it as a covariate. 
 
Ratings of ability 
 
• Please evaluate your own ability on this specific fraction task compared to the other 
participant’s. (1 = [His/her] ability is much higher; 5 = Our abilities are the same; 9 = My 
ability is much higher) 
• Please evaluate your own general fraction ability compared to the other participant’s. (1 = 
[His/her] ability is much higher; 5 = Our abilities are the same; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
• Please evaluate your own general math ability compared to the other participant’s. (1 = 
[His/her] ability is much higher; 5 = Our abilities are the same; 9 = My ability is much 
higher) 
 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (Modified) 
 
Most people compare themselves from time to time with others. For example, they may compare 
the way they feel, their opinions, their abilities, and/or their situation with those of other people. 
There is nothing particularly ‘good’ or ‘bad’ about this type of comparison, and some people do 
it more than others. We would like to find out how often you compare yourself with other 
people. To do that we would like to ask you to indicate how much you agree with each statement 
below, by using the following scale. 
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1. I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things. 
2. If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare what I have done with 
how others have done. 
3. I am not the type of person who compares often with others. (R) 
4. I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life. 
5. If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others think about it. 
6. I never consider my situation in life in relative to that of other people. (R) 
 
Scale: 1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly 
 
Additional Social Comparison Items 
 
1. I often compare myself to other students in my classes to determine how well I am doing 
academically. (1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
2. When I am uncertain of how well I am doing in a class, I try to figure out how well others 
are doing. (1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
3. I like to have information about how well other students are doing in my classes. (1 = I 
disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
4. I frequently use information about how well other students are doing in my classes to 
figure out how well I am doing. (1 = I disagree strongly, 5 = I agree strongly) 
5. In general how much information is available to you about how others are doing in your 
college classes? (1 = Very little, 5 = A lot) 
 
Theories of Intelligence Questionnaire 
 
Next, we are interested in your general beliefs about intelligence. There are no right or wrong 
answers. We are interested in your opinions. Please read each item carefully and rate the extent 
to which you agree or disagree with the item using the scale that appears below it. 
 
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you really can’t do much to change it. 
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much. 
3. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level. 
4. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are. 
5. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. 
6. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence. 
7. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit. 




1. Please indicate your age: 
 
2. Please indicate your sex: 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity: 
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African-American, Black, African, Caribbean 
Asian-American, Asian, Pacific Islander 
European-American, Anglo, Caucasian 
Hispanic-American, Latino/a, Chicano/a 
Native American, American Indian 
Bi-racial, Multi-racial 
 
4. Which of these categories does your major best fit into? (Agriculture/Natural Resources; 
Architecture, Planning, and Preservation; Arts and Humanities; Behavioral and Social Sciences; 
Business; Computer, Mathematical, and Natural Sciences; Education; Engineering; Journalism; 




Thank you for your participation in this study! 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether undergraduate students’ thinking about their 
own effort influence how they evaluate their academic ability in situations where they put forth 
high or low levels of effort. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three “effort source” 
conditions: The “task-elicited” condition (where they were led to believe their effort on the task 
was driven by the demands of the task), the “self-initiated” condition (where they were led to 
believe their effort was driven by their own motivation), or the “control” condition (where they 
were not given any information about the source of their effort). Participants were also assigned 
to one of two “effort level” conditions: The “high effort” condition (where they were told they 
exerted more effort than another participant) or the “low effort” condition (where they were told 
they exerted less effort than another participant). 
 
As part of this study, we told you that another participant had previously completed the task and 
that he or she had exerted either more or less effort than you did on the task. There was really no 
“other” participant. This was part of the manipulation. We apologize for the deception. However, 
we felt that this was the best way to examine how your ability evaluations changed based on 
information you received about the level of your effort on the task as compared to another 
student. 
 
We are interested in examining whether participants’ perceptions of the source of their own 
effort influenced whether they conceived of a positive or an inverse relation between levels of 
their effort and ability. Results from these studies can help researchers and educators better 
understand what types of effort information students use when forming self-evaluations of 
ability, which are important to students’ motivation and achievement. 
 
So, that’s a basic description of what the study is about. It is very important that other 
participants in this study come in without knowing exactly what we are studying so that their 
responses are completely honest. For this reason, please do not talk about this study with any of 
your classmates or friends who may participate in this study. Prior expectations may influence 




If you have further questions, please direct your inquiries to Katherine Muenks 
(kmuenks@umd.edu). Thank you again for your participation!  
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Appendix C: Additional tables 
 
Table 2 
Means and standard errors for effort source x effort level x ability evaluation order three-way 
interaction in Study 1 
 
  Task-elicited Self-initiated 
  M SE M SE 
Low effort Evaluation 1 6.30 0.13 5.64 0.13 
 Evaluation 2 7.04 0.12 4.61 0.12 
 Evaluation 3 5.77 0.08 5.58 0.08 
High effort Evaluation 1 4.06 0.14 4.64 0.14 
 Evaluation 2 3.29 0.13 5.74 0.13 
 Evaluation 3 4.62 0.08 4.81 0.08 
Note. SE = standard error. There were four covariates included: students’ initial beliefs about 
their mathematics ability, social comparison orientation, amount of social comparison 
information available to them in general, and theories of intelligence.  
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Table 3 
Means and standard errors for effort source x effort level interaction for specific fraction task 
ability in Study 2 
 
 Task-elicited Control Self-initiated 
 M SE M SE M SE 
Low effort 5.42 0.38 6.05 0.33 6.31 0.34 
High effort 5.12 0.34 3.66 0.32 4.14 0.34 
Note. SE = standard error. There were five covariates included: effort distance, students’ initial 
beliefs about math ability, students’ social comparison orientation, social comparison 
information available, and theories of intelligence.  
 168 
Table 4 
Means and standard errors for effort source x effort level interaction for fraction ability in Study 
2 
 Task-elicited Control Self-initiated 
 M SE M SE M SE 
Low effort 5.46 0.32 5.84 0.28 6.22 0.29 
High effort 4.93 0.28 4.37 0.27 4.64 0.28 
Note. SE = standard error. There were five covariates included: effort distance, students’ initial 
beliefs about math ability, students’ social comparison orientation, social comparison 
information available, and theories of intelligence.  
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Table 5 
Means and standard errors for effort source x effort level interaction for math ability in Study 2 
 Task-elicited Control Self-initiated 
 M SE M SE M SE 
Low effort 5.64 0.37 5.95 0.32 6.23 0.33 
High effort 5.30 0.33 4.09 0.32 4.30 0.33 
Note. SE = standard error. There were five covariates included: effort distance, students’ initial 
beliefs about math ability, students’ social comparison orientation, social comparison 
information available, and theories of intelligence.  
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